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Abstract 
Through use of rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural theory, this study of IMF Low 
Income Country (LIC) policy change from 1996 to 2010 identifies potential causal variables and 
mechanisms that drive contemporary reform in the institution toward its poorest member states. 
Patterns uncovered through principal-agent analysis suggest that coalition formation between at least 
two actors is a necessary condition for LIC policy reform. Principal-agent analysis also establishes 
that discontinuity among powerful states gives IMF management and staff greater openings to 
initiate or block reform efforts. Constructivist analysis assesses if shifts in thinking among IMF 
insiders and the broader epistemic community of development economists have causal effect on LIC 
policy reform. Evidence gathered through process tracing methods shows that reform occurred after 
economic ideas that underwrote previous policy positions lost legitimacy among influential elites 
within and outside the IMF. Thus while IMF staff self -identify as rational technocrats, they are also 
driven by concerns of pursuing what the broader elite community deems as appropriate policy 
choices. When the boundaries of appropriateness change, we can expect reforms that are consistent 
with new frames of acceptable policy choices to emerge.  
Stepping outside of mainstream IR theory, historical structural analysis of IMF reform focuses on 
the interrelation of contemporary capitalist crisis, hegemony, and “inclusive neoliberal” development 
models. Here, the IMF is understood to hold a central role in the creation and perpetuation of the 
current geopolitical order underwritten by globalizing capitalism. Recent IMF LIC reforms that 
champion more participation, flexibility, and a nod toward Keynesian practices thus are seen as one 
component of a broader political project pushed by global elites to undermine potential challenges to 
the contemporary world order. Evidence gathered through discourse analysis and interviews shows 
    
that IMF staff and management were cognizant of growing resistance to Washington Consensus 
reforms and embraced less coercive and more participatory means to increase LIC buy in into 
concessionary lending programs. The scope and character of contemporary IMF reforms paralleled 
similar calls for rethinking how to ‘do’ development among global elites. This suggests that a 
component of IMF policy response in LICs is tied to a broader political project focused on building a 
more inclusive and hegemonic form of globalizing capitalism. 
The juxtaposition of three theoretical frameworks to examine the same phenomenon also provides a 
platform to evaluate current IR theory focused on IMF reform. Rationalist and positivist oriented 
constructivist approaches provide clear analytical roadmaps to cut through the complex dynamics 
found in the IMF, identify potential causal variables and mechanisms, and develop testable 
predictive hypotheses related to institutional reform. However, if studies of IMF LIC reform rely 
solely on current mainstream frameworks, explanation and analysis of how Fund policy change is 
interrelated with shifts and tensions in capitalist social structures and the power relations therein 
remain unexamined. This proves particularly critical when exploring why certain ideas considered 
market distorting remained off limits in contemporary IMF debates and how post Washington 
Consensus reforms reflect attempts by global elites to manage crisis points in the contemporary 
historical structure. In conclusion, I assess the merits of IMF research open to the use of positivist 
and historical relational paradigms. Such an approach will not produce one correct answer and 
suffers at some level from divergent baseline understandings of the social world. However, I 
maintain that despite this tension, the complexity of that world and processes of change within it 
merit space for mainstream and critical ontologies. Future studies of the IMF should explore more 
fully how diverse paths of inquiry can be effectively used to explain policy reform. 
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Chapter 1- The IMF, LIC Reform, and the post Washington Consensus 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF/Fund) is “back in business.”
1
 Dismissed as incompetent or 
increasingly irrelevant following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, fallout from the 2008 global 
economic crisis has restored the Fund’s prestige and policy influence across the globe. In the five year 
period since the crisis, the IMF has boosted its lending capacity by $456 billion and lent out 
approximately $75 billion annually to its member states.
2
 This stands in stark contrast to its pre-crisis 
total lending portfolio in 2007 of $10 billion.
3
 Along with greater lending activity, the Fund has taken 
on a leading role in the coordination of multilateral policy response to the aftershocks of the 2008 
crisis, particularly in its work with the G-20 and European Union.
4
    
This rebirth of the IMF in the post-2008 period includes another notable trend that serves as the point 
of departure for this project. After several decades of involvement in low income countries (LICs),
5
 
the IMF has substantially increased resources and institutional focus on its poorest member states. 
Financing available for LIC concessional lending has doubled to $17 billion since 2008 while lending 
to LICs from 2008 to 2012 totaled over $13.6 billion. This level of lending in annual terms is four 
                                                 
1
 Current IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde made the following observation when serving as French Finance 
Minister in 2009: “The major thing that happened is that the IMF is back in business. Only two years ago, people were 
wondering whether the IMF was still serving a purpose. Now the IMF is busy with all sorts of things including its 
traditional mandate, which has to do with financing those countries that are really in trouble.” 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/26/lagarde-imf-economy-business-washington-monetary-fund.htm 
2
 IMF, “IMF’s Response to the Global Economic Crisis”, 19 September 2013, available at   
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/changing.htm (accessed 5 October 2013). 
3
 For an overview of the pre-2008 diminished significance of the IMF, see Eric Helleiner and Bessma Momani, “Slipping 
Into Obscurity: Crisis and Institutional Reform as the IMF,” in Can the World Be Governed? Possibilities for Effective 
Multilateralism, ed. Alan Alexandroff (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2008), pp. 353-388. 
4
 At the 2009 G-20 summit, member states requested that the IMF coordinate the so-called Mutual Assessment Process 
(MAP). The MAP is designed to “identify objectives for the global economy, the policies needed to reach them, and the 
progress toward meeting these shared objectives.” Since 2009, the Fund has presented an annual MAP report at the G-20 
meetings. See IMF, “The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP)”, 26 September 2013, available at   
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (accessed 7 October 2013). 
5
 As of 2013, the Fund recognized 72 of its members as low income countries. The IMF defines LICs as states that have 
GNI/capita levels that qualify them for World Bank concessional lending ( up to $1175/capita). 
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times the Fund’s historical average.
6
 Technical assistance programs, forums focused on LIC issues, 
and institutional outreach to LIC stakeholders also have expanded since the 2008 crisis.
7
  
As is well documented, IMF policy choices impact development outcomes for a significant percentage 
of the world’s poorest people.
8
 Conditionality requirements tied to IMF loans to LICs include 
monetary and fiscal policy requirements and economic restructuring mandates that impact growth and 
poverty rates, education and health outcomes, environmental quality, and employment levels.
9
 Fund 
technical support also impacts patterns of growth and economic redistribution. 
10
 Less well understood 
are dynamics that drive the formation of IMF LIC policy and episodes of reform. Given the recent 
increase of Fund resources and institutional attention toward LICs, addressing this gap in the literature 
is critical for policy makers and activists focused on shaping contemporary IMF policy direction and 
subsequent twenty first century development outcomes in poor states. 
Several recent studies of the IMF have identified key actors involved in individual cases of LIC policy 
change that occurred in the 1990s. Kathryn Lavelle uncovered evidence that the U.S. Congress pushed 
the Fund to deepen its commitment to debt relief in processes leading up to the 1999 “enhanced” 
                                                 
6
 See IMF, “Financing the Fund’s Concessional Lending to Low-Income Countries,” 13  May 2013, available at   
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/concesslending.htm (accessed 7 October 2013).  
7
 For an overview of LIC programs at the IMF and how these have become more ‘front and center’ in the IMF’s agenda, 
see the recently launched Fund website on LICs at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/key/lic.htm. 
8
 As of 2012, approximately 847 million people live in LICs that participate in IMF and World Bank programs. See 
http://data.worldbank.org/income-level/LIC. 
9
 Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 
2006), pp. 141-178;  Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 45-72;  Ian Taylor, “Hegemony, Neoliberal ‘Good Governance’ and 
the International Monetary Fund: a Gramscian Perspective,” in Global Institutions & Development: Framing the World?, 
eds Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.124-136. 
10 Axel Dreher, “IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality,” 
World Development, 34, no.5 (2006), pp.769-788; James Boughton and Domenico Lombardi, “The Role of the IMF in 
Low-Income Countries,” in Finance, Development, and the IMF, eds. James Boughton and Domenico Lombardi  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 3-11; Graham Bird, IMF Lending in Developing Countries: Issues and Evidence 
(London: Routledge, 1995) ; James Vreeland, The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending (New 
York: Routledge, 2007). 
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Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative.
11
 Antje Vetterlein traced how the IMF’s Executive Board 
responded to broad external criticism of conditionality requirements and pushed the institution to 
approve the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper framework in 1999.
12
 Along with the Executive Board, 
there is evidence that suggests Fund staff and management played an integral role in past cases of LIC 
policy reform. IMF adoption of the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative in 1996, for example, was 
strongly influenced by senior staff members and then Managing Director Michel Camdessus.
13
 André 
Broome also established that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) successfully reframed LIC debt 
relief as a moral issue in the 1990s, and in so doing, helped catalyse Fund reform.
14
  
These investigations are an important first step as variables tied to individual episodes of IMF LIC 
change are identified. No comparative analysis across cases of LIC reform, however, has been 
undertaken. This limits understanding in several key areas. Can we observe, for example, any pattern 
of policy actors and conditions that promote or block IMF LIC change? Does the evidence from past 
cases of LIC policy reform point to any recognisable threshold conditions that must be met for reform 
to occur? Can we discern any generalizable patterns in these cases that can be used to predict future 
cases of IMF LIC policy change? Are these episodes of LIC reform reflective of deeper or broader 
shifting power dynamics and social forces in the early 21
st
 century? And if so, what are the primary 
components of these structural changes that drive post Washington Consensus LIC policy and reform? 
Contemporary scholarship focused on the Fund also has not engaged with the most recent case of LIC 
                                                 
11
 Kathryn Lavelle, Legislating International Organization: The US Congress, the IMF, and the World Bank (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
12
 Antje Vetterlein, “Lacking Ownership: The IMF and its Engagement with Social Development as a Policy Norm,” in 
Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank, eds. Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.93-112.  
13
Bessma Momani, “Internal or External Norm Champions: The IMF and Multilateral Debt Relief,” in Owning 
Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank, eds. Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 29-47.  
14
André Broome, “When do NGOs Matter? Activist Organizations as a Source of Change in the International Debt 
Regime,” Global Society 23, no.1 (2009), pp.59-78. 
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reform that replaced the concessionary Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in 2010. How did the 
processes that facilitated this policy shift following the 2008 global financial crisis compare with LIC 
reforms that occurred in the late 1990s? Inclusion of evidence drawn from this case is crucial, as it 
updates understanding of early 21
st
 century LIC policy dynamics in the IMF and broader development 
outcomes.  
 
Four major cases of IMF LIC reform occurred between 1996 and 2010 (see Figure 1.1 below).
15
    
Figure 1.1:  Four Cases of post-Washington Consensus IMF LIC Reform (1996-2010) 
  
Title of Reform       Year  Policy Change?` 
Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC)   1996  -Limited debt relief for LICs 
           
Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC II)  1999  -Replaced HIPC 
          -Introduces PRSPs 
 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)   1999  -Replaced SAF & 
           ESAF   
 
Extended Credit Facility (ECF)     2010  -Replaced PRGF   
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) 
Stand-By Credit Facility (SCF) 
 
The 1996 Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) introduced a series of policies designed to 
lower debt burdens of LICs. It also marked the first formal recognition by the institution that a decade 
and a half of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) instituted after the 1982 Mexican debt crisis failed 
to adequately address issues of severe poverty and poor economic performance in LICs. In 1999, the 
HIPC was replaced with the HIPC II. HIPC II called for significant debt forgiveness and support of 
                                                 
15
 This project thus consciously selects on the dependent variable (LIC policy change). As outlined by Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett, doing so is appropriate in early stages of research focused on identifying potential variables and 
mechanisms that impact the dependent variable in question: “Cases selected on the dependent variable…can help identify 
which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome. In addition, in the early stages of a 
research program, selection on the dependent variable can serve the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal 
paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest. Later, the resulting causal model can be tested against 
cases in which there is variation in the dependent variable.” See Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Study and 
Theoretical Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), pp.23-24. 
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“pro-poor” growth strategies. This was organized through the introduction of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). PRSPs, still in use today, are individualized plans that spell out how the 
recipient LIC in question will use resources from the IMF (and World Bank) to reduce poverty in 
accordance with the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.
16
  
1999 also witnessed the replacement of the major concessionary lending facilities for LICs.
17
 The 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), adopted 
in 1986 and 1987 respectively, were replaced with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF). Both the SAF and ESAF were controversial in that conditionality requirements included a 
three part policy cocktail of anti-inflationary stabilization, liberal market structural adjustment, and 
moves toward export-led growth that produced short term economic retraction and social upheaval in 
many poor states.
18
 The PRGF, in contrast, embraced a more diverse policy response and also 
prioritized poverty reduction as an essential component of successful development strategy. As with 
the HIPC II, the PRGF required that recipient states develop a PRSP to ensure a focus on poverty 
reduction and ownership of policy decisions by various stakeholders in LICs. 
2009-2010 saw the fourth major contemporary shift in Fund policy toward LICs. The PRGF was 
replaced with the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), along with the creation of the Rapid Credit Facility 
(RCF) and Stand-by Credit Facility (SCF). Loans under these initiatives are both highly concessional 
and contain more flexible conditional requirements than the previous PRGF. Most notably, monetary 
and fiscal policy conditions tied to ECF/RCF/SCF loans suggest a shift among IMF LIC policy makers 
                                                 
16
 The success of these efforts led to further calls for debt reduction. In 2005, the G-8 proposed that the IMF, Bank, and 
African Development Fund cancel 100 percent of multilateral debt claims of states that had reached HIPC II completion 
points. Under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), the Fund formed two trusts (MRDI-I and MDRI-II) to pay off 
the full stock of debt owed to the IMF for loans disbursed prior to 2005. 
17
 Loans that have a grant element equal to 35 percent are considered concessional. 
18
 As discussed in chapter 5, Latin America experienced an upsurge in social movements and protests in the 1980s and 
1990s that focused on IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies.  
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toward more Keynesian practices. ECF programs, for example, advocate countercyclical fiscal and 
monetary stimulus during economic downturn and an increase in inflationary target rates and “pro 
poor” spending.
19
  This position stands in stark contrast to nearly three decades of policy that 
prioritized price stability and advocated pro-cyclical austerity during recessionary periods. 
 IMF and LICs in the post Washington Consensus 
These four cases of IMF LIC reform fall within what is described by development scholars as the 
current “post Washington Consensus” period. This term captures in broad terms a rejection of the   
Washington Consensus paradigm that heavily influenced IMF and the World Bank policies from the 
early 1980s to the late 1990s.
20
 Supporters of the Washington Consensus maintained that price 
stability, privatization, and liberalization were the best strategy for poor states to successfully grow 
and integrate into the emerging global economy.
21
 Specific to the IMF and LICs, this translated into 
conditionality requirements in SAF and ESAF loans focused on dismantling the remnants of state-
centered Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategies highly popular in developing capitalist 
states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia between the 1930s and 1980s.
22
    
                                                 
 
19
IMF, “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy,” Staff Position Note SM/10/03, 12 February 2010 available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1003.pdf  (accessed 10 March 2011).  
20
 John Williamson, an economist at the Peterson Institute in Washington D.C., coined the term “Washington Consensus” 
in 1989. In its original context, the Washington Consensus was a description of what Williamson saw as the broad based 
consensus among “the political Washington of Congress and senior members of the administration and the technocratic 
Washington of the international financial institutions, the economic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve 
Board, and the think tanks” around appropriate reforms needed in Latin American economies at the time. Williamson 
argues that the popular use of “Washington Consensus” that emerged in the 1990s equated the term with market 
fundamentalism and misrepresented his original meaning. He maintains, for example, that his conception of the 
Washington Consensus did not support carte blanche deregulation and privatization. Williamson also notes that he was 
staunchly opposed to capital account liberalization pushed by the IMF until the late 1990s. See John Williamson, “A Short 
History of the Washington Consensus,” in The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, 
eds. Narcis Serra and Joseph Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 14-30.  
21
Woods, The Globalizers, pp. 146-153. 
22
 Proponents of ISI argued that developing states heavily involved in primary exports would see long-term decline in 
demand and price for their products compared to manufactured goods. ISI policies therefore focused on industrializing 
poor states through a series of measures that included: (1) Tariffs and quotas on imported consumer goods and overvalued 
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Facilitated in part by growing evidence that Washington Consensus reforms failed to produce expected 
growth outcomes in poor states and the Asian crisis, the late 1990s witnessed broad based challenges 
to the development policies pushed by the IMF and World Bank. Along with powerful political and 
institutional leaders including Kofi Annan and World Bank President John Wolfensohn, an 
ideologically diverse group of economists ranging from Joseph Stiglitz to free market advocate 
Jagdish Bhagwati
23
 criticized the Washington Consensus model.
24
 At the eve of the 2008 crisis, 
Stiglitz summed up the post-Washington Consensus thinking that emerged as follows:  It rejects 
development models that advocate a minimal role of the state and carte blanche privatization and 
liberalization; it highlights the importance of effective market and state institutions; it emphasizes the 
importance of addressing poverty; it stresses diversity in policy response rather than a “one size fits 
all” development paradigm.
25
   
As explored in the chapters below, these themes were prominently reflected in HIPC, HIPC II, and 
PRGF reform efforts. In addition, policy debates around the relationship between inequality and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
exchange rates to stimulate internal consumer demand for infant industries while allowing manufactures to import 
materials needed for production, (2)  High investment by the state in infrastructure required by industry (roads, water, 
electricity), (3) Nationalization of key industries (oil, utilities) and/or creation of state-private consortiums, and  (4) 
Support of urban workforce through price controls and subsidizing basics including food. As developed further in chapter 
5, there was broad consensus within the IMF in the 1980s that ISI policies were the main cause of balance payment 
difficulties, economic inefficiency, and corruption seen in much of the developing world at the time. 
23
 While Bhagwati is a staunch advocate of multilateral free trade, he is equally adamant in his critique of carte blanche 
financial liberalization and the IMF’s role in pushing for elimination of capital controls in the 1990s. For clarification of 
these two positions, see chapter 13 in Jagdish Bhagwati’s In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004). Here, Bhagwati argues that the Asian crisis was caused by “hasty and imprudent financial liberalization” 
underwritten by “gung-ho international financial capitalism” pushed by the “Wall-Street Treasury Complex.” He describes 
the Wall Street- Treasury Complex as follows: “This is a loose but still fairly coherent group of Wall Street firms in New 
York and the political elite in Washington, the latter embracing not just Treasury but also the State Department, the IMF, 
the World Bank, and so on.” He made similar arguments in a 1998 publication in Foreign Affairs. See Jagdish Bhagwati, 
“The Capital Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars,” Foreign Affairs 77, no.3(1998), pp.7-12. 
24
 The term ‘post-Washington Consensus’ was first used by then Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank 
Joseph Stiglitz in a 1998 speech outlining his critique of  the “market fundamentalism” of the Washington Consensus. See 
Joseph Stiglitz, “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post Washington Consensus.” The WIDER 
Annual Lecture, Helsinki, 7 January 1998.  
25
 Joseph Stiglitz, “Is there a Post Washington Consensus Consensus?,”  in The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: 
Towards a New Global Governance, eds. Narcis Serra and Joseph Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 31-
56 at pp.53-54.  
     
8 
 
growth in LICs have emerged within the IMF. This is perhaps best exemplified by the institutional 
signals sent by the Fund in the September 2011 issue of Finance and Development devoted 
exclusively to the subject.
26
 Here, prominent Washington Consensus critic and former World Bank 
economist Branko Milanovic penned the lead article that highlighted the positive role states can play 
in reducing inequality and improving economic growth.
27
  In the same issue, senior staff in the Fund’s 
influential Research Department also argued that policy makers rethink the notion that inequality is 
good for growth and address severe and prolonged inequality as a necessary prerequisite for sustained 
development in LICs.
28
   
Fallout from the 2008 crisis has introduced an additional dimension to the post Washington Consensus 
period that is linked to IMF LIC reform. As developed in detail in chapters 4 and 5, the crisis 
facilitated a reassessment of three decades of monetary and fiscal policy that prioritized price stability 
over all other macroeconomic outcomes. Within the Fund, this rethinking of monetary and fiscal 
policy response was first initiated by former Managing Director Dominique Strauss Kahn (2007-2011) 
and current chief economist Oliver Blanchard.
29
 What emerged from what Strauss Kahn described as a 
“crisis of macroeconomics” are new IMF policy positions supportive of countercyclical fiscal 
response, higher inflationary targets, and automatic fiscal stabilizers in LICs. These policies were first 
formally integrated into LIC initiatives when the PRGF was replaced by the ECF/RCF/SCF lending 
framework.  
                                                 
26
 Finance and Development is the quarterly publication of the IMF and is self-described as “publishing analysis of issues 
related to the international financial system, monetary policy, economic development, poverty reduction, and other world 
economic issues.” 
27
 Branko Milanovic, “More or Less: Income inequality has risen over the past quarter-century instead of falling as 
expected,” Finance and Development 48, no.3 (2011), pp. 6-12.  
28
 Andrew Berg and Jonathan Ostry, “Equality and Efficiency: Is there a trade-off between the two or do they go hand in 
hand?,” Finance and Development 48, no.3 (2011), pp. 12-15. 
29
 See Dominique Strauss Kahn, “Opening Remarks: Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis,” Washington, 
D.C., 7 March 2011, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/030711.htm (accessed 10 April 2012).;   
and IMF “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”.  
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In sum, the post Washington Consensus period is characterized by a broad based rethinking of the 
relationship between states, markets, macroeconomic policy, and development. As described by Dani 
Rodrik and supported by evidence in this project, rejection of the Washington Consensus has been 
replaced by a diverse range of arguments on how best the IMF and World Bank should in fact “do” 
development.
30
 The current flux of the post Washington Consensus period therefore represents a 
critical juncture in the relationship between the IMF, development, and 21
st
 century outcomes in the 
world’s poorest states. Clarification of how and why the IMF has shifted positions in the recent past 
therefore is particularly pertinent for those interested in strategically pursuing future reform efforts and 
development policy trajectories in the global South. 
Theoretical Approaches to IMF LIC Reforms  
This study of post Washington Consensus IMF policy reforms also presents an opportunity to evaluate 
strengths and weaknesses of theoretical frameworks focused on episodes of change in International 
Organizations (IOs). In chapters 3-5, I apply three distinct theoretical frameworks and their 
corresponding research methods to examine the same phenomenon of post-Washington Consensus 
IMF LIC change. Two mainstream frameworks divided along ontological lines of rationalism and 
constructivism currently predominate the literature of IO change. In chapter 3, I examine post 
Washington Consensus LIC change through the theoretical framework and methods currently used by 
rationalist inspired approaches. Here, I utilize principal-agent (PA) modeling to examine the external 
conditions that shape if and when the IMF (agent) has greater autonomy in development policies 
                                                 
30
See Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s 
Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature 44, no.4 (2006), 
pp.973-987. 
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primarily vis-à-vis the dynamics of member states (principals).
31  
PA models make the following 
predictions:  IMF policies should most directly reflect the preferences of the most powerful member 
states when preferences of these states are relatively homogenous and information asymmetry between 
states and the Fund is low. In the absence of these conditions, Fund management and staff are more 
likely to pursue an independent agenda but will not generally enact policy choices or reforms that 
would invite greater oversight and intervention by member governments. PA models focused on the 
IMF and World Bank also integrate the concept of delegation chains into their predictive models. The 
Fund is most likely to respond to demands for change from its most proximate principals (states) 
rather than distal principals (voters, NGOs).
32
 
 
Rationalist scholars focused on IOs also have recently integrated components of sociological 
organizational (SO) theory to complement PA models.
33
 SO theory assumes that institutions have their 
own unique organizational culture that impacts policy choices and processes of reform. Internal and 
external studies focused on the Fund’s organizational culture describe the institution as rooted in a 
scientific, technocratic, and rational worldview consistent with the broader epistemic and professional 
economics field.
34
 The Fund historically also has maintained a strong normative position against 
policies that are deemed market distortive. Despite the shifting ideological terrain of the post 
Washington Consensus, we should not expect that LIC policy change was packaged in a form that 
fundamentally challenged market based solutions to balance of payment and development issues. 
                                                 
31
 Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney, eds  Delegation and Agency in International 
Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
32
 Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank 
Environmental Reform,” International Organizations 57, no.2 (2003), pp.241-276 at pp.249-250. 
33
 Daniel Nielson, Michael Tierney, and Catherine Weaver, “Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide: Re-
engineering the Culture of the World Bank,” Journal of International Relations and Development 9, no.2 (2006), pp.107-
139 at pp. 114-116. 
34
 Bessma Momani, “Limits on Streamlining Fund Conditionality: The International Monetary Fund’s Organizational 
Culture,” Journal of International Relations and Development  8, no. 2 (2007), pp. 142-163. 
     
11 
 
 
In chapter 4, I examine IMF LIC change through the lens of “conventional” constructivism. 
Contemporary constructivist IO scholars focus their research on the impact of economic ideas, 
economic schools of thought, and development norms on policy choices.
35
 Specific to the IMF, they 
highlight three major themes. First, while changes in ideas and norms that exist outside the institution 
matter in regard to potential shifts in policy direction, it is ultimately internal processes of how staff 
interpret these ideas and norms and act on them that determines if and when reform occurs.
36
 Second, 
staff and management decisions are driven in large part by notions of legitimacy.
37
 The economics 
profession, member states, and private market actors are the three constituencies identified that grant 
social acceptance to particular Fund ideas and policies.
38
 Policy change is more likely to occur when 
these constituencies no longer grant legitimacy to particular economic ideas, economic schools of 
thought, or development norms. Third, ideational change that shapes policy outcomes is an ongoing 
process that involves stages of emergence, stabilization, and contestation. Here, three triggers 
undermine economic ideas and development norms and a subsequent increased probability that reform 
will occur:  (1) acknowledgement that a particular policy doesn’t work; (2) an external shock; and (3) 
mass condemnation. In chapter 4, inquiry into why IMF LIC policy changes therefore focuses on how 
                                                 
35
Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein, eds Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). As developed further in chapter 4, Park and Vetterlein focus their 
analysis on impact of shifting development norms on IMF policy outcomes. Jeffrey Chwieroth instead focuses on shifts in 
economic ideas and the popularity or rejection of economic school of thought as driving IMF reform. See Jeffrey 
Chwieroth, Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press, 2010) 
36
 Catherine Weaver, “The Meaning of Development: Constructing the World Bank’s Good Governance Agenda,” in 
Constructing the International Economy, eds. Rawi Adedal, Mark Blythe, and Craig Parsons  (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2010), pp.47-67. 
37
Leonard Seabrooke, “Bitter Pills to Swallow: Legitimacy Gaps and Social Recognition of the IMF Tax Policy Norm in 
East Asia,” in Owning Development, eds. Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), pp. 137-149 at pp.137-141. 
38
 Manuella Moschella, Governing Risk: The IMF and Global Financial Crises (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010), pp.17-34. 
     
12 
 
economic ideas and development norms that shape IMF LIC staff evolve and identifies triggers that 
reshape them.
39
  
  
Do these approaches sufficiently capture the dynamics involved with IMF LIC policy change? Two 
areas of concern merit broader theoretical investigation. In rationalist approaches, the state is often 
conceptualized as a unitary actor. This ignores the multiple forces and interests that shape state forms 
and their relations to multilateral institutions, including the Fund. A more dynamic approach that 
highlights this weakness is offered by Robert Wade.
40
 In his study of the World Bank in the 1990s, 
Wade demonstrated that the institution was influenced by two contradictory forces: a “finance agenda” 
pushed by the U.S. Treasury and finance ministers from both the OECD and global South that 
advocated liberal market reform in all sectors of the economy, and a “civil society agenda” pushed by 
the U.S. Congress and NGOs generally more skeptical of liberal market development solutions. 
Conceptualization of the state as a unitary entity in rationalist approaches thus limits our 
understanding of diverging interests found within states that lobby for different policy direction in 
IMF.  
 
Constructivists conceptually account for the impact of both outside forces and institution specific 
dynamics in their explanations of IMF change. Jeffrey Chwieroth, for example, argues that economic 
ideas and specific economic schools of thought shape how IMF staff conceptualize problems and 
appropriate policy response. Bessma Momani, Susan Park, and Antje Vetterlein, in a similar manner, 
                                                 
39
 Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein, “Do Policy Norms Reconstitute Global Development? in Owning Development: 
Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank, eds. Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 137-149 at pp.137-141. 
40
 Robert Wade, “US Hegemony and the World Bank: the Fight Over People and Ideas,” Review of International Political 
Economy 9, no.2 (2002), pp.201-229 at pp.218-220. 
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highlight that development norms formed outside the IMF shape staff decisions.
41
 However, these 
scholars are adamant that ultimately it is “change from within” that drives policy reform. The Fund 
(and any institution) has its own unique organizational culture through which outside ideas and norms 
are processed. As articulated by Chwieroth, this should dissuade IO scholars from embracing accounts 
that prioritize the influence of broader structural change while ignoring the unique micro-dynamics of 
the institution under study.
42
 
 
I maintain that heightened attention to institutional process to explain IMF reform, while a critical 
contribution, has downplayed how economic ideas and development norms are interrelated with 
broader shifts in 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century capitalist social structures. Why, for example, have we 
witnessed the replacement of the monolithic neoliberalism of the Washington Consensus with a 
diversity of ideas on how one should approach monetary and fiscal policy and structural reform in 
LICs? Can we accurately or fully explain LIC change within the Fund by focusing primarily on 
internal institutional culture? Or are there underlying macro-structural shifts that explain why certain 
economic ideas and development norms have become more or less influential in driving policy reform 
within the halls of the IMF?  
 
In response to these concerns, I also explore if a theoretical framework that draws from Gramscian 
inspired historical materialism offers greater analytical leverage or unique insights into explanations of 
                                                 
41
 Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein, “Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank.” in 
Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank, eds. Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 3-26 at p. 12; Momani, “Limits of Streamlining Fund Conditionality: 
The International Monetary Fund’s Organizational Culture,” p.146. 
42
 Jeffrey Chwieroth, “Normative Change “From Within”: The International Monetary Fund’s Approach to Capital 
Account Liberalization,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no.1 (2008), pp. 129-158 at pp.129-136. 
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contemporary Fund LIC change.
43
 This historical structural approach highlights how shifting social 
structures and productive relations within 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century capitalism have reshaped 
contemporary power structures, state forms, and multilateral institutions, including the IMF.
44
 The unit 
of analysis in this framework consists of an identifiable constellation of mutually constituted and 
reinforcing social forces that make up a historical structure reproduced in part by a historic bloc.
45
 A 
historical structure consists of three interrelated, reinforcing social forces (ideas/ideology, material 
capabilities, and institutions) that set the broad context of political possibilities and agency within a 
particular world order. These social forces, in turn, interact dialectically at three interlocking levels of 
activity: social relations of production, state forms, and world order.
46
 By historic bloc, neo-Gramscian 
scholars refer to a complex of productive relations, classes, and ideology that underwrite and give 
cohesion to particular state forms and world orders.
47
    Historical structures and historical blocs, while 
                                                 
43
 I draw primarily from the work of Robert W. Cox and neo-Gramscian scholars in chapter 6. Examples of neo-Gramscian 
scholarship include: Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990); Craig Murphy “Global Governance Poorly Done and Poorly Understood,” International Affairs 76, no.4 
(2000), pp.789-803;  Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995);  Magnus Ryner, Capitalist Restructuring, Globalization and the Third Way: Lessons 
from the Swedish Model (London: Routledge, 2002); and Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to 
Hegemony, World Order, and Historic Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations,” Capital and Class 
82 (2004), pp.85-113. Works of Cox include Robert W Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no.3 (1981) , pp. 126-155;    Robert W 
Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Methods,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 12, no.2 (1983), pp.162-175;   Robert W Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making 
of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987);  Robert W Cox, “Multilateralism and World Order,” Review of 
International Studies 18, no. 2 (1992), pp.161-180;  Robert W Cox, “Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualization of 
World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” in Approaches to World Order ed. Robert W Cox and 
Timothy J Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 144-173; and Robert W Cox, The New Realism: 
Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order (London: Macmillan, 1997). 
44
 A focus on human material life is understood to encompass a broad range of historically contingent productive relations 
and processes - “entailing political, cultural, and economic aspects of social life”-  that allow humans to reproduce and 
“remake their world and themselves. Mark Rupert “Marxism and Critical Theory” in International Relations Theories: 
Discipline and Diversity, eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.150-
151. 
45
 As outlined by Rupert, social relations, while not empirically observable as things, have structures that can be explained 
through analysis of “identifiable constellations of dominant social forces” in prevailing historical structures. See Mark 
Rupert, Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order (London: Routledge, 2000), p.42.  
46
 Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, pp.395-398. 
47
 Mark Rupert, “Producing Hegemony: State/Society Relations and the Politics of Productivity in the United States,” 
International Studies Quarterly 34 no.4 (1990), pp.427-456 at p.433. 
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broadly cohesive, are never fully stable or uncontested. Contradictory tendencies and tensions within 
historical structures and historic blocs produce periodic crises that may serve as flashpoints of change.  
 
Historical structural studies of the contemporary world order and its relationship to the IMF frame 
their analyses in four interrelated themes that characterize the past five decades: the shift from a world 
economy made up of linked national economies to a globalized economy characterized by the 
transnationalization of production and accumulation; the dismantling of Keynesian welfare state forms 
in the global North and ISI state forms in the global South; the rise of a “globalist” historic bloc 
dominated by an emerging transnational capitalist class that has been unsuccessful in its attempt to 
build a hegemonic world order; and counter-tendencies that have emerged that challenge this non-
hegemonic order.  
 
For neo-Gramscians, the turmoil and crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s and the global financial 
crisis of 2008 serve as the contextual foundation to explain post Washington Consensus policy change. 
Specific to the IMF, the HIPC and HIPC II initiatives, the PRGF, and the post 2008 ECF/RCF/SCF 
reforms are seen as components of a larger project initiated by progressive elements of the globalist 
bloc to secure a hegemonic global order. William Robinson, for example, contends that the post 
Washington Consensus period is an expression of an emerging “inclusive neoliberalism” that 
ultimately serves the purpose to “…attenuate some of the sharpest social contradictions of global 
capitalism…” in the interest of undermining challenges to the current historical structure.
48
  Arne 
Rückert makes similar claims.
 49
  Through post Washington Consensus reforms, “…the World Bank 
                                                 
48
 William Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 2004), p.163. 
49
 Rückert has published widely on World Bank policy in the post-Washington Consensus period from a Gramscian 
perspective. See Arne Rückert, “The World Bank and the Transformations of Neoliberalism: The Poverty Reduction 
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and the IMF play an increasingly important role in the attempt to promote hegemony around inclusive-
neoliberal practices, particularly in “weak” developing countries.”
50
  Chapter 5 assesses these claims. 
Organization and Findings of Dissertation 
This dissertation has five main goals. First, through a comparative case study of the four major cases 
of IMF LIC reform from 1996 to 2010, it identifies potential causal variables and mechanisms that 
drove these instances of policy change. Second, it assesses if the evidence gathered from these cases 
suggests any generalizable patterns relative to LIC policy reform. Third, it analyzes if and how policy 
reform is interconnected to changing social relations and social forces in the contemporary historical 
structure. Fourth, it evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of rational, constructivist, and 
Gramscian inspired historical materialist frameworks focused on IMF reform. And fifth, it explores if  
we gain any additional analytical leverage in the study of contemporary IMF behavior through a 
research model open to mainstream and critical ontological and epistemological frameworks.  
 
Chapter 2 provides the institutional and historical context for the four cases of post Washington 
Consensus LIC reform examined in chapters 3-5. The chapter first outlines the Fund’s formal 
operations and LIC programs. This is followed by a focus on the IMF’s organizational culture. 
Evidence gathered from interviews and internal Fund survey data highlights that LIC staff diverge 
from a broader institutional culture characterized by a silo mentality and ideological conformity. This 
suggests LIC staff exhibit a greater willingness to engage alternative ideas and policy positions than 
their colleagues in other departments in the Fund. The second section of chapter 2 includes a brief 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Strategy of Honduras,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 36, no.70 (2011);  Arne Rückert,“The 
Forgotten Dimension of Social Reproduction: The World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Paradigm,” Review of 
International Political Economy 17, no.5 (2010), pp.816-839;  Arne Rückert, “A Decade of Poverty Reduction Strategies 
in Latin America: Empowering or Disciplining the Poor?,” Labour, Capital, and Society 42, no. 1&2 (2009), pp.56-81; and 
Arne Rückert, “Producing Neoliberal Hegemony? A neo-Gramscian Analysis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) in Nicaragua,” Studies in Political Economy 79 (2007), pp.91-118.  
50
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historical overview of the IMF’s relationship with LICs from the creation of the institution in 1945 up 
to the post Washington Consensus period.  It highlights three trends. First, prior to the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the IMF’s role in poor states concerned itself primarily 
with balance of payments correction. From the 1970s forward, IMF resources and focus on LICs have 
substantially increased. Fund “mission creep” into areas of development also emerged in the 1970s. 
Along with a focus on balance of payment correction, IMF conditionality evolved to include structural 
conditionality requirements designed to reform LIC state institutions and legal systems. The nature of 
structural conditionality took a radical liberal market turn through the introduction of SAF and ESAF 
programs in the mid-1980s and set the stage for post Washington Consensus LIC reform efforts.  
 
Second, the IMF exerted – and continues to exert- its power in LICs. Formal surveillance over LIC 
activities and conditionality requirements demonstrates that the IMF has established what Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall describe as direct “compulsory” and indirect “institutional” power in its 
relationship with its poorest member states.
51
 In regard to the former, the Fund’s influence in LICs is 
rooted primarily in conditionality requirements tied to concessionary lending. The IMF also evolved to 
fill an informal role as gatekeeper for LIC access to World Bank loans, other multilateral assistance, 
and private bank lending. Agenda setting through its conditional lending programs also shapes what 
poor states and development economists consider as legitimate policy positions. This ability to frame 
the relative appropriateness of policy choices is a key mechanism of power that remains entrenched in 
the relationship between the IMF and LICs. 
 
                                                 
51
 See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall “Power in Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael 
Barnett  and Raymond Duvall  (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press, 2005) pp.1-22. 
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Third, a formula for dealing with balance of payment deficits emerged in the Fund in the 1960s that 
highlighted the need for states with balance of payment deficits to undergo short term economic 
contraction and governmental belt tightening. Known as the “Polak model,” this framework shaped 
how the institution perceived economic problems in LICs and the general formula for corrective 
action. Balance of payment problems and broader economic performance were considered primarily 
the fault of deficit states, rather than an outcome that also involved the behavior of surplus states or 
instability in global markets. As developed further in chapter 4, a key aspect of the Polak model has 
been challenged in the post Washington Consensus period that has shaped LIC policy reforms. Rather 
than focus primarily on balance of payment correction, an increase in balance of trade deficits may be 
necessary in the medium term in LICs to allow for poverty reduction and subsequent improvements in 
growth and development.  
 
In Chapter 3, four cases of post Washington Consensus IMF LIC reform are studied through 
application of principal-agent modeling and sociological organizational theory. Evidence from these 
cases uncovers the following patterns. Two tiers of actors with different levels of influence shaped 
LIC outcomes. Primary actors included the Managing Director (MD), powerful states, and staff. 
Secondary actors included LICs, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress. In all the cases examined, LIC policy 
shift was successful either when a coalition formed between at least one primary and one secondary 
actor or at least two primary actors. Evidence from these cases also suggests that a primary actor can’t 
initiate reform alone. Without the support of other primary actors, staff, powerful states, and the MD 
must have backing from a secondary actor to successfully produce policy change. 
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As predicted by PA models, increased division among powerful state principals provided openings for 
management and staff to initiate, resist, or shape LIC policy. This was most salient when staff and the 
Managing Director shared preferences. In future scenarios, increased preference heterogeneity 
between powerful states on the Executive Board should result in greater leverage from management 
and staff to initiate or resist reform efforts. In regard to the impact of NGOs in delegation chains and 
the impact of pressure applied distally to principals, the evidence is inconclusive. Disaggregating the 
impact of direct and indirect lobbying on Fund policy choices requires further study before any 
conclusions can be drawn. More conclusively, evidence from these cases demonstrates greater success 
of direct lobbying when the NGO has at least one primary actor supporting their position. Finally, 
strategically situated individuals in the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and African 
Department reinforce or block coalitions of change in the institution if the LIC reform in question 
substantially challenges the Fund’s culture. 
 
In Chapter 4, post Washington Consensus LIC reform is examined through the lens of constructivist 
theory. In broad terms, this framework is rooted in the notion that humans are social and reflexive 
emotional beings driven by the “logic of appropriateness” and make decisions based on shifting 
contexts of social identity and notions of legitimacy. Applied to this study, the role of economic ideas 
and development norms that inform what are deemed appropriate policy choices relative to LICs thus 
take center stage. Consistent with current trends in the constructivist literature focused on the IMF, I 
adopt a positivist epistemological position in Chapter 4.  
 
Evidence from interviews and policy documents points to two categories of ideas within the IMF that 
shaped post Washington Consensus LIC policy reform. The first consists of ideas that have remained 
     
20 
 
fairly stable and uncontested since the creation of the IMF and set the broad boundaries of what is 
considered legitimate policy debate. These include the notion that transparent, market based 
mechanisms are the best tools to allocate resources efficiently, support growth, and reduce poverty and 
inequality in LICs.
 52
 An aversion to market distortive policies and support of free trade also fall within 
this non-debatable category.
 
Within the boundaries of acceptable debate, IMF staff have been 
influenced by a diversity of economic ideas related to two distinct policy areas where the Fund is 
actively involved: (1) monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize short term balance of payment 
disequilibria; and (2) structural reform that improves economic efficiency and stimulates growth and 
development.  
 
Constructivists argue that the primary constituency outside of the institution that reinforces the 
legitimacy of particular ideas or development choices pursued by the IMF is the economics profession. 
As such, chapter 4 then explores how the Fund has come to accept particular economic ideas that 
constitute appropriate macroeconomic and development policy and how challenges to these 
frameworks of thinking in the post Washington Consensus period have impacted policy reform efforts. 
I outline five mainstream schools of economics that have influenced the economics profession and 
IMF staff and management. These include traditional Keynesianism, the neoclassical synthesis, 
monetarism, new classical economics, and New Keynesianism.  
 
Constructivist analysis points to three prominent trends concerning the role of economic ideas and LIC 
policy reform. A highly stable framework of what constituted appropriate monetary and fiscal policy 
response  (known as the  “New Consensus”) emerged in the early 1980s and was not significantly 
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challenged until the 2008 financial crisis. The New Consensus – influenced primarily by monetarism, 
new classical economics, and New Keynesianism – argued against expansionary countercyclical 
monetary and fiscal policy response. The 2008 crisis delegitimized the New Consensus among 
development economists and IMF staff and has ushered in a new framework of  economic ideas 
supportive of more Keynesian inspired macroeconomic policy. As previously noted, this helped drive 
replacement of the PRGF with the ECF/RCF/SCF in 2010. The Asian crisis of the late 1990s, in 
contrast, had little impact on monetary and fiscal policy reform efforts. However, fallout from the late 
1990s led to the reevaluation of the role of the state in its relation to market efficiency, growth, and 
development. Along with challenges to the Polak model, an emphasis on poverty reduction, 
investment in human capital, and issues of inequality facilitated the replacement of the SAF/ESAF 
with the PRGF. Despite this shift in thinking in the late 1990s, an aversion to market distortive 
practices remains. LICs are advised to avoid protectionism, over or undervalued exchange rates, 
subsidies, and large-scale government managed redistribution. 
 
Chapter 5 examines LIC reform in the post Washington Consensus through the lens of a historical 
structural framework. Given that this approach sits outside the mainstream of contemporary political 
science, the first section of Chapter 5 outlines the differences between what Robert Cox describes as 
“critical” and positivist “problem-solving” frameworks. In broad terms, a critical approach 
conceptualizes the world as constituted by human agents dialectically interrelated with time specific 
social structures that shape – and are shaped by – their action. Human nature and structures of human 
interaction thus are never fully static or characterized by essential, timeless qualities. As such, critical 
approaches reject the notion that generalizable causal patterns can be teased out from a series of cases 
in one particular historical era and then used as a template to predict future outcomes. Explanation in 
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this context instead focuses on revealing the historical structures that produce regularities in one 
particular era and how and why historical structures and subsequent world orders change over time.  
 
Within this context, Chapter 5 then examines the interrelationships between shifting productive 
relations, state forms, and historic blocs of the first half of the 20
th
 century that forged the post-World 
War II world order of pax Americana and its demise throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. During pax 
Americana (roughly 1945-1973), the IMF played a central role in the establishment and reproduction 
of a hegemonic global order rooted in a U.S. based “Fordist” historic bloc. Fordism describes the 
social structures, ideology, and practices that facilitated the emergence and consolidation of mass 
based factory production and consumption in the United States in the first several decades of the 20
th
 
century. Following World War II, Fordism was internationalized through various U.S. supported 
initiatives, including the IMF. 
 
A critical factor that facilitated the internationalization of Fordist hegemony and the U.S. centered 
liberal order in the post WW II era involved the emergence of class compromise between American 
corporate capital and moderate elements of labor in the interwar years. Along with a series of laws 
supportive of organized labor in the 1930s and 1940s, the emergence of a New Deal Keynesian 
welfare state model committed to full employment policies helped undermine socialist and communist 
elements in the American union movement.
53
 As highlighted by Mark Rupert and developed further in 
chapter 5, a de-radicalized labor movement that identified in Fordist “politics of productivity” and 
liberal notions of “free trade unionism” was a key element of the post-World War II U.S. centered 
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historic bloc.
54
  IMF policy during the hegemony of pax Americana reflected the interests and tensions 
between elements and interests of this historic bloc. While sympathetic to notions of liberal trade 
pushed by the U.S. government and major industrial capitalists, the IMF did not actively push for 
structural reforms that undermined the politics of class compromise embedded in Keynesian welfare 
state models in the global North and ISI state models in the global South.  
 
Chapter 5 then traces how the internationalist Fordist historic bloc and the hegemonic liberal world 
order of pax Americana began to unravel in the late 1960s and 1970s. Liberalized global markets and 
the spread of Fordist production methods and consumption patterns throughout Western Europe and 
Japan in the 1950s and 1960s produced excess industrial capacity and increased competition between 
wealthy capitalist states.
55
 As U.S. competitiveness fell and trade surpluses turned into deficits by the 
early 1970s, American industrial capitalists and labor grew increasingly skeptical of free trade. This 
skepticism also focused on the perceived unfairness of the Bretton Woods monetary regime that 
required the U.S. to maintain fixed value for the dollar while other capitalist states enjoyed greater 
flexibility to devalue their currencies.
56
 Richard Nixon (1968-1974) shared these sentiments. Between 
1971 and 1973, Nixon opted for dollar devaluation that subsequently dismantled the Bretton Woods 
modified gold standard regime. The spirit of positive sum game liberal internationalism of Bretton 
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Ibid., p.176. 
55
Jeffry Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2006), pp.346-347. 
56
  As discussed in detail in chapter 2, the Bretton Wood regime was centered on the fixed value of the US dollar at $35/ 
ounce of gold. Other states pegged their currencies to the dollar, but were free to devalue if deemed necessary within a 
narrow range. As US trade surpluses shrank in the 1960s and turned into trade deficits by the early 1970s, US export 
manufacturers and the ALF- CIO lobbied to devalue the dollar. President Nixon complied in August 1971. Along with a 
subsequent 10 percent devaluation of the dollar in 1971, Nixon imposed a series of import tariffs. Despite attempts to 
revise Bretton Woods in 1972 and 1973, Nixon once again devalued the dollar by 10 percent in 1973. Ibid., pp.349-342. 
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Wood was further undermined in the early 1970s by the rise of protectionist measures across the 
OECD.
57
   
 
High productivity levels that had facilitated both increased profits for capital and real wage growth for 
labor since 1945 also began to fall in the mid-1960s.
58
  Increased tension between capital and labor 
born from drops in economic growth, lowered productivity, and real wage stagnation by the late 
1960s
59
 was further exacerbated by a series of crises in the early 1970s that produced periods of 
stagflation throughout much of the OECD economies in the mid and late 1970s.
60
 With the subsequent 
rise of neo-conservative political movements and elections of Margaret Thatcher (1979) and Ronald 
Reagan (1980), Fordist class compromise forged through the interwar and Bretton Woods eras quickly 
eroded. Corporate restructuring efforts, designed to revise productivity and profit, prioritized 
weakening the bargaining power of organized labor through multiple means.
61
     
 
NeoGramscian scholars point to the “crisis of capitalism” in the 1970s as the catalyst that sparked the 
demise of the hegemonic world order of pax Americana. Starting roughly in the 1980s, a non-
hegemonic world order has emerged that includes the following key dynamics. First, capitalist 
processes of production and accumulation have increasingly globalized. Second, the establishment of 
                                                 
57
Along with a 10 percent devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and 1973, Nixon also embraced protectionist measures. As 
competition and crises increased in the capitalist core throughout the 1970s, calls for increased protectionism reemerged 
across the OECD. 
58
 Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power, pp.178-179. 
59
 Frieden notes that between 1968 and 1973, the rate of labor strikes across Western Europe was “five to twenty times the 
normal level.” Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century, p.350. 
60
 Following the demise of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange regime, states across the industrial world rapidly increased 
spending to stimulate their economies. Increased government spending in combination with the 1973 oil shock pushed 
inflation across the OECD to average rates of over 10 percent by the mid-1970s.  
61
 One key development from the new industrial model pushed by capital focused on producing ‘flexible’ workers able to 
manage and adapt in real time to the needs of consumers and market demand. This required the dismantling of Fordist 
collective bargaining agreements that had negotiated narrow job categories for workers. Corporate profit levels also were 
also increased through an upsurge of  non-union and part time labor and subcontracting of production processes to non-
union shops. See Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power, pp.180-
183. 
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globalized circuits of production and accumulation produced a new dominant “transnational capitalist 
class.” The ascendant transnational capitalist class (TCC) forms the core of a “globalist” historic bloc 
that also includes elite technocrats from multilateral institutions, including the IMF and World Bank, 
politicians of powerful states, and popular cultural and media figures. Third, Keynesian welfare states 
in the global North and ISI states in the global South have been dismantled and replaced with 
neoliberal state forms. Neoliberal state forms, in contrast to the Keynesian welfare state forms of pax 
Americana, are characterized by open hostility to organized labor and policy positions that have 
increased the intensity and extensity of commodification. Fourth, while powerful, the globalist historic 
bloc has been unable to produce a unified social vision to legitimate the restructuring of workplaces 
and state forms in accordance to their interests. For NeoGramscians including Stephen Gill, the current 
world order is therefore characterized by a more coercive and less consensual “politics of 
supremacy.”
62
 
 
Applied to a study of the IMF and LICs, its adoption of Washington Consensus thinking in the 1980s 
and 1990s was interrelated with a world order shifting from hegemony and Fordist class compromise 
to a globalized neoliberal order. This was expressed in SAF and ESAF structural adjustment lending 
programs that helped dismantle the remaining vestiges of ISI state forms in these societies and 
reorganized economies along liberal market lines.
63
 Secondary sources and internal Fund documents 
highlight that the IMF sensed growing pushback from SAF and ESAF programs in LICs in the late 
1980s and 1990s and pursued a program focused on “good governance” to rationalize structural 
reform efforts. As resistance to neoliberal reform increased throughout the 1990s, neo-Gramscians 
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 Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, p.85  
63 After two decades of strong growth in Latin America, Asia, and Africa between 1940 and 1960, economies in the 
majority of non-oil producing ISI states witnessed increased debt levels, an increasing number balance of payment crises, 
higher inflation, and lower growth in the 1960 and 1970s. Levels of debt increased substantially in the late 1970s when 
U.S. raised interest rates dramatically and helped lead to the Mexican Debt Crisis of 1982.  
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focused on the Bretton Woods institutions argue that social upheaval and crisis caused by these 
dynamics in LICs are one key component that explains current post-Washington Consensus reform 
efforts. In order to facilitate long term support of market based development, IMF (and World Bank) 
policy over the past decade has become more sensitive to concerns of weak economic growth, poverty, 
and increased inequality in LICs. On an even broader scale, neo-Gramscians also hypothesize that 
contemporary IMF reforms are a by-product of elements within the globalist bloc that hope to 
(re)establish a hegemonic world order through a more inclusive form of globalizing capitalism.  
 
Evidence from interviews with IMF staff and Executive Directors, internal Fund documents, and 
secondary sources lends initial support to these hypotheses. The rollout of the HIPC, HIPC II, and 
PRGF initiatives in the late 1990s was underwritten in part by two internal goals articulated by the 
Fund’s LIC staff and management. First, there was a concentrated effort to increase support from 
multiple civil society stakeholders in LICs to IMF reform efforts. Second, the IMF staff highlighted a 
need to engage in a more consensual decision-making process with LIC stakeholders. Fallout from the 
2008 crisis strengthened these trends. This was expressed most concretely in the elimination of 
“structural performance” criteria in Fund lending arrangements in 2009 that has given LICs greater 
flexibility and control over domestic reform efforts. Along with shifts in how LIC policy processes are 
implemented by the IMF, World Bank-IMF annual meetings and the annual World Economic Forum 
meeting in Davos over the past decade demonstrate that elements of the globalist bloc were 
increasingly concerned with poverty and increased global inequality.  
 
Chapter 6 briefly first summarizes the evidence uncovered in chapters 3-5. It then analyzes  
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the relative strengths and weaknesses of rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural frameworks 
in regard to the study of the IMF and IOs more generally. It finds that rationalist and constructivist 
approaches to contemporary IMF LIC reform share the advantages common to positivist-oriented 
research. These include an ability to conceptually simplify the phenomenon under study, tease out 
potential causal relationships, and form predictive models. Rationalist models offer the best 
opportunity for practical application of knowledge gained. Contemporary constructivist studies,  
focused on the interplay between  identity, legitimacy, economic ideas, and organizational culture, 
have pushed IO scholarship in a much more empirically sound direction. Here, the focus on internal 
micro-dynamics of the institution under study requires IO scholarship to be more careful in making 
monolithic claims about IMF behavior.  
 
A critical framework rooted in a social ontology examines three areas of Fund behavior that 
mainstream frameworks are unable to engage. First, it introduces a causal story that sees processes of 
contemporary Fund policy change as dialectically related to the multiple and often contradictory 
dynamics embedded in the transnationalization of capitalist social relations. Second, it recognizes the 
role that IMF reform plays in the production and reproduction of hegemonic or more overtly coercive 
world orders. Third, the social relational roots of historical structural theory provide a foundation to 
evaluate where and why certain ideas have been folded into post Washington Consensus reforms while 
others have not, and what that signifies about the contemporary role that the IMF plays in the early 21
st
 
century world order. As developed in chapter 6, the Marxist and Gramscian roots of a historical 
structural framework is uniquely suited to explore why market distortive ideas remain off the table of 
post Washington Consensus “pro-poor” reforms and why a technocratic self- understanding remains at 
the core of IMF thinking around policy reform. It also may provide clues as to why this 
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identity is essential to how the Fund participates in (re)building hegemony in the contemporary 
historical structure through its policy choices in LICs. In short, while recognizing that IMF policy and 
market based development more broadly need to “work” for the poor, the boundaries of what is open 
for debate do not include policies that challenge deeply held beliefs in market efficiency. Following 
the logic of Marx, this makes sense as debating the efficacy of market distortive policies would bring 
politics into the arena that liberal market economists argue don’t belong. This, in turn, could 
potentially open up more radical challenges to the current historical structure underwritten by 
globalizing capitalist social relations. 
 
Chapter 6 then assesses the potential benefits and drawbacks of research position open to use of 
rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural frameworks focused on IMF change. It opens this 
discussion by first affirming that each theoretical framework presents a reasonable causal story when 
explaining contemporary IMF policy reform. Evidence uncovered in this project also does not 
significantly undermine any major claims each framework makes that should disqualify it from future 
research. For example, evidence suggests that policy change is impacted by the formation of coalitions 
that either block or facilitate reform, shifts in how particular economic ideas gain or lose legitimacy 
among IMF staff, and broader tensions in the current historical structure of globalizing capitalism.  
 
If each theoretical framework presents a reasonable causal story on its own terms, does it therefore 
make sense to study the phenomenon of multilateral institutional change through use of a diverse 
ontological and epistemological arsenal? Such an approach will not produce one correct answer and 
suffers at some level from divergent baseline understandings of the social world. However, as I 
explore in the conclusion of Chapter 6, I maintain that despite this tension and at some level 
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incompatible understandings of the world, the complexity of that world and processes of change 
within it merit space for mainstream and critical ontologies. Future studies of the IMF should explore 
more fully how diverse paths of inquiry can be effectively used to explain policy reform. 
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Chapter 2- The IMF and LICs  
Analysis of post Washington Consensus IMF LIC policy reform first requires basic institutional 
literacy in three areas: formal operations; informal dynamics of operational culture with focus on LIC 
staff; and the evolving role of the IMF in LICs. Chapter 2 first summarizes the Fund’s formal 
operations and institutional structure with an overview of the IMF and its contemporary role in 
member surveillance, technical support, and lending. It then focuses on more informal characteristics 
of the institution’s operational culture and explores several areas where LIC staff and procedures 
diverge from broader institutional trends. The chapter then examines the evolution of the Fund’s 
relationship with LICs from its birth nearly seven decades ago to the end of the Washington 
Consensus period. 
 
The International Monetary Fund 
The International Monetary Fund came into force on December 27, 1945. Article I includes the 
following “purposes”: 
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation…(ii) To facilitate the expansion and 
balanced growth of international trade…(iii) To promote exchange stability…and to avoid 
competitive exchange depreciation…(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system 
of payments in respect to current transactions…and…elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. (v) To give confidence to members by 
making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them…to correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity. (iv) To shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
balance-of-payment disequilibria.
64
 
 
At the organizational level, the Fund is best conceptualized as an international credit union made up of 
member states. Upon initial acceptance to the Fund, members are assigned a quota (currency 
contribution) that is held as a deposit at the Fund. Quotas are determined by the relative size of the 
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economy and engagement with international trade,
65
 and shape two key aspects of members’ 
relationships with the IMF. First, quota share determines how much the member must contribute in 
full when initially joining the institution. Once the overall currency contribution is established, the 
initial 25 percent of the quota must be paid in hard currency.
66
 Referred to as the “reserve tranche” or 
“first tranche,” these resources can be accessed by a member state without any conditionality 
requirements. The remaining three quarters (“upper credit tranches”) are paid in member-specific 
currency and access to this credit is generally only granted with conditionality. Second, the quota 
amount sets the limit on how much a member can borrow from the Fund. For non-concessionary 
loans, this currently stands at 200 percent of its quota annually and 600 percent cumulatively.
67
 In 
addition, the quota size determines the voting power of the member. As of 2013, the U.S. has the 
largest quota and percentage of votes (17.69 percent) of the Fund and holds unilateral veto power over 
significant Fund policy reform.
68
 Germany, Japan, France, and the UK have quota sizes in the five 
percent range. 
 
Quota shares are reviewed approximately every five years. Any change must be approved by 85 
percent of the total voting power in the Fund. The 14
th
 review, completed in November 2010, doubled 
overall quota requirements to a total of approximately $756 billion.
69
 Quotas were initially denoted in 
US dollar equivalents but were replaced with Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in 1969. Today, the 
value of the SDR is determined by a basket of four currencies (euro, yen, pound sterling, and US 
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 The current quota system formula involves four components: GDP (50 percent), openness (30 percent), economic 
variability (15 percent), and international reserves (5 percent). 
66
 Prior to 1973, the reserve tranche was paid in gold. Today, countries must pay in currencies including the U.S. dollar, the 
euro, yen or pound sterling. 
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 Any major initiative can be blocked by 15 percent of the total allocated voting shares.  
69
 This review was portrayed by the Fund as a major victory for developing states in several areas. Quotas for LICs were 
preserved while six percent of quotas were shifted to “emerging market and developing countries” (EMDCs) including 
China, Russia, Brazil, and India. 
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dollar) and one unit currently hovers around the equivalent value of $1.50.
70
  A member state in need 
of hard currency in world markets can obtain it through two mechanisms. It can voluntarily exchange 
SDRs for usable currency with another member, or the Fund can designate states with balance of 
payment surpluses to buy SDRs from those with payment deficits.  
             
Along with quota subscriptions, two additional programs are implemented on an ad hoc basis to 
supplement Fund resources for lending purposes. The “General Agreement to Borrow” (GAB), 
established in 1962, allows the IMF to borrow up to $27 billion from 11 industrial countries on a 
short-term basis. The “New Arrangement to Borrow” (NAB) serves as a source of funds to supplement 
quota resources, particularly in times of financial crisis. Initiated after the Asian crisis, the NAB 
currently involves 39 members who have committed $580 billion in resources to the arrangement as of 
2011. Under NAB rules, proposals to access NAB resources must be approved by both 85 percent of 
states that have contributed to the fund and the Executive Board. In March 2011, the NAB was 
activated for six months in the amount of $334 billon.
71
 
 
Organizational Structure 
Voting formally takes place at two levels in the Fund. The Board of Governors is comprised of finance 
ministers or central bank heads of each of the 187 member states (see Figure 2.1 below). The Board of 
Governors retains the right to vote on policies including quota increases, SDR allocations, member 
admittance and withdrawal, and amendments to Fund Articles of Agreements and By-Laws.
72
 This 
body meets twice a year, at the fall Annual Meeting and Spring Meeting, and much of its business is 
allocated to the International Monetary and Financial Committee (previously the Interim Committee). 
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The International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) “monitors developments in global 
liquidity and the transfer of resources to developing countries; considers proposals by the Executive 
Board to amend the Articles of Agreement; and deals with unfolding events that may disrupt the 
global monetary and financial system.”
73
 The Development Committee, made up of Fund and Bank 
members, is tasked with advising both institutions’ Board of Governors on economic development 
issues in emerging and low-income states.  
Figure 2.1: IMF Organizational Chart 
 
    (Source: http://www.elibrary.imf.org) 
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Day to day operations are delegated to a 24 member Executive Board whose Executive Directors 
(EDs) are elected or appointed to two year terms. Eight appointed EDs currently represent individual 
countries with the largest quotas (the U.S., Germany, France, Britain, Japan, China, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia) while 179 members are represented by the remaining sixteen. The Managing Director (MD) is 
appointed by the Executive Board, serves a five year term, and by convention is European. Christine 
Lagarde (see Figure 2.2 below) serves as the current MD and is assisted by the First Deputy Manager 
(by convention a U.S. citizen) and two Deputy Managing Directors. The Independent Evaluation 
Office (IEO), founded in 2001, sits outside the IMF and conducts ongoing reviews of Fund policies 
and programs.
74
   
Figure 2.2: IMF Managing Directors: 1946-2013 
 
Managing Director  Tenure 
Camille Gutt   1946-1951     
Ivar Rooth   1951-1956  
Per  Jocobsson   1956-1963  
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer  1963-1973 
H. Johannes Witteveen  1973-1978 
Jacques de Larosière  1978-1987 
Michel Camdessus  1987-2000 
Horst Köhler   2000-2004 
Rodgiro de Rato  2004-2007 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn 2007-2011 
Christine Lagarde  2011-present 
   
The Fund staff of approximately 2500 individuals is distributed across eight functional and five area 
departments. Functional departments include: Finance; Fiscal Affairs; IMF Institute; Legal; Monetary 
and Capital Markets; Strategy, Policy, and Review; Research; and Statistics. Area departments 
include: Africa, Asia and Pacific, European, Middle East and Central Asia, and Western Hemisphere. 
Staff members across all departments are formally involved in three primary activities for member 
states: monitoring economies, providing technical assistance, and designing short-term loan packages 
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for states with balance of payments difficulties. In regard to the former, under Article IV of the 
Articles of Agreement, members agree to collaborate with the IMF and one another to promote 
international economic stability. The Fund is charged with monitoring both individual member 
economies (“bilateral surveillance”) and reporting on global and regional economic trends 
(“multilateral surveillance”). Bilateral surveillance is accomplished through Article IV consultations. 
IMF staff travel to individual member states to evaluate monetary, fiscal, financial, and exchange rate 
policies and meet with various stakeholders to discuss and advise future policy direction. Upon return 
to the Fund, a report is filed with the Executive Board and then forwarded to the member state in 
question. Multilateral surveillance efforts include publication of two semi-annual reports, the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).  
 
Technical assistance is primarily geared toward developing countries. It includes staff support for 
creating and managing macroeconomic policy, monetary and fiscal policy design and implementation, 
banking systems, taxation reform, financial systems, fiscal management, and foreign exchange policy. 
Delivery of assistance takes various forms. Staff missions are sent to member states for short term 
analysis and advice or may also remain for longer in-house placements. Training programs are also 
offered at the IMF Institute in Washington, D.C. and seven new regional technical assistance centers 
throughout the global South.
75
 Funding for technical assistance makes up approximately one fifth of 
the Fund’s operating budget, with two thirds of these funds provided by external sources.
76
 
 
Lending Facilities 
                                                 
75
 These are located in Fiji, Barbados, Tanzania, Mali, Gabon, Lebanon, and Guatemala.  
76
 Multilateral donors include: the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Caribbean Development 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the 
European Commission, and the United Nations Development program. 
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As of 2013, IMF loan instruments (“facilities”) are divided into three main categories. Non-
concessional loans (Figure 2.3 below) are made available through either the Stand-By Arrangements 
(SBA), the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), or Precautionary Credit 
Line (PCL). The interest rate charged on non-concessional loans (“rate of charge”) is based on the 
SDR interest rate and is adjusted on a weekly basis. Non-concessional lending arrangements with 
member states are facilitated through a Letter of Intent (LOI). Through the LOI process, Fund staff 
meet with country authorities and draft what the government plans to pursue in return for financial 
support. The LOI is then presented to the Executive Board for approval.  
 
 Although the Executive Board is formally empowered to reject or veto lending arrangements, staff 
have considerable autonomy in setting and monitoring member agreements. Staff assessment 
determines if a member has abided by conditions and qualifies for further lending. Staff can also 
require member states to implement “prior action” or “preconditions” before forwarding LOIs to the 
Board. Directors on the Executive Board also do not have access to confidential documents between 
staff and member governments during the LOI process. As such, Executive Board influence on LOIs is 
mostly informal, while formal control is limited to minor changes in staff proposals.
77
 
 
Concessional loans designed for LICs include the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Standby Credit 
Facility (SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF).
78
 All concessional loans sit at below market 
interest rates and reflect policy commitments developed through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs). PRSPs involve Fund and World Bank co-sponsored efforts to work with “domestic  
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 Jeffrey Chwieroth, “The Silent Revolution: Professional Characteristics, Sympathetic Interlocutors, and IMF Lending,” 
pp 8-9. 
78
 Concessionary loans carry a very low or no interest. As of 2014, for instance the interest rate for ECF, SCF, or RCF 
loans was zero. 
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Figure 2.3: IMF Lending Facilities 
 
Non-concessional IMF Lending Facilities 
 
IMF Loan Instruments  Introduced Description     
Stand By Arrangement  1952  -1-2 year loan/ Repayment due 3-5 years 
-Designed to address short-term balance of payments deficits 
      -Bulk of IMF conditional lending 
 
Extended Fund Facility  1974  -3 year loan/ Repayment due 4-10 years    
      -Designed to address longer –term balance of payments problems 
      -Often focuses on deeper structural reform 
 
Flexible Credit Line  2009  -1-2 years/Repayment due 3-5 years    
    -Line of credit for crisis prevention for states with “strong 
    fundamentals” 
       -No conditionality requirements   
 
 
Precautionary Credit Line 2009  -1-2 years/ Repayment due 3-5 years 
-Renewable line of credit for crisis prevention for states with“ 
sound fundamentals” but facing “moderate vulnerabilities.”  
      -Commitment to address vulnerabilities identified in  
            qualification process     
         
Concessional IMF Lending Facilities 
 
IMF Loan Instruments  Introduced Description      
Extended Credit Facility 2010  -Succeeds Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
      -Main tool for medium-term support for LICs 
-Zero interest rate/5.5 year grace period/10 year final  maturity 
 
Standby Credit Facility  2010  -Short-term support for LICs 
-Zero interest rate/4 year grace period/ 8 year final maturity 
 
Rapid Credit Facility  2010  -Rapid, limited conditional support for LICs 
-Zero interest rate/5.5 year grace period/ 10 year final maturity 
 
Emergency Resources 
 
IMF Loan Instruments  Introduced Description      
Post-Catastrophic Debt   2010  -Assistance for LICs who have suffered a natural disaster 
   Relief Trust     -May involve debt flow relief or debt stock cancellation  
       
Emergency Natural   1962  -3-5 year non-conditional assistance for natural disaster 
Disaster Assistance    -Standard interest rate/ Up to 50 percent of quota 
 
Emergency Post   1995  -3-5 year non-conditional assistance for post-conflict emergency 
Conflict Assistance    -Standard interest rate/ Up to 50 percent of quota 
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stakeholders” to develop “macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs to promote 
growth and reduce poverty.”
79
 Emergency resources for poor states that qualify for concessional 
lending are also available via the Post-Catastrophic Debt Relief Trust (PCDR). Non-LICs are eligible 
for crisis assistance through either the Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance (ENDA) or Emergency 
Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) programs. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the Fund also has increased initiatives focused on global financial stability. 
Along with promoting “codes of best practice” regarding fiscal and monetary policies, the IMF has 
developed and lobbied states to abide by a Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and General 
Data Dissemination Standard (GDDS)  “as guidelines for government production of economic and 
financial data, with a view to improving the operation of global capital markets.
80
 Following the 2008 
crisis, the Fund has worked in partnership with the G-20 on its Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) 
focused on how best to restructure the global economy.
81
   
Operational Culture 
The current IO literature recognizes four major components of organizational culture. Routines include 
the standard operating procedure that over time produce patterns in behavior in an institution. Ideology 
is defined as the underlying belief system that sets the agenda and parameters of policy choices. 
Norms include collectively shared principles and values. Constructivist scholar Catherine Weaver 
additionally maintains that an institution also develops its own internal language “which enables the 
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organization to create a common and efficient means of communicating the shared meaning of 
ideology and to consistently identify, categorize, and apply standard solutions to tasks.”
82
   
I maintain the relationship between organizational culture of the Fund and its impact on policy shift is 
most effectively analyzed if organizational culture is separated into two components. Operational 
culture includes the routines as defined above. Standard operating procedures and the reproduction of 
“how things are done” produces specific patterns of behavior that shape how calls for reform move 
through the institution irrespective of the substance or ideological slant of the policy reform in 
question. Normative culture instead consists of predominant economic ideas, development norms, and 
language found in the organization. Evidence from this project points to procedural and ideological 
patterns among LIC policy makers that are at some levels distinct from the broader operational and 
normative culture of the Fund. I outline the Fund’s operational culture below and explore dynamics of 
normative culture in chapter 4. 
 Momani, in her 2007 study of the Fund, highlights an evaluation completed in 2006 by the 
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) that documents several prominent characteristics of the IMF’s 
operational culture.
83
 In the study, staff members were asked to assess if various categories of behavior 
accurately described the Fund.
 84
 The survey response points to four primary cultural characteristics: 
bureaucracy, hierarchy, homogeneity, and technical/economistic thinking.  
Bureaucratic 
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The Fund follows a series of standard operating procedures with new proposals and country reports 
that produce and reinforce bureaucratic tendencies in the institution. Country reports follow a chain of 
command within area departments (e.g., African, European) starting with the desk officer and moving 
upward to division chiefs and then to the responsible area department’s senior staff.
85
 Following 
review by senior staff in the area department, the document in question then is sent to the Strategy, 
Policy, and Review (SPR) department for review. SPR consists of two strategy divisions and six issue 
divisions (see Figure 2.4 below), two of which are solely focused on LIC issues. SPR serves as the 
main gatekeeper of Fund policy positions and also is seen as the main generator of new initiatives.  
   Figure 2.4:  Strategy Policy and Review Department 
     SPR 
Strategy Divisions     Issue Divisions 
Strategy Unit      Surveillance Policy 
Low Income Country Strategy Unit   Advanced Economies 
       Emerging Markets 
       Trade, Institutions, and Policy Review 
       Low Income Countries 
       Debt Policy 
     
SPR is designed to maintain institutional coherence in its policy recommendations. Relative to its role 
as gatekeeper, SPR’s review process focuses on two objectives. First, through its extensive review and 
editing process, SPR reinforces coherence in application of the Fund’s institutional mission. Second, 
as SPR is not tied to any particular member-state or area department, its review process provides a 
more objective take on policy choices.
86
 Once approved by SPR, the policy document is forwarded to 
the Managing Director and finally to the Executive Board for adoption or rejection. If rejected by the 
Executive Board, the report or policy recommendation is returned down the chain of command for the 
next round of review and revision.  
                                                 
85
 Momani, “IMF Staff: Missing Link in Fund Reform Proposals,” p.45. 
86
 Richard Harper, Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology, and Organizational Action (San Diego, 
CA.: Academic, 1998), p.238. 
     
41 
 
 
 Extensive documentation is thus a common complaint from staff. Specific to mission chiefs and 
others involved with LICs, the PRSP process and coordination with the World Bank on LICs has 
added multiple layers of review and bureaucracy to the policy making process. 87 Demands for timely 
documentation within the bureaucracy also produce a dynamic where “need for speed” are often in 
conflict with “need for local knowledge.”
 88
 Staff are often not given sufficient time to understand the 
particular dynamics of countries and also feel pressure to quickly report findings and issue 
recommendations to their superiors.  
Hierarchical 
Several studies of Fund dynamics highlight that an institutional mandate focused on short term crisis 
management reinforces a hierarchical culture in the institution. Former UK Executive Board director 
Ian Clark, in an internal 1996 study focused on the Fund’s adaptability, noted how the institution 
prized and identified in its “crisis management capability” and how this favored hierarchical 
tendencies: “A prized element of the Fund’s culture…is its organizational discipline and crisis 
management capability. The goal of presenting a single corporate line in negotiations with countries 
requires a somewhat hierarchical managerial style and highly developed internal procedures to 
encourage questioning and debate at an early stage but to act with Cabinet-like solidarity after 
decisions are made.”
89
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Momani’s investigation of Fund staff culture highlights how hierarchical tendencies in the Fund 
produce a “silo-mentality” that discourages coordination and communication across departments.
90
  
Several studies support this claim. An internal 1991 report concluded that Fund staff had “a sense of 
allegiance to an individual department, which rewarded loyal service and was protective of staff.  
[This] produced a situation in which departments were reluctant to explicitly identify or address 
performance problems, or sought to arrange for the transfer of weak performers to other less 
influential departments which tended to become repositories for problem cases.”
91
 A 1999 review of 
surveillance noted how lack of communication between the Research Department (RES) and the Asia 
and Pacific Department (ADP) didn’t allow for concerns around South Korea’s poorly regulated 
financial sector to be properly explored and may have led in part to the Asian crisis.
92
 A 2006 IEO 
report also concluded that the Monetary and Capital Market Department (MCM) seeks little input 
from area departments when it creates its annual Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).
93
 And 
finally, a 2011 IEO report focused on the IMF’s failure to identify risks in the global financial system 
in the run-up to the 2008 crisis was due in part to staff reluctance to share information or seek 
consultation outside of their departments.
 94
 
 
Despite silo thinking broadly found within the institution, LIC staff interviewed for this project 
maintained that there is collaboration between the SPR and area departments, particularly the African 
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Department, when designing new policy directives. 95 As articulated by a senior staff member of the 
African Department, 
SPR carries the pen in terms of policy development but they do so quite collaboratively 
with other departments. The department that has the biggest stake is us [African 
Department]. The initiative typically comes from them. But we can play and have played a 
role when we see a particular need.
96 
 
Based on their career tracks in the Fund, senior level staff involved with LICs interviewed have not 
remained in one department. Rather, the general trend was that senior staff moved between SPR, 
Research, and the Africa departments during their tenure. This dynamic may also guard against the 
extensity of silo mentality seen more broadly in the institution.  
Homogenous/Conforming 
 
60 percent of staff surveyed in the 2004 IEO report characterized the Fund as homogenous and 
conforming. A 2011 IEO evaluation focused on research at the Fund found that conformity to “IMF 
views” and “pre-set policy prescriptions” remains. 43 percent of staff noted that research at the Fund 
shunned alternative perspectives while 62 percent reported that research and conclusions had to be 
aligned with IMF views.
97
 A series of Fund evaluations identify several standard operating procedures 
that reinforce conformist tendencies. First, extensive review processes within departments often 
hamper inter- and intra- department communication and innovation. A 1999 external report noted that 
staff complained that “the process [of internal departmental reviews] hinders innovation and 
flexibility; departments are inhibited from trying to do things differently.”
98
 Second, staff reports 
forwarded to SPR and the Executive Board are designed to present a team view, and thus represent 
areas where staff have only found general agreement on the topic of concern. As reported by staff, this 
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produces a process “preoccupied with getting their analysis agreed and accepted internally.”
99
 Third, 
all staff documents must conform to an accepted writing style. Staff reports that have reached the 
Executive Board, for example, are first given to the Fund Secretary who standardizes them. Momani 
argues this is one additional process where dissenting or critical staff voices may be toned down or 
even eliminated.
100
  Chwieroth also notes that a focus on team work and assimilation is reinforced by 
Fund protocol with new recruits. Here, a two-year training program commonly includes time abroad 
where the new staff members are expected to assimilate and work with mission teams.
101
   
 
The Fund’s hiring practices are also a variable that reinforces a homogenous culture in the Fund. Since 
1970, the primary recruiting tool for new staff has been through the Economist Program (EP). From an 
annual initial recruitment pool of between 1500 and 2000 applicants, roughly 20-50 economists are 
hired through the EP each year. Comparison of data from 1985-87, 1991-97, and 2007-10 (see Figure 
2.5  below) shows a prominent increase in percentage of women (from 5 percent to 44.4 percent) and 
those from “underrepresented” regions (from 33 percent to 59.3 percent) brought into the Fund 
through the EP program.
102
  
    Figure 2.5:  Economist Program Recruits (1985-2010) 
   1985/87   1991/97    2007/10  
Female   5%    22%     44.4% 
 
Underrepresented 33%                34.7%     59.3%  
regions 
       (Source: Momani, 2005 and IMF, 2010) 
 
However, recruitment data also shows that the majority of new recruits from underrepresented regions 
comes from East Asia and the former Soviet and Eastern European communist states. On average, 
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only two new economists from Africa and the Middle East were recruited into the Fund annually 
between 2007 and 2010 through the Economist Program.
103
 
 
Longer term trends charted by the Fund’s Diversity Office that focused on staff make-up also show the 
percentage of Africans working at the Fund has remained between 6 and 7 percent between 1995 and 
2010. In the same time period, the share of economists from the Middle East fell from 5 percent to 4.4 
percent. Nationals from former communist states (2 percent to 9.5 percent) and East Asia (7 percent to 
10 percent) increased their representation in the Fund during this period. Comparing trends among 
industrialized regions, European representation increased from 38 percent to 44 percent while U.S. and 
Canadian nationals declined from 24 percent to 15 percent.  
 
Despite efforts to increase staff diversity by national origin and gender, staff remain predominately 
male (74.5 percent) and from industrial countries (53.7 percent). The U.S. (12 percent) and UK (5.2 
percent) have the greatest representation among staff by nationality. Only 6.5 percent and 4.4 percent 
of economists working at the Fund are from Africa and the Middle East respectively.
104
 Along with the 
greatest representation of staff by nationality, the majority of IMF staff receives their academic 
training in the U.S. and UK. As of 2010, 72.2 percent had earned their PhDs from the U.S. (63 
percent) or UK (9.2 percent) while 1.2 percent of staff held doctoral degrees from universities outside 
of the U.S., Canada, or Europe.
105
 The majority of new recruits currently are graduates from 15 
universities in the U.S. and 4 universities in the UK.
106
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As articulated by a senior staff member involved in hiring processes, lack of diversity in training has 
produces problematic dynamics of group-think in the institution: 
You have people who are normally argumentative and have their own views. Why do they 
agree with each other so easily? It could be that the mind-set is very similar. A problem we 
have is that the economists are all trained roughly in the same place, either in Europe or the 
U.S. Even though we may come from different parts of the world, we are filtered through 
the U.S. and European system. Just because we look different doesn’t mean we think 
different. There is some sense that this needs to change. We are giving a lot of attention to 
diversity in all dimensions including intellectual diversity. We need people who think 
different as well.
107
   
 
An effort to intellectually diversify through hiring and recruitment appears to be gaining  
 
traction in the institution but “is at an early stage”: 
 
We are trying to hire a little bit more from institutions outside of the U.S. and Europe. We 
have people now with PhDs from Asia, from Latin America, from Russia. But it is at an 
early stage. I am not saying we have succeeded in making it intellectually diverse but we 
have succeeded in recognizing that this is an issue we need to address. And that is the first 
step that needs to happen before anything can change.
108
 
 
Specific to LIC policymakers, two IEO studies provide evidence that staff involved with LICs are less 
homogenous and conforming in their thinking and interactions with country authorities than the 
institution at large. A 2011 IEO survey shows that 21 percent  of authorities from LICs “strongly 
agreed” that Fund research was open to alternative perspectives and was not driven by pre-set policy 
prescriptions. In comparison, only 4 percent of authorities form advanced states and 8 percent of 
emerging states responded in the same fashion.
109
  
Technocratic/Economistic 
Architects of the IMF, including John Maynard Keynes and Dexter White, were wary of the influence 
that states would exert on policy choices of the institution. In response, the Fund was structured in a 
                                                 
107
 Author interview of Fund staff member from Asia and Pacific Department, Washington D.C., 26 September 2011. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 IEO, Research at the IMF: Relevance and Utilization, p.24. 
     
47 
 
manner where the staff remained separate from the Executive Board.
110
 This has translated into a 
policy process in which the staff is mainly responsible for key aspects of Fund functions, including 
loan negotiations, program monitoring, designing conditionality, and communicating Fund policies. 
Although the Executive Board has the ultimate power to approve policy decisions, it is normally not 
involved in the “nuts and bolts” of particular terms and conditions for loan arrangements or policy 
reform.
111
 By design, it is the Fund’s staff of macroeconomists that ideally set policy. 
 
The institutional power granted to a staff dominated by macroeconomists has reinforced a technocratic 
operational culture that historically has focused primarily on issues of economic efficiency when 
developing policy for member states. Drawing primarily from macroeconomic modeling, policy 
recommendations tend to downplay or sometimes ignore country-specific political and institutional 
dynamics. Internal and external reviews point to a history of complaints from member state 
representatives on the practicality of Fund recommendations. A 2004 study reports that “Fund advice 
fails to take into account existing political constraints, or is so optimistic about the ability of the 
governments to overcome them that it does not consider second-best policy choices that would be 
consistent both with maintenance of macroeconomic stability and country-specific realties.”
112
  
 
According to a senior SPR staff member heavily involved in LIC policy design, there also has been a 
slow evolution within the Fund to think about macroeconomic advice more holistically and within a 
broader context of other social and development goals: 
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Where there has been a real cultural change is that if you go back to the late 70s and early 
80s, the conventional view in the Fund was that there is a clear separation between 
macroeconomic policies and everything else. Development policies, things like 
composition of spending, income distribution, and the social effects of policies we saw as 
important but felt that the Fund had no business in those areas. These were political issues 
and were for other people to worry about and we could pursue our macroeconomic policy 
agenda completely independently of those kind of considerations. That is what has really 
changed in the Fund. No one really believes that anymore.
113
   
 
Despite this shift, the same staff member also articulated that this change in operational thinking is  
 
not complete and has produced some confusion as to how the Fund now engages in its policy work: 
  
 We are still learning that we need to make linkages between politics and economics. I don’t 
think we are all the way there yet. Recent events in North Africa, for example, have been a 
wakeup call again that you cannot ignore factors like lack of opportunity, perception about 
corruption and subsequent legitimacy of the state if you’re going to be concerned about 
stability and sustainability of economic policies. Political factors can undermine the macro-
stability that we are trying to achieve. We are still trying to figure what that implies for the 
nature of our engagements and the policy work we get into.
114
 
 
LIC staff also still see themselves as practical economists who objectively evaluate data and focus on 
“what works” rather than ideologues pushing a particular agenda. A senior staff member responsible 
for the design of current ECF/SCF/RCF framework described this dynamic as follows: 
 I would not pin the Fund’s position too much on any internal change in culture and thinking 
but perhaps more of an evolution also of the countries that we work in. So there has been a 
shift in what’s possible because many countries have made a lot of progress in 
macroeconomic stabilization. Probably more circumstances have shifted than internal 
views of people. I can assure you that within the staff there have no debates where terms 
including “neoliberal”or “Keynesian” have been uttered.
115
 
 
This sentiment was reiterated by a current Executive Director representing LICs: 
 
 I would try to correct a sense that the IMF is ideologically driven….Within the institution, 
every view is available. There is not a particular ideology within the institution that policies 
align to, but for the IMF is it rather “what can work today.”
116
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In sum, prominent aspects of the Fund’s organizational culture and several trends that diverge from 
these norms found in LIC staff are as follows. First, the Fund operates in a bureaucratic, hierarchical 
fashion. Policy review follows a standard process that moves up the chain of command that includes 
various points of review. At the staff level, SPR serves as the main gate-keeper of potential policy 
reform for the Fund. Specific to LIC policy makers, three divisions within SPR (Low Income Country 
Strategy Unit, Low Income Countries, and Debt Policy) are responsible for review of all LIC policy 
documents before these are passed up the chain of command to the Managing Director and Executive 
Board.  
 
Second, a culture of “silo mentality” exists between departments in the institution. There is, however, 
evidence of collaboration between the African, Research, and SPR departments concerning LIC issues 
that diverges from the broader institutional trend. Third, the staff is made up of economists primarily 
trained in elite universities in the U.S., UK, and Europe who identify themselves as non-ideological, 
practical technocrats. Fourth, despite recruiting patterns and institutional design that reinforces 
homogeneity in staff thinking, survey evidence demonstrates that LIC policy makers are more open to 
alternative perspectives than other departments. Adoption of the PRSP process in 1999, for example, 
has widened the variables included in policy design in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. Greater 
openness to alternative perspectives also appears to give LIC staff greater intellectual room to explore 
ideas that historically stood outside the norm of Fund thinking. As explored in chapter 4, for example, 
LIC staff have been the main institutional actors pushing the institution to seriously address issues of 
poverty in policy design.  
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Based on its formal operations and operational culture, an argument can be made that the Fund is 
simply a technocratic institution that objectively responds to facts on the ground to alleviate balance of 
payment crises and promote international economic stability and growth. As is the general consensus 
among IO scholars focused on the IMF, I argue that the institution is much more than a technical 
support instrument for its member states’ monetary and fiscal concerns. Since 1945, the IMF’s power 
in the international system also makes it a key political actor that formally and informally shapes 
development outcomes across much of the global South.
117
 To support this claim and to give context 
to my focus on the post-Washington Consensus period in chapters 3-5, I outline below the evolution of 
the Fund’s relationship with LICs from its birth nearly seven decades ago to the mid- 1990s. 
1944-1952: The Bretton Woods Framework and the rise of IMF Conditionality  
At the end of the Second World War, U.S. and British policy makers led negotiations with allied states 
to reconstruct the international monetary and financial system. Several areas of concern marked these 
deliberations. Since the Great Depression, states had abandoned the classic gold standard of foreign 
exchange rates for floating exchange rate systems.
118
 This shift had dramatic effects in multiple policy 
areas. Under the fixed exchange rate of the gold standard, states generally implemented deflationary 
monetary and fiscal policy when currencies came under pressure from balance of trade deficits.
119
 
With floating exchange rates, states instead corrected deficits through currency depreciation and 
increased trade barriers. Along with disruptions from two major wars, this pattern of competitive, 
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“beggar thy neighbor” devaluations and protectionism resulted in major contractions of global trade 
and production.  
 
Shifts in domestic political forces also pushed states away from the gold standard in the interwar years. 
While deflationary monetary and fiscal policy to support fixed currency value was relatively easy to 
implement in the pre-WW I period, increased electoral franchise and the growing power of organized 
labor made such measures less politically tenable. Governments instead came under increased pressure 
to implement countercyclical monetary and fiscal measures during economic downturns and deficit 
spending more generally in support of emerging welfare states. Following the Great Depression, 
governments also began instituting capital controls to support domestic expansionary policy initiatives 
and counter increased speculation in the run-up to the global economic collapse of the 1930s.
120
   
 
Key then for those given the task of rebuilding the international financial order was a multilateral 
institutional framework that would reconcile domestic priorities of emerging social welfare states and 
full employment policies with a desire to move away from protectionism and competitive devaluations 
seen in the interwar period. This tension between domestic welfare state policy objectives and desire 
to restore a liberal, international trade framework manifested itself in what John Ruggie describes as 
the compromise of “embedded liberalism” adopted by capitalist states through the Bretton Woods 
arrangement: “The embedding of commitment to economic openness – the liberal element – within 
domestic economic and political objectives was attained through the inclusion of provisions in the 
rules of international trade and finance that would allow governments to opt out, on a temporary basis, 
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from their international commitments should these threaten fundamental domestic economic 
objectives.”
121
    
 
Within this context, the Bretton Woods framework was built around three pillars. To encourage trade 
liberalization, states committed to reducing protectionist barriers through the multilateral framework 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
122
 Currency stability would be reestablished 
through a flexible gold standard arrangement built around IMF monitoring and support. States pegged 
their currencies to the US dollar convertible at $35/ounce and agreed to hold exchange rates within 
one percent of those levels. With IMF consultation, member states could correct a “fundamental 
disequilibrium” by up to 10 percent devaluation of currency. States contributed to an IMF monitored 
stabilization fund from which members could borrow to finance temporary balance of payments 
deficits rather than be reliant on private funds. These policies would substitute for harsh domestic 
austerity adjustments as seen under the classic gold standard. Finally, states could control short term 
capital flows as deemed necessary under the new Bretton Woods regime, facilitating individual state 
autonomy in instituting monetary and fiscal policy that would support full employment policies and 
the subsequent stability needed for long-term liberalization.
123
 
 
In its original institutional form, the Fund had no mandate to deal with development issues. This was 
left to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). While given 
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clearly distinct roles, the Bretton Woods design also directly linked the two institutions via a provision 
in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement making membership to the Bank preconditioned on membership 
to the Fund. For the Bretton Woods framers, this linkage was driven by two concerns. Fund 
membership required that states agree to exchange rate and currency restrictions and surveillance of 
domestic economic policy. Bank membership, in contrast, involved only the benefit of access to 
development loans. Linkage would therefore reduce the risk of freeriding behavior. The framers also 
argued that monetary stability was an essential prerequisite for successful Bank lending. Fund 
membership served as leverage to push states to have their fiscal and monetary “houses in order” as a 
precondition of Bank development loans.  
 
The Bretton Woods framework also reflected different tensions seen among powerful states at the 
time. The U.S., as the clear political and economic hegemon, advocated for economic liberalization. 
European powers, particularly a weakened Britain, focused more on issues of long-term stability, 
regulation, and a framework that supported post-war reconstruction.
124
 Another controversial area 
specific to Fund activity involved conditional lending for short term balance of payments deficits. 
Britain and European states argued that conditionality requirements on short-term balance of payments 
deficits be strictly limited. By 1950, conflict between Fund staff pushing for conditionality and 
European resistance to these efforts set off a crisis in the institution as no members drew on Fund 
resources for the year. In response, Managing Director Ivar Rooth (1951-1955) proposed and 
ultimately persuaded member states to agree to a system of tiered conditionality. Each member state 
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would have conditional free access to the first 25 percent of its quota paid to the Fund in gold (the 
“gold tranche” at the time).
125
 Any loan amounts greater than the gold tranche would be subject to 
Fund conditionality and surveillance. Approved in 1952, tiered conditionality arrangements would be 
negotiated via Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs). In return for access to “upper credit tranches,” states 
agreed to implement specific policies laid out in SBAs. SBAs remain the primary non-concessionary 
lending tool of the Fund. 
1954-1962:  IMF common sense, the Polak Model, and SBAs 
Poor states were not the primary concern of the early Bretton Woods system. Only five of the original 
members of the Fund and Bank would be considered low income by today’s standard. Several factors 
quickly broadened the institutional focus of the Fund to include the concerns of developing states in 
the 1950s. First, the IMF was shut out of European reconstruction efforts as Marshall Plan aid was 
conditional on not tapping Fund (or Bank) resources. As such, the IMF was eager to broaden its 
membership.
126
 Decolonization movements also increased the number of poor states in the 
international system and subsequently membership in the Fund and Bank. The role the Bretton Woods 
institutions played in the emerging Cold War was perhaps most crucial in early Fund activity in the 
global South. Here, the Fund and Bank pushed an evolutionary model of development that rejected 
non-capitalist approaches espoused by the Soviet Union and a growing number of leftist and 
nationalist revolutionary movements. The values and thinking of “modernization theory” pushed by 
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the Fund and Bank are best captured in U.S. economist Walt Witman Rostow’s highly regarded The 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Rostow outlined key prerequisites 
necessary for successful development and “economic take-off” in poor states. These included 
technological and scientific expertise; appropriate infrastructure; education; the rule of law; private 
property rights; and the rejection of both traditional values and communism.
127
  John McCloy, the first 
president of the World Bank, was even more explicit in his description of the role that Bretton Woods 
institutions played in the support of U.S. and Western geopolitical imperatives. The World Bank  “… 
would create markets for US trade…[and] stop Communism.”
128
 Within this context, the Fund 
formally entered its first agreement with a developing state in 1954 (a $12.5 million SBA arrangement 
with Peru) and steadily increased its activities in Latin America, Africa, and Asia in the 1950s.
129
   
 
A critical driver of the emerging “common sense” behind Fund conditionality found in SBA lending at 
the time, and arguably still at some level today, is the work of IMF’s Research Department under the 
leadership of Jacques Polak (1959-1979). In the early post-War period, economists at the Fund and the 
broader economics field had not developed the analytical and theoretical tools to engage with the new 
Bretton Woods system. In response, the Research Department under Polak developed a model that 
drew from the “absorption” and monetarist approach to balance-of-payments. In regard to the former, 
much of the work in the interwar period that concerned the impact of currency devaluation on balance 
of payments deficits focused its analysis on shifts in supply and demand of imports and exports in the 
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devaluing country.
130
 Polak rejected this approach. Rather than focus on multiple elastic variables, he 
instead proposed a “simple social accounting” premise regarding balance of payment deficits: 
…the existence of balance-of-payments deficit implies that the country absorbs more 
resources in consumption and investment than it produces. Therefore, if devaluation is to 
cure this deficit, it must either increase production with consumption and investment 
constant, or decrease consumption and investment with output constant, or achieve some 
combination of the two.
131
 
 
Polak’s focus on level of consumption as the primary variable that impacts balance-of-payments 
deficits served as the foundation of the Fund’s focus on domestic policy choices of its members.  
 
While the absorption approach shifted the analysis of Fund economists onto features of the domestic 
economy, no model existed to examine how different components of economies contributed to balance 
of payments problems and what policy tools could be used for correction. Polak’s “monetary model” 
demonstrated that states could not correct balance of payment deficits in the long term solely through 
either increases in exports or import restrictions. Correction of deficits instead only occurred if the rate 
of monetary expansion remained below growth rates of real gross national product. Deficit correction 
therefore required either decreases in domestic consumption or increases in productivity. Given that 
substantive productivity increases were difficult to obtain within the time frame of Fund short-term 
lending, the Polak Model pushed for reduction in government spending, deflationary monetary policy, 
and/or tax increases. Along with narrowing policy focus for Fund staff, Polak argued that this model 
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was practical as information needed for the model (banking and trade statistics) was generally 
available while data needed for elasticity models was incomplete and often inaccurate.
132
  
 
Polak’s model and subsequent Fund thinking thus clearly placed the onus of correction on deficit 
states and their domestic policy choices. It is important to note there were other ways Fund thinking 
may have evolved concerning deficits and adjustment. Since the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the 
Fund has focused greater attention on the role of surplus states in creating global imbalances and 
called on these governments to adjust.
133
 Another possible framing of balance of payments issues is 
the role of exogenous, systemic conditions that undermine the ability of states to increase export 
earnings to correct trade imbalances. In the 1950s, however, the analytical framework of the Fund did 
not emphasize the policies of surplus states as causes of global disequilibria. Instead, a focus on 
domestic issues in deficit states produced a series of anti-inflationary policy choices and operating 
procedures that became standard for Fund engagement with LICs.
134
  Ngaire Woods contends this 
framework resonated most strongly due to the fact that it was easier for the IMF to deal with domestic 
causes of balance of payments deficits over which it could apply institutional leverage than with 
broader systemic issues. Powerful member states including the United States also were supportive of 
Polak’s framework.
135
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By the late 1950s, there was also evidence of early engagement with development issues tying Polak’s 
deflationary model to areas of growth in poor states. This is captured in excerpts from the Fund’s 1959 
Annual Report defending the need for short-term anti-inflationary adjustment: 
Notwithstanding the realization that is now fairly general that sound economic 
development is not compatible with the distortions that rapid or chronic inflation always 
creates, a number of less developed countries have had great difficulty in abating or 
slowing down the rates of inflation…The temporary deterioration of the standard of living 
[due to] a stabilization program is inevitable [and] may be interpreted by some sections of 
the public as an indication of the failure of the program, and give rise to the claim for 
prompt upwards adjustments in wages and salaries and form more liberal credit terms, 
which, if granted will again generate inflationary pressures.
136
  
 
In the 1961 Annual Meeting, Fund Managing Director Per Jacobsen (1956-1963) reinforced this  
vision of the Fund as a tool for stabilization for long term gaps of capital inflow during periods of 
adjustment.
137
   
1962- 1971: Push Back, Early Concessionary Lending, and LIC Technical Assistance   
The implementation of Polak-inspired adjustment in developing states was not without its critics. 
Conservative voices including the Economist argued that restrictive monetary policy pushed by the 
Fund was undermining Western influence in the Cold War. In a 1961 article, Per Jacobsen was 
described as  “Mr Khruschev’s secret weapon” overseeing potential “serious social eruption” in 
developing states.
138
  Pushback from the left came in two primary varieties. Deflationary prescriptions 
in Fund policy and a push to eliminate multiple exchange rates
139
 stood in sharp contrast to ISI theory 
popular in Latin America and much of the global South at the time. Among other policies to stimulate 
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industrialization for developing states, ISI frameworks embraced heavy government intervention in the 
economy. Inflation for ISI advocates was simply a by-product of state-driven investment and 
subsequent monetary expansion, and remained desirable within limits.
140
 More radical critiques tied 
IMF policy to broader attempts by wealthy countries and capitalist elites to undermine efforts of poor 
states to diversify and industrialize. Here, dependency theorists including Celso Furtado pointed to the 
fact that U.S. aid and access to private capital were often linked to states first agreeing to anti-
inflationary SBAs.
141
  For Furtado, the IMF “operated primarily as a U.S. serving control instrument 
over the economic and financial polices of other countries, especially the so-called underdeveloped 
countries.”
142
 
 
Concern over SBAs also emerged within the Fund and Washington policy establishment in the early 
1960s. An internal IMF staff document focused on Colombia, for example, concluded it was “not too 
strong to say that the Colombian case tends to support many of the recent criticisms of the Fund.”
143
  
In 1966 a Bank paper harshly criticized Fund policy in regard to short-term stabilization and called for 
“urgent reconsideration of the IMF’s approach to the performance of developing countries.”
144
 
External and internal critiques and the attention created by a new concessionary branch of the World 
Bank (the International Development Group or IDA
145
) pushed the Fund to create its first loan facility 
focused on the needs of poor states in 1963. The “Compensatory Financing Facility” (CFF) 
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acknowledged that volatility in primary commodity prices did in fact impact balance of payments 
issues in states dependent on agricultural and mineral exports. Temporary low conditionality funding 
to accommodate downturns in commodity prices thus could be more appropriate than short term 
austerity.
146
 Under the CFF, overall Fund lending to LICs increased from $243 in 1963 to $723 million 
in 1967.
147
 
 
By the mid-1960s, a growing number of developing states also pressured the Fund to address causes of 
commodity price fluctuations. This was a major goal shared by states that formed the United Nations 
Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. UNCTAD also pushed the IMF to focus 
on the drop of global liquidity seen throughout the 1960s. Developing states argued that inconsistent 
access to short term lending resources was a key element in causing disruptive balance of payment 
crises. Pressure from developing states and emerging European economies helped catalyze the 1969 
adoption of “special drawing rights” (SDRs): 
  
 One vision of what would eventually become the SDR saw an important role for what 
came to be called the “link” with development, on the grounds that the effects of liquidity 
shortage in dealing with short-term balance of payments problems were felt most acutely 
outside the developed world.
148
 
  
Growing tension between the Fund and Bank also emerged during this period. A series of Bank loans 
in Latin America and Asia in the early and mid-1960s, for example, included conditions on exchange 
rate policies and macroeconomic initiatives. In response to growing turf wars, Bank and Fund 
leadership reached an agreement that clarified the primary responsibilities of each institution in late 
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1966. The IMF was given jurisdiction over “exchange rates and restrictive systems, for adjustment of 
temporary balance of payments disequilibria and for evaluating and assisting members to work out 
stabilization programs as a sound basis for economic advice.” The Bank’s primary responsibilities 
would involve “composition and appropriateness of development programs and project evaluation, 
including development priorities.” Areas “of interest to both institutions” included “the structure and 
functioning of capital markets, the actual and potential capacity of a member country to generate 
domestic savings, the financial implications of economic development programs…foreign debt 
problems, and so on.”
149
 As outlined further below, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and 
the oil shocks of the 1970s would chip away at the clear roles outlined in the 1966 concordat. 
 
The Fund role in providing technical assistance to LICs also expanded in the 1960s. In response to the 
fact that most new African states at the time had no central banks, the Fund created its “Central 
Banking Service.” In 1964, the IMF Institute was opened in Washington, D.C. “Prominent in the 
curriculum were courses on financial programming, which taught national officials how to use the 
Fund’s analytical techniques in their own policymaking at the national level.”
150
 Increased Fund 
missions to LICs “demanded certain kinds of data for their analysis from members” that in turn shaped 
what those member states would examine in their societies. In reaction to weak data collection seen in 
LICs, the Fund also opened its Bureau of Statistics in 1969.
151
   
1971-1982: Breakdown of Bretton Woods and Early Structural Conditionality 
While the Fund’s role in the global South was established by the early 1970s, several factors pushed 
the institution more firmly into the realm of LIC development. The most influential factor was the 
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collapse of the Bretton Woods system of adjustable pegged exchange rates between 1971 and 1973. 
As industrialized states adopted floating exchange rates, a primary component of the Fund’s original 
institutional responsibility evaporated. An institutional focus on chronic balance of payments issues in 
developing states filled this vacuum. The Fund also found itself marginalized in its role of financing 
balance of payments deficits in middle income states. Major commercial banks flush with OPEC 
petrodollars accelerated lending to the global South and undermined the IMF’s presence in emerging 
and middle-income countries.
152
 By the mid -1970s, the IMF’s main policy interventions were in the 
world’s poorest states deemed too risky for private investment. 
 
As the Fund’s clientele became poorer, three initiatives were introduced to meet LIC needs: the Oil 
Facility, the Trust Fund, and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Both the Oil Facility (1975-1983) and 
Trust Fund (1976-1981) were financed outside the Fund’s general account and represented the first 
generation of Fund concessional lending.
153
 The EFF (introduced in 1974) signified a watershed 
moment in regard to the Fund’s contemporary role in LICs. The three year EFF loan was designed by 
Fund staff to fill a gap between short-term SBA financing and long-term World Bank development 
aid.
154
  Unique to the EFF was its focus on correcting long term structural issues in member states that 
produced “slow growth and an inherently weak balance of payments position” that undermined “an 
active development policy.”
155
 While Polak inspired macroeconomic policy conditionality focused on 
short term issues, structural conditionality went deeper as it pushed for substantial reform in national 
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economies and their legal systems and linked reform to broader issues of development.
156
  Structural 
conditionality focused on liberalizing economies became the new norm of Fund and Bank policies 
following the 1982 Mexican debt crisis.  
1982-1996: The Washington Consensus and Liberal Market Restructuring 
By the early 1980s, LICs accounted for 44 percent of the IMF’s membership and over 60 percent of its 
borrowers.
157
 These states faced a series of daunting challenges sparked by a perfect storm of events 
from 1979-1982. The second oil crisis of the decade cut into national income for non-oil producing 
states and reinforced already existing patterns of high inflation across the global South. Inflationary 
concerns were not limited to LICs, as the U.S. Federal Reserve dramatically curtailed monetary supply 
from 1979 to 1982. The subsequent combination of higher interest rates for global debtors and reduced 
demand from industrialized states for their products pushed up unemployment, increased balance of 
payments deficit and debt levels, and reduced access to cheap private financing.  
 
The initial response to the 1979 oil shock included increased pressure from borrowers and creditors on 
the Fund to increase LIC lending. Managing Director Jacques de Larosière (1978-1986) responded in 
kind with a strategy pushing for increased conditional lending. With a move toward greater use of 
SBAs and the EFF for LICs, overall Fund upper tranche conditionality lending grew from an annual 
average of $1.25 billion in 1973-1978 to $3.23 billion from 1979-1984.
158
     
 
Fall out of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis also proved a significant factor in the Fund’s relationship with 
its poorest member states. Here, IMF conditionality requirements that emerged worked to dismantle 
                                                 
156
Nitsan Chorev and Sarah Babb, “The Crises of Neoliberalism and the Future of International Institutions: A Comparison 
of the IMF and the WTO,” Theory and Society 38 (2009), pp.459-484 at p.465. 
157
 Boughton, “Lending to and for the Poor,” p 55. 
158
 Boughton, Silent Revolution, p.563. 
     
64 
 
the remnants of state-heavy ISI strategies seen as responsible for high inflation, corruption, 
inefficiency, and chronic balance of payment problems across much of the developing world at the 
time. As introduced in chapter 1, these were described as “Washington Consensus” reforms and 
included trade and financial liberalization; privatization of state enterprises; reduction and elimination 
of subsidies; liberalization of labor markets, restructuring taxation toward consumption based systems; 
and strengthened institutional protection of private property rights.  
 
Washington Consensus reforms were pursued in LICs through two concessionary lending 
arrangements. In 1986, the IMF introduced the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF). The SAF 
merged concessionary lending (0.5 percent interest, ten year maturity, and repayment in 5 ½ years) 
and structural conditionality requirements into one loan program for the first time. Using IDA 
eligibility as the income criterion for access to the three-year SAF, 60 LICs qualified to draw from 
approximately $3.2 billion in lending resources.
159
 Conditionality requirements of the SAF were 
designed to be stricter and broader than those previously enacted under the Trust Fund. Whereas the 
Trust Fund was designed to “carry out programs of balance of payment adjustment,” policy reforms in 
SAFs were spelled out in a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) where the member state in question would 
outline “a three-year adjustment program…to correct macroeconomic and structural problems that 
have impeded balance of payment adjustment and economic growth.”
160
  The PFP process also 
included World Bank participation at various steps. After a state requested a SAF loan, Fund and Bank 
staff collaborated to draft an initial PFP to be negotiated with country authorities. Once the PFP 
negotiation process was complete, the Bank’s Executive Board would review the agreement and 
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forward its recommendation to the Fund’s Board. Despite low funding levels, stricter conditionality, 
and a cumbersome review process, 29 countries borrowed a total of $2.4 billion through the SAF 
program from 1987 to 1999.
161
 
    
The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), initiated in 1987, tripled the resources available 
to qualifying states through the establishment of the ESAF Trust. LICs applying to the ESAF also 
could draw on a substantially higher percentage of their quota (140- 185 percent over three years) than 
under the SAF (63.5 percent). To strengthen conditionality requirements, the ESAF introduced 
procedures that linked semiannual disbursement of funds to successful completion of PFP negotiated 
“structural benchmarks” and “structural performance criterion.”  Performance criteria, eliminated in 
2009, were easily measurable benchmarks set by the Executive Board that a member state was 
expected to adopt before further disbursement of loans. Failure to meet performance criteria required a 
waiver from the Executive Board for any future distribution of loan resources. Structural benchmarks, 
also approved by the EB, “are applied to measures that cannot be specified in terms that are 
objectively monitorable, or to measures where non-implementation to a single component would not 
be judged sufficient to derail the program.”
162
  Between 1988 and 1999, the ESAF became the primary 
concessional loan instrument of the Fund, disbursing over $10.7 billion in lending through 90 
arrangements to 52 LICs.
163
   
 
Conclusion 
Six trends from 1945-1996 highlight the Fund’s contemporary role in formally and informally shaping 
LIC policy choices. First, the focus of the Fund shifted from industrial economies to poor states during 
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this time. By the 1960s, less than 10 percent of Fund lending went to OECD members, and from 1975 
to 2007, no Western industrialized states received Fund loans.
164
  Second, since the establishment of 
Polak-inspired conditionality in the 1950s, members are granted access to resources contingent on 
implementation of Fund-directed policies. While these conditions changed over time, the leverage of 
the Fund to impose rules or reform remains in place in LICs. Third, the Fund evolved to fill an 
informal role as gatekeeper for member access to World Bank loans, other multilateral assistance, and 
private banks. Fourth, adoption of the Polak model shaped how the institution perceived economic 
problems in LICs and the general formula for corrective action. Balance of payments problems and 
broader economic performance were considered primarily the fault of deficit states. Adjustment and 
belt tightening in LICs, rather than a focus on the behavior of surplus states or instability in global 
markets, is the primary lens through which policy is developed and implemented. 
 
 Fifth, the Fund’s focus on statistics and technical data as the basis of policy decisions influenced what 
data member states measured and the rules and procedures undertaken to collect this information.
165
  
Member governments, in turn, responded by creating new categories of measurement and subsequent 
policy focus. And finally, the framing of Fund policy choices and technical assistance as based on 
objective, apolitical “facts” and econometric modeling helped established the Fund as a legitimate 
authority in LICs. As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore,  
The IMF uses rules to reason and also to justify and explain its decisions to its publics, and 
in this way is no different from the UN Secretariat or UNHCR…But its form of reasoning 
is different because of its reliance on quantitative analysis…Because analyses based on 
numbers, models, and rules seem impartial and fair, they are a defense against accusations 
of politicized and unprofessional behavior that can undermine bureaucrats’ authority as 
experts. Indeed, it is the objective and depoliticized nature of these policy 
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recommendations that allows them to garner political support and mobilizes people to 
implement the recommended policies.
166
 
 
Establishment of legitimate authority in turn supplemented the Fund’s growing power in shaping LIC 
outcomes.
167
   
 
This power remains today and is manifested in multiple forms.
168
 As outlined above, the Fund exhibits 
compulsory power in its ability to directly alter LIC behavior through denial of funds or categorization 
of a member state as off the “right track.” Its more indirect institutional power stems primarily from its 
bilateral and multilateral surveillance and technical support activity. The Fund also has a specific way 
of categorizing economies and their progress, and uses particular data points to determine if a LIC is 
meeting benchmarks necessary for continued or future funding. Through data collection and 
determination of what problems exist in LICs to be solved and how these problems should be 
addressed, the Fund exhibits productive power in helping to constitute “what matters” in these 
societies. Finally, the Fund’s engagement in LICs also reflects broader structural power relations 
highlighted by neo-Marxist scholars. As developed further in chapter 5, the IMF’s policy directive in 
LICs can be interpreted as one component of broader processes that facilitate and reproduce the state 
forms and policy choices necessary for globalizing capitalism.
169
    
                                                 
166
Ibid., p.69. 
167
 For a discussion of different forms of authority seen in post -World War II international organizations (“rational-legal, 
delegated, moral, and expert”), see Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Power of Liberal International 
Organizations” in Power in Global Governance, eds. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp.161-175. 
168
 I draw from Barnett and Duvall’s typology of power that divides power into four primary forms: compulsory, 
institutional, structural and productive. See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall “Power in Global Governance,” in 
Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael Barnett  and Raymond Duvall  (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp.1-22. 
169
 Mark Rupert “Class Power and the Politics of Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall  (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.200-214. 
 
     
68 
 
Two prominent themes developed in chapters 1 and 2 thus highlight the rationale for an in-depth study 
of contemporary post Washington Consensus IMF LIC reform. First, the Fund “matters” in regard to 
LICs and will continue to play a prominent role in early 21
st
 century development outcomes. It is in 
the best interest of those inside and outside the IMF to understand what dynamics facilitate change in 
its policy directives. Second, while the role of the IMF in LICs is firmly established, the post 
Washington Consensus period has produced a more complex landscape of how the Fund expresses it 
power and leverage in LICs. Rather than a strict top-down, “one size fits all” development model 
pushed by IMF during the Washington Consensus period, the past two decades are marked by a more 
consensual and multilayered reality. The complexity of this dynamic is reinforced further by LIC staff 
that exhibit greater openness and flexibility than their peers in other more prominent departments in 
the institution. In chapter 3, we begin unpackaging the multiple layers of post Washington Consensus 
LIC policy reform. 
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Chapter 3 - Coalitions of Change: Rationalist Explanations of LIC Reform  
Chapter 3 investigates four cases of post Washington Consensus LIC reform through a framework that 
combines principal agent modeling and elements of sociological organizational theory. It identifies 
four patterns in regard to LIC policy reform. First, two tiers of actors were involved in LIC change. 
Primary actors included powerful states, the Managing Director, and senior staff. Secondary actors 
consisted of poor states, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress. Policy change occurred only when a coalition 
made up of two primary actors or a primary actor and secondary actor formed. Second, as 
hypothesized by principal agent theory, increases in powerful state preference heterogeneity granted 
staff and management greater room to initiate or resist policy change. Third, direct NGO pressure 
proved most effective when a sympathetic primary actor was present. Fourth, individuals in the 
Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and African Department and the Managing Director were 
key actors who reinforced coalitions around LIC change. 
Theorizing IO Change: PA Modeling and SO Theory 
IO scholars Daniel Nielson, Michael Tierney and Catherine Weaver contend that stand alone 
rationalist and sociological organizational (SO) approaches fail to effectively explain change in 
multilateral institutions. Rationalist approaches, grounded in principal-agent (PA) theory, have 
difficulty explaining why some patterns of institutional behavior remain in place even when heavily 
targeted for change by powerful state actors or management. SO approaches reciprocally fail to 
explain why staff opposed to certain reform initiatives concedes to powerful state or management 
demands seemingly at odds with the institution’s culture. Nielson et al. call for an “empirical 
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synthesis” of PA modeling and SO theory to best capture the interplay of “top down” and “bottom up” 
dynamics.
170
 
 PA models ground their analysis in the following two assumptions. First, IOs are not simply 
manifestations of powerful state preferences in the international system.
171
 Rather, they are entities in 
and of themselves and exhibit relative autonomy from powerful states: “We emphasize the importance 
of IOs as actors that implement policy decisions and pursue their own interests strategically.”
172
   
Despite political agency, IOs face constraints on policy direction, as they are ultimately granted 
conditional authority by states to perform tasks in the international system. In PA parlance, states are 
“principals” that delegate authority to IOs through formal or informal “contractual” agreement.
173
 IOs 
are “agents” that function within the constraints of conditional grants of authority. This dynamic sets 
up a fluid situation witnessed by changing degrees of “agency slack” and “autonomy.”  Agency slack 
refers to “independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal.” Autonomy is the range of 
potential independent action available to an agent after the principal has established mechanisms of 
control.
174
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PA theory maintains that the nature of the contractual relationship produces predictable dynamics 
concerning institutional behavior and change. For the principal, the main concern is how authority is 
delegated without losing control. Agents are opportunistic and commonly engage in several forms of 
behavior to increase slack and autonomy. Most common are processes that hide information or involve 
taking action behind the back of the principal.
175
 For their part, states reduce “agency slippage” 
through five primary mechanisms. First, they formally determine what authority is delegated to the IO 
and have the power to alter contracted agreements. Second, principals have control of the selection, 
hiring, and firing of IO management. Third, agents also can monitor principals directly or through 
third parties. Fourth, principals can structure IOs in a manner that keeps individuals in the institution 
in check. This is accomplished through creation of institutional checks and balances or through 
empowering more than one agent with the same mandate (e.g., adjustment lending in both the Bank 
and Fund). Finally, states can punish or reward the IO. In the case of the IMF, states ultimately can 
withhold funding of quota resources.
176
 
PA models also focus on the form of principal agent relationships. At its simplest, PA models involve 
a single principal delegating to a single agent (see Figure 3.1 below). In reality, delegation of authority 
to agents often involves a principal made up of multiple actors (“collective principal”) or a situation 
where a single agent has more than one contract with organizationally distinct principals (“multiple 
principals”).
177
 All else being equal, PA models predict greater agency slack and autonomy as the 
number of principals increases. Room for agents to shirk principal demands also is predicted to 
increase as divergence in preferences among principals (“preference heterogeneity”) increases. 
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Figure 3.1:  Types of PA Relationships 
 Single principal      Multiple principals 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective principal 
 
 
 
 
     
     
       (Source: Lyne et al., “Who Delegates?,” p.45) 
 
PA models also focus on what are termed “proximate” principals in predicting IO change (see figure 
3.2 below). In a delegation change visualized here for the Fund, the proximate principal is the entity 
with the closest formal authority to the agent in question. While pressure for change may come from 
actors (voters, NGOs) several places removed in the delegation chain (“distal principals”),  Fund 
management and staff will most likely ignore these demands and instead focus on signals from their 
proximate principal: “Because staff members of IOs are not rewarded, or may even be punished if they 
respond too vigorously to stimuli other than the demands of their proximate principal, they should tend 
to ignore or discount demands made by interest groups in given member countries.”
178
  PA models 
thus predict little change due to NGO “street heat” or direct lobbying of the Fund. Rather, NGO 
pressure on states should prove more effective in producing reform in policy direction. 
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 Nielson and Tierney, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental 
Reform,” p.250. 
X Agent       gggggg 
XYZ Agent       gggggg 
Agent       gggggg 
      Z 
Y               Y     
X       XxXX      
 
 
     
73 
 
Figure 3.2: Hypothetical Chain of Delegation for IMF 
 
     Private actors (voters) 
      ↓ 
     Member Governments 
      ↓ 
     Fund Executive Board 
      ↓  
         Management 
      ↓ 
                      Staff 
 
PA modeling is incorporated to clarify the outer structural constraints within which IO policies may 
diverge from state (or managerial) preferences and which actors carry the greatest leverage over policy 
choices. Answers to how and why the Fund changes policy direction within semi-autonomous 
relationship with principals instead draws from sociological organization (SO) theory. SO theory 
assumes that IOs have their own internal social life, norms, and organizational culture through which 
external demands from states, NGOs or senior management are refracted and internally processed. It 
also holds that internal policy culture and subsequent policy choices may sometimes even change 
without external pressure and develop a path-dependent life of their own potentially at odds with 
powerful state interests.
179
  
 
Several variables that can shift internal culture and policy choices are identified in the SO literature. 
Foremost is the role of internal “norm entrepreneurs.” Individuals pushing a new idea will command 
the greatest influence if they occupy a position within the bureaucracy that: (1) has access to 
management; (2) can serve as a veto point for policy initiatives; and (3) has access to resources.
180
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Staff and management also maneuver through the organizational bureaucracy, promoting new beliefs 
that can potentially alter the organization’s culture and practices.
181
 These agents promote particular 
policy outcomes through three primary avenues.
182
 First, they interpret historical experience through 
the assumptions and worldviews that will support their ideas and actively search for evidence that will 
reinforce their beliefs. Second, these actors may also engage in small scale experiments to test their 
assumptions. In the IMF, for example, this dynamics is seen when staff circulate position papers or 
articles published in Finance and Development that explore and test questions concerning appropriate 
policy response. Third, actors that push for change will also engage strategically in ideological battles 
to win support for their ideas.
183
  
The ultimate success of reforms proposed also is tied to the form and depth of change advocated. 
When staff interpret new information and events that fail to meet expected outcomes, “they tend to 
change their beliefs about legitimate means in an ad hoc fashion rather than changing their beliefs 
about legitimate goals.”
184
  Shifts in thinking and subsequent policy choice reform are therefore most 
likely due to “adaptation.” Defined as a change in beliefs about desirable means to reach a policy 
outcome, this is manifested in various forms including “changes in organizational language, structures, 
symbols, and small modifications of behavior.”
185
 Adaption differs from more fundamental processes 
of “learning.”  Rather than questioning the efficacy of policy process to achieve a certain outcome, 
learning challenges policy goals. Given that learning is a deeper process of change that can 
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fundamentally challenge organizational culture, SO theorists predict that IO policy shift occurs most 
frequently through processes of adaption.
186
 
Successful reform also hinges in part on the degree of discursive influence individuals hold. Seasoned 
staff and management considered authorities advocating change encounter less resistance from less 
senior colleagues. Position in the bureaucracy also matters. Staff situated in leadership positions more 
easily lobby management, initiate or block potential reforms, and control information.
187
 Specific to 
LIC policy reform at the Fund, we should expect that senior staff found in the Africa, SPR, and 
Research Departments are key gate-keepers that influence the potential success or failure of reform 
efforts. 
PA Modeling, SO Theory and Fund Policy Change 
For purposes of this project, I focus on two levels of delegation (see Figure 3.3 below): State to Fund 
management (level 1) and management to staff (level 2). At level 1, powerful states represented by the 
Fund’s Executive Board serve as the collective principal. Member states of the Fund delegate authority 
to the 24 member executive board (EB), which oversees day to day operations of the Fund. As noted 
in chapter 2, each Executive Director (ED) has different weighted voting power based on quota size of 
state(s) represented. The U.S., Germany, Britain, Japan, and France each have individual 
representation on the EB and the largest weighed voting power since 1945. Decisions on the EB are 
mainly finalized through consensus rather than formal votes and require coalitions built around 
support of the above shareholders, particularly the United States.
188
  Along with the greatest voting 
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share, the U.S. differs from other powerful states in its presidential government design. The model 
below therefore includes the U.S. Congress as an additional principal that can contract with Fund 
management.
189
 
 
   
 
   Figure 3.3:  Principals at Two Levels of Delegation Chain 
  
                                                 Level 1                                                          Level 2 
Level 1      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congress confirms the ED appointed by the President and must approve any quota increase to the 
Fund. Congress also must consent to any supplemental lending to the IMF via the General 
Arrangement of Borrowers (GAB), the New Arrangement of Borrowers (NAB), and sale of IMF gold 
resources. In addition, Congress passes mandates that direct the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct 
the U.S. ED to pursue specific policy objectives: 
 Policy mandates seek to foster or advocate certain policies at the IMF by directing Treasury 
to instruct the U.S. Executive Director to use his or her “voice,” “vote,” or both, on behalf 
of the United States at the Executive Board to bring about a policy change at the IMF. For 
example, the U.S. Executive Director is directed to encourage the IMF to adopt 
internationally recognized worker rights for borrowing countries. Directed vote mandates 
are more prescriptive, in that they instruct the United States to “oppose” or “vote against” 
loans or other IMF assistance to particular countries or categories of countries.
190
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As of 2005, the Government Accountability Office has identified 70 legislative mandates passed by 
Congress since 1945. 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, the Fund’s operational culture is characterized by hierarchical and 
bureaucratic tendencies. The staff is also rooted in a scientific, technocratic worldview that is 
consistent with analysis found in the broader epistemic and professional economics field. Shifts in LIC 
policy should not be expected to occur rapidly or be shaped extensively by political pressure from 
outside the institution. Reform of LIC policy is also more likely if the reform in question resonates or 
is packaged in way that is congruent with a culture historically supportive of liberal market solutions 
to development issues (see chapter 4). 
 
Drawing from the PA and SO frameworks, the following hypotheses are derived for explaining LIC 
policy change: 
H1: If pressure for LIC policy change comes from staff and runs counter to state or management 
preferences, increased/decreased heterogeneity of principal preferences strengthens/weakens the 
ability of staff working to shift policy direction. 
 
H2: If pressure for LIC policy change comes from state principal demands on the Fund and runs 
counter to internal staff and management interests, increased/decreased heterogeneity of state 
preferences weakens/strengthens the ability of management and staff to shift policy direction. 
 
H3: LIC policy change only occurs due to proximate principal pressure. Direct NGO or citizen 
(“leapfrogging”) pressure on the Fund will not produce LIC policy change. 
 
H4: A strategically situated “norm entrepreneur” is a necessary component of LIC policy change 
when the change in question challenges the Fund’s institutional culture. 
 
H5: Framing of policy reform shifts as a need to address policy implementation (adaption), rather 
than a fundamental challenge to Fund thinking on macroeconomic policy (learning), and increases the 
change of subsequent implementation of reform in LIC policy choices. 
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Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) 
Liberal market policy positions pushed by SAF and ESAF structural conditionality (see chapter 2) sets 
the stage for examination of the first substantial shift in Fund policy away from a strict Washington 
Consensus model. Facilitated in part by growing evidence of stagnant growth and rising inequality and 
poverty across much of the developing world in the 1980s, critics of the IMF and World Bank argued 
that conditional lending to LICs was a primary cause of unsustainable debt levels and called for 
substantial multilateral debt relief.  
 
The debate around debt relief first formally emerged in Paris Club
191
 negotiations of bilateral debt 
levels in the 1980s. The general consensus from creditor states at the time was that debt levels of poor 
states were manageable if correctly addressed. Rather than debt forgiveness, extension of terms of 
payment or reduction in interest rates was seen as the appropriate response for bilateral agreements. 
By the mid-1980s, growing debt levels – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – prompted British 
officials to propose a framework of bilateral debt relief through the Paris Club. The proposal, 
introduced by UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson in 1987, called for Club members to 
convert bilateral aid loans to grants, increase repayment periods to twenty years, and reduce the rate of 
interest on outstanding debt by one-third for debtor states in good standing with the Fund.  
 
British lobbying continued through 1987 and 1988 at the Paris Club, the Venice and Toronto G-7 
Summits, the Commonwealth Finance of Ministers, and IMF/World Bank Annual meetings. Despite 
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initial broad opposition from other rich states (Germany, Japan, and the U.S.), the G-7 endorsed the 
“Toronto Terms” in 1988. Through the Paris Club, creditors could choose from three options for 
dealing with debtor states: long-term rescheduling, lower interest rates, and a partial write down of 
stock of debt.
192
  Inertia toward bilateral debt relief was further enhanced with several U.S. initiatives, 
including the 1989 Brady plan,
193
 and a 1991 reduction of Egyptian debt for its contribution of military 
forces in the first Gulf War. Further proposals increasing bilateral debt relief pushed by the UK were 
adopted throughout the early 1990s, culminating in the Lyon Terms agreement at the 1996 G-7 
Summit. Under this agreement, highly indebted states in good standing with the Fund and Bank could 
have up to 80 percent of bilateral debts written off through the Paris Club.
194
 
 
As bilateral debt relief increased through the late 1980s and early 1990s, the percentage of debt owed 
to multilateral institutions increased substantially.
195
 In addition to calls from NGOs (see below), the 
UK (along with the Netherlands and the Nordic states) formally initiated the notion of Fund and Bank 
debt relief for LICs at the 1994 spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank. Although broadly 
resisted by the majority of wealthy states and management at the Fund,
196
 growing pressure to 
examine multilateral debt relief continued. Along with lobbying by the UK and NGOs, newly 
appointed World Bank President James Wolfensohn was sympathetic to looking at the issue.
197
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In February 1995, The Fund and Bank staff presented a joint paper on issues of debt sustainability and 
concluded that for the majority of LICs “debt service ratios on currently outstanding multilateral debt 
will be essentially unchanged or lower in the coming three years (1995-1997) and will decline further 
in most cases over the next decade.”
198
  As such “there was no unmanageable hump of debt servicing 
to multilaterals for the vast majority of heavily indebted poor countries.”
199
  
 
Reaction at the Executive Board was mixed. At a February 24 meeting, critics of the staff report most 
sympathetic to multilateral debt relief included the EDs from the UK (Evans), Nordic states (Srejber), 
and those representing LICs (Dlami and Koissey). Evans, for example, concluded “…that the problem 
is more serious than the Fund staff paper admits. And that the Fund has a role in resolving the 
problem.”
200
 The U.S. (Lissakers) and Canada (Clark) provided more reserved support. Clark argued 
“that the Fund and Bank cannot be grant agencies. Nevertheless these multilateral credit organizations 
cannot ignore that their interest charges…divert some productive resources away from the debtor 
country.”
201
  EDs from Germany (Esdar), Japan (Mesaki), France (Autheman), and Italy (Grilli) 
resisted calls for debt relief. Division of powerful state preferences on the issue of debt relief remained 
in subsequent EB debates in 1995 and 1996. Most notable was U.S. movement from a mild supporter 
of the UK position to a strong advocate for debt relief in 1996. ED Lissakers, for example, critiqued an 
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April 2, 1996 revised staff proposal on multilateral debt relief as biased and too rigid to effectively 
address debt issues in LICs: 
 ….the proposed framework would not give the Fund sufficient flexibility to assess the 
 needs of individual cases, including those where it might be appropriate to take bolder 
 actions in tandem with other bilateral and multilateral creditors within a shorter time 
 frame to provide effective debt relief and place the country on a path toward higher 
 rates of sustainable growth.
202
 
 
France, Germany, and Japan remained staunchly opposed to the UK and U.S. position and were even 
critical of staff’s reference to poverty issues in the report. Japanese ED Mesaki, for example, stated: 
…it would not be appropriate to indicate that…principal donors and multilateral creditors 
…undertake to implement a set of measures aimed at the achievement of a sustainable debt 
level consistent with a country’s strategy to improve growth prospects and reduce poverty. 
The Fund’s efforts should be aimed at helping countries strengthen their overall 
macroeconomic framework, not at achieving objectives related to longer-term growth or to 
social issues…. Therefore, we did not see a need to expand on the prospective role of the 
Fund in resolving the debt problem of the HIPCs.
203
 
 
Despite this division, there was consensus among wealthy states that any program on debt relief going 
forward would require strong conditionality requirements and continual staff oversight.
204
   
 
Staff was generally skeptical of any moves toward debt relief. As noted above, an initial paper on the 
issue of debt sustainability in LICs issues on February 7, 1995 maintained the majority of poor states 
could manage debt levels. This conclusion was based on assumptions of annual nominal export growth 
rates of 6 percent and annual nominal 3 percent growth rate of new concessional lending. When 
challenged by NGOs on these figures, the Executive Board asked staff to revisit the issue. A March 30 
revised staff report increased the number of countries that could be adversely affected from 8 to 23 but 
argued again that multilateral debt was manageable if sufficient concessionary lending came 
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forward.
205
 Two further studies requested by the Development Committee and the Board in 1996 
focused on individual LIC cases. Staff once again argued that the majority of highly indebted states 
could pay back multilateral debts. The paper also focused on issues of moral hazard and noted a 
potential upside to some form of debt relief if the Fund and Bank maintained strong conditionality and 
oversight of the process: 
 A potential advantage of refinancing/rescheduling (accompanied by conditionality) 
 relative to explicit up front debt reduction may be that by allowing the Fund and the 
 Bank to constantly monitor policy performances in the indebted countries, it leads to 
 better policies and less moral hazard problems.
206
 
 
In response to an Interim Committee request for some form of debt relief proposal, the staff presented 
its framework in February 1996. Under a two-step program over a six year period, highly indebted 
LICs under Fund and Bank surveillance would first be granted up to 90 percent debt relief from Paris 
Club and commercial creditors. If the LICs met Fund and Bank standards of reform, they then would 
graduate to phase two where debt owed to the Fund, Bank, and other multilateral institutions would be 
reduced to sustainable levels.  
Along with staff, management was wary of HIPC. Camdessus supported staff positions in regard to 
debt sustainability and rejected calls for substantive multilateral debt relief: 
I would conclude…there does not seem to be at this stage a generalized problem of debt to 
multilateral institutions…For the Fund, the clear implication is the need to have available 
resources on ESAF terms for the foreseeable future….there appears to be no need for major 
changes in the Fund’s facilities or in their concessionality for most of the poorest 
members.
207
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Due to the split between powerful state preferences on staff HIPC proposals in spring 1996, 
Camdessus advocated for a proposal put forth by the German (Esdar) and Japanese (Mesaki) EDs that 
the staff position on HIPCs be considered endorsed by management and not the Executive Board.208  
Despite critiques from the UK and U.S. EDs that the staff proposal was too conservative and “neither 
economically effective and efficient nor politically sustainable,” the split on the board and Camdessus’ 
support for Esdar’s proposal allowed the staff framework of debt relief to go to the Interim Committee 
in April 1996. The HIPC initiative was then endorsed by the Board of Governors and Executive Board 
in September 1996. 
In regard to NGO influence on HIPC adoption, methods included indirect pressure on powerful states 
and direct lobbying of Fund staff and management. Most prominent in shaping Fund policy change on 
debt was the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad) and Oxfam International. 
Starting in 1994, Eurodad organized a campaign on multilateral debt forgiveness that targeted the 
Bank and IMF.
209
 By 1996, “over 150 NGOs, NGO networks, academics, debt experts, representatives 
from the UN, UNCTAD, UNDP, the Non-aligned Movement, the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
other interested institutions” had joined the campaign.
210
 NGO pressure was applied indirectly to 
powerful state legislatures and finance ministers in several venues. Prior to the July 1995 Halifax G-7 
summit, for example, Eurodad heavily lobbied G-7 leadership around issues of multilateral debt relief. 
In its communiqué, the G-7 acknowledged that the “IMF and World Bank should lead in developing a 
comprehensive multilateral approach to assist countries with multilateral debt and debt-service ratios 
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above prudent levels in addressing their debt burdens, through the flexible implementation of existing 
instruments, and new mechanisms where necessary.”
211
   
 
Relative to direct action, Eurodad was also the primary actor that pressured Fund and Bank EDs and 
management to review the assumptions of the February 7, 1995 staff report initially downplaying the 
severity of multilateral debt issues. Eurodad, Oxfam, and the Debt Crises Network also actively 
lobbied Fund management and staff on debt issues, and participated and demonstrated at the joint 
annual meetings of the Fund and Bank during this time.
212
  Religious organizations were also outside 
players that actively pushed the Fund to address debt relief issues. Catholic Church leadership, for 
example, met with Camdessus in London and Washington in 1996, where the MD “was reported to 
have been deeply affected by the meetings as he came face to face with the hostility of world Catholic 
leaders toward the institutions he led and its economic policies.”
213
   
HIPC Results: 
    
Returning to the hypotheses introduced above, the evidence in the HIPC case points to the following. 
H1-H2: The division between two blocs of powerful states (U.S./UK and Germany, Japan, and France) 
allowed the MD and staff to initially block HIPC reform efforts. While pressure from the U.S. and UK 
and NGOs ultimately led to adoption of the HIPC, the fact that Germany, Japan, and France resisted 
these efforts increased the leverage of the MD and staff in shaping the final design of debt relief. Strict 
conditionality requirements and increased surveillance of LICs as a component of debt relief pushed 
by the staff, for example, were included in the HIPC. This suggests that powerful state preference 
heterogeneity increased management and staff power in the shaping of reform efforts.  
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H3: NGOs applied pressure both on IMF management and staff and on state principals. PA theory 
maintains that NGO pressure applied directly to IMF management and staff will not have significant 
impact on Fund policy change. Effective pressure applied to powerful states, in contrast, is 
hypothesized to produce a dynamic where the IMF responds to the new demands of its proximate 
principal. In the HIPC case, NGOs applied pressure both directly on Fund management and staff, and 
indirectly on powerful states in their support of debt relief. While these efforts helped produce a 
change in policy direction, the evidence from this case is thus unable to definitively discern to what 
degree direct or indirect pressure helped spur adoption of the HIPC. 
H4: Evidence does not point to any individual within the IMF who pushed for the HIPC.  
H5: IMF management and staff initially resisted debt relief for LICs. As documented above, multiple 
staff position papers initially downplayed the severity of LIC debt and its impacts. When adopted, the 
HIPC in its final form was framed in a manner that did not fundamentally challenge Fund thinking. 
Debt relief, for example, was presented in a manner whereby recipient states would see increased 
conditionality requirements and Fund surveillance. 
           
“Enhanced” Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC II) 
The Fund and World Bank replaced the HIPC with the “enhanced” HIPC (HIPC II) in 1999. HIPC II 
promised to provide “faster, deeper, and broader debt relief” for LICs and tied debt forgiveness to a 
series of new poverty reduction initiatives introduced with the PRGF (see below). Dynamics leading to 
the adoption of HIPC II included broad support from a series of actors, including powerful states, 
LICs, the Managing Director, staff, and NGOs supportive of the initiative. Both liberal and 
conservative wings of the U.S. Congress also played an active role in pressuring the Fund to adopt 
HIPC II. As developed below and further in chapter 4, broad support of a more aggressive stance on 
debt relief and its relationship to both poverty and development outcomes also points to a broader shift 
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both within the Fund and the broader policy-making community between 1996 and 1999. This is 
arguably tied in part to the fallout from the Asian crisis, which significantly challenged Fund 
competence and Washington Consensus policy prescriptions. 
 
NGOs were perhaps the most important actors pushing the Fund to adopt HIPC II changes in 1999. As 
articulated by a Fund staff member,  
The NGO community, having tasted blood with HIPC, decided to push harder…push 
further. They said we set the sustainability threshold too high… [and the process of debt 
relief] is taking too long… And there is not enough linkage between debt relief operations 
that you are doing and the ultimate objectives of reducing poverty. So they pushed for all of 
these things as part of a reformed HIPC and the international community eventually bowed 
to that pressure. You have to hand it to the NGOs, they were extremely effective and in 
some respects, they got it right.
214
 
 
Jubilee 2000, launched in 1996, was the key NGO pushing for HIPC II. Specific to direct lobbying, 
Jubilee (along with Oxfam and Eurodad) regularly met with EDs, staff, management, and the 
Development and Interim Committees between 1996-1999 and pressed their concerns. Jubilee 2000 
also organized direct action and lobbying campaigns. By 1999, Jubilee had petitions circulating in 
over 100 countries and had collected over 17 million signatures demanding debt cancellation.
215
 It also 
was a primary player in organizing highly visible demonstrations at the 1998 Birmingham and 1999 
Cologne G-7 Summits. 
 
In the U.S., Jubilee 2000 and other NGOs pushed Congress to pressure the Fund in two primary areas. 
First, lobbying took place to build support for a symbolic Congressional mandate in 1998, instructing 
the U.S. ED “to use aggressively his voice and vote to enhance the general effectiveness of the IMF 
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with respect to….core labor standards, social safety nets…especially the world’s poorest, heavily 
indebted countries.”
216
 The Jubilee campaign also built a successful coalition of liberal Democrats and 
conservative Republicans that eventually secured $435 million of Congressional funding for Fund debt 
relief.
217
 Pressure was also exerted on Congress in 1998 in regards to the Fund’s 11
th
 Quota review. 
While much of the critique came from conservative members focused on the fallout from the Asian 
financial crisis, hearings in Congress included witnesses critical of Fund programs for the poor.
218
   
NGO pressure also targeted the Clinton administration and governments in the UK, France, and 
Germany.  
 
Staff and management thinking around the relationship between debt relief and Fund policy objectives 
in LICs also shifted during the 1996-1999 time period. Most striking was the rise of internal debates 
about the efficacy of the Polak model when applied to LICs. As noted by a senior staff member in the 
African Department: 
When I first came here, it was all about closing a balance of payment gap. Every program 
that you designed had to show that the balance of payments gap closed within a three to 
five year period. If it didn’t show this, out the window it went. Starting with… the HIPCs, 
we started questioning that. If a country is really developing and is really poor, that can’t be 
true. It has to borrow from abroad. In fact, you have to have a balance of payment gap that 
opens over time, not one that closes.
219
 
 
The primary role of debt relief therefore no longer was seen by staff as a bridge to allow for an orderly 
process of correcting balance of payments deficits. Rather, it was one tool to allow LICs to increase 
short-term balance of payment deficits that would allow for long-term poverty reduction and 
subsequent improved development outcomes. 
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NGO pressure and internal staff debates led to a joint IMF-World Bank review of the HIPC in 1998. In 
April 1999, Camdessus and Wolfensohn outlined their position for modifying the initiative. This 
included: 
1. Debt relief should reinforce the tools of the international community with the wider aim of 
promoting sustainable development and poverty reduction. 
2. Debt relief should strengthen the incentives for debtor countries to adopt strong programs 
of adjustment and reform. 
3. Enhanced debt relief should focus on poorest countries. 
4. Debt relief should be irrevocable. 
5. Simplification of the HIPC framework.220  
 
A joint Fund-Staff paper summarizing critiques and possible options going forward was debated at the 
EB on April 16. Here four areas were discussed: depth, breadth, and timing of debt relief, and issues of 
conditionality. Most notable was the shift in position of the Japanese (Yoshimura) and German (Esdar) 
EDs from three years earlier. While wary of debt forgiveness and a move toward development issues 
in the HIPC process in 1996, they were now open to deeper and quicker debt forgiveness in 1999 and 
linking debt issues to poverty. Yoshimura, in endorsing a move toward HIPC reform, argued “…social 
development and poverty alleviation are among the ultimate targets of HIPC countries, and no one 
disagrees generally on the need for tighter links among debt relief, poverty reduction, and social 
policies.”
221
 The German position was more explicit in calls for deepening debt relief and linkages to 
poverty and reflected the position of the new Social-Democratic government under the leadership of 
Gerhard Schröeder: 
We should aim to speed up the debt relief process, so that HIPCs can benefit from debt 
reduction as early as possible. The debt relief process should lead to an immediate freeing 
up of internal budgetary resources for poverty reduction measures by granting debt service 
relief. We should increase the volume of delivered debt reduction, so that more funds can 
be released for measures to fight poverty and to promote sustainable development. The debt 
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relief process should be embedded in a development strategy promoting sustainable 
development and in particular focusing on the reduction of poverty in debtor countries.
222
 
 
This position of speeding up and deepening debt relief was shared by the UK (Pickford) and EDs 
representing LICs (Barro Chambrier, de Morais), the Nordic states (Lehmussaari), Netherlands and 
Eastern Europe (Wihnholds), and Canada, Ireland, and the Caribbean (Bernes).
223
 The U.S. 
(Lissakers), while supportive of deepening relief, was cautious on issues of timing:  
We believe that the presumption of a six year track record of reforms should be  
maintained…Providing debt relief outside a framework of macroeconomic stabilization and 
broader structural reform will not support the type of sustained improvements in growth 
and poverty alleviation at the heart of this initiative. Stabilization efforts and reform need 
time to take hold…we do not do these countries any favors by rushing to  a completion 
point.
224
 
 
France (Milleron) was least enthusiastic on deepening and broadening the HIPC framework: 
We are also ready to reflect further on tightening the links between debt relief and poverty 
reduction. We recognize that we do not have specific views on how to proceed at this stage. 
But, we nevertheless believe that debt cancellation cannot substitute for  traditional ODA 
support, which has the additional advantage of positive externalities. …. Debt relief 
measures, however generous, can only accompany, not substitute for development policies. 
France therefore believes that only countries with irreproachable  economic and social 
management as well as governance should benefit from this enhanced exceptional effort by 
the international financial community.
225
 
 
As with the HIPC process, negotiations around HIPC II saw broad agreement from powerful states and 
staff on the importance of structural reform, conditionality, and Fund involvement in any new debt 
relief scheme. This is best captured by EDs from poor LICs who reaffirmed this sentiment pushed by 
creditor states. ED Chambrier, for example, stated: 
 While we see merit in de-linking debt relief from ESAF compliance, we understand the 
 concerns expressed on the need for assurances regarding policy performance…. 
 Concerning the use of performance requirements after the completion point, we can 
 endorse the arguments outlined by the staff, given the risk related to the fact that this 
 situation could entail difficult judgments about the delivery of debt relief.
226
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Feedback from the 1999 April meeting was forwarded to G-7 leadership for discussion at the Cologne 
Summit meeting in June. Merging various proposals from the Fund and Bank, the G-7 leaders 
“recommended relaxing the eligibility criteria to provide speedier and deeper debt relief to more 
countries.”
227
 In September, 1999 HIPC II was approved by the Interim and Development Committees 
pending funding, and formally adopted by the Fund and Bank Executive Boards in December 1999. 
HIPC II Results 
H1-H2:  In contrast to the HIPC, preference heterogeneity of powerful state was low in the HIPC II 
case. This cohesiveness undermined any attempt by staff and the MD to resist implementation of the 
reform.  
H3: Similar to the HIPC, NGOs applied pressure both directly on IMF management and staff and 
distally on state principals. In this case, staff interviewed more clearly articulated that pressure from 
NGOs and direct lobbying of staff and management were integral to the implementation of the HIPC 
II reform. While this analysis is unable to measure the degree to which direct pressure vs. indirect 
pressure produced policy change, the evidence suggests that direct lobbying efforts that leapfrogged 
the delegation chain proved effective. 
H4: As with the HIPC case, there was not a primary individual or set of individuals who pushed for 
the adoption of the HIPC II internally. 
H5: Two major shifts in how the HIPC II was framed within the institution are of note. First, the 
notion that the introduction of the HIPC II would serve a broader agenda for LIC poverty reduction 
marked a watershed moment for IMF policy direction. Second, the fact that some staff  began to 
reevaluate the appropriateness of the Polak model signaled that the ideas debated went beyond 
adaption and into the realm of learning as described above.  
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Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
Unlike the process that led to the HIPC II, replacement of the Fund’s decade-old concessionary 
lending programs (the ESAF) with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999 did not 
enjoy broad institutional support. Most strident in opposition was the majority of staff wary of moving 
the Fund too far into issues of development. This became particularly controversial when advocates 
for the PRGF argued that the new lending facility would include Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs). As introduced in chapter 1, PRSPs included a formal assessment of how specific 
macroeconomic and social policies should be designed and implemented to reduce poverty. Heading 
the charge for an overhaul of the ESAF at the time was Managing Director Camdessus and a few 
select staff members in the Policy, Development and Review (now SPR) and African departments. 
NGOs also played a role, but less so than in the HIPC and HIPC II cases. Powerful member states 
were generally supportive while evidence from Executive Board documents shows division among 
LIC EDs. 
 
As with the HIPC and HIPC II, initial concerns raised about the ESAF were pushed by the NGO 
community and focused on two areas. First, lending arrangements under the ESAF did not address 
deeper issues of poverty. Second, conditionality frameworks were not sensitive to specific conditions 
on the ground for the LIC in question. External and internal reviews of the ESAF completed in 1997 
reiterated similar themes. ESAF conditionality had not sufficiently protected the poor; the program 
had not effectively defined the role of the Fund and Bank in implementing ESAF loans; and attention 
to linkages between inequality, poverty, and growth were necessary in future Fund lending.
228 
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Camdessus, nearing retirement, argued before the Executive Board on August 30, 1999 that a new 
thinking had to emerge in the Fund around policy toward LICs: “…we have made important strides in 
increasing the attention given to poverty reduction and social sector issues in ESAF programs. It is 
time to consolidate this progress and formalize some of the reforms envisaged for transforming the 
ESAF into a new renamed instrument, not least so that it can play the role foreseen for it in the HIPC 
cases.”
229
 At the September 13, 1999 EB meeting, Camdessus outlined his case for reform:   
The current framework that ties the policies in ESAF-supported programs to poverty reduction 
is insufficiently comprehensive and lacks the elements needed to ensure the consistency of 
these policies with the country’s social goals and vice versa… To remedy these problems, the 
ESAF must be made to benefit from an open and comprehensive approach that starts with an 
understanding of the main obstacles to growth and poverty reduction, and iterates toward a 
constellation of macroeconomic, structural and social policies sufficient to achieve realistic and 
monitorable goals for poverty reduction….Hence the proposal-which has the joint support of 
both Bank and Fund managements-to create a new comprehensive vehicle, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper, that is government-led, poverty-focused, based on an open and 
consultative process, and from which all ESAF and IDA operations should stem.
230
 
 
The proposal was most enthusiastically supported from EDs representing the U.S. (Lissakers), UK 
(Pickford),  France (Milleron), Belgium, Austria, and Eastern Europe ( Kiekens), Italy, Portugal and 
the Mediterranean (Faini),  and  the Nordic and Baltic states (Hansen). Lissakers, for example, argued 
for a comprehensive reform of the ESAF that integrated poverty and social development issues into 
concessionary lending arrangement:  
I fully agree with the Managing Director’s statement that the current framework still 
lacks all of the elements needed to ensure the consistency of ESAF supported policies 
with the country’s social goals and vice versa. We do need a more fully developed 
integrated strategy….We fully support the establishment of the proposed procedures for 
PRSPs as a starting point for both the Bank and the Fund operations, with the PRSP 
replacing the PFP over time.
231
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A focus on poverty reduction was also shared by Pickford: “The poverty reduction strategies 
developed by countries to serve as the basis for Fund and Bank supported programs are clearly the 
right way forward…it seems clear that the Fund has a key role in poverty reduction.”
232
  
 
EDs representing Japan (Yoshimura) and Holland and the Caucuses (Wijnholds), while generally 
supportive of ESAF reform, expressed some reservations in regard to the Fund’s traditional mission 
and a new focus on poverty reduction. For Yoshimura, “the Fund should…deal with social policy 
issues only insofar as they are necessary to achieve its main purpose, which is to realize 
macroeconomic stability...sound macroeconomic policies should not be compromised for the sake of 
social policy concerns.”
233
 Winjholds argued along similar lines, “I do not think it would be expedient 
to turn the Fund into a multidisciplinary institution. The Fund should do what it does best: offer 
macroeconomic policy advice. The Fund is not properly equipped to advise on social issues.”
234
  For 
Germany (Esdars), support for reform was framed in maintenance of successful macroeconomic 
policy: “Effective poverty alleviation requires at first the full commitment of the countries themselves 
to tackle the roots of poverty, to restructure the economy and to pursue macroeconomic policies that 
ensure a sustainable high-quality growth process.”
235
 
  
Middle income and poor state ED representatives’ reactions were mixed. Barro Chambier argued that 
“we should strongly support the MD’s proposal that the PRSP underlining the link [between] debt 
relief [and] poverty reduction be an integral part of PFPs, or ultimately could replace the existing 
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framework.”
236
 Morais was broadly critical of the proposal and instead argued for greater funding of 
the current ESAF.
237
 These concerns were shared by EDs Shalan (Egypt and Arab states) and Kelkar 
(India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka), who also remained wary of “mission creep” into poverty 
areas. For Shalan: 
There is no question that the pursuit of poverty reduction, and the promotion of poverty 
reduction and the promotion of macroeconomic and social policies that support it, should 
be at the forefront of the economic development agenda at a global level. …It is important, 
however, that we approach this subject in a practical manner…While we can appreciate the 
desire for some in the donor community, and some NGOs, that the Fund take on a more 
active role in this process. Our contribution, as an institution, toward the goal of poverty 
reduction, should stem from ensuring macroeconomic stability, thereby providing an 
optimal environment for sustained growth, while addressing the potential adverse impact of 
stabilization of the poor.
238
 
 
 
Another area of concern shared by middle income and poor state EDs was the notion that the PRGF 
would set specific quantitative targets on social spending levels. Morais worried that “earmarking 
funds for social sectors would detract us from the multi-dimensional efforts and flexibility that should 
be embedded in any poverty reduction strategy.”
239
  Kelkar was even more specific in his concerns:  
“In sum, we do not agree to the Fund incorporating structural benchmarks or performance criteria 
related to social safety nets or social reforms or social issues at large.”
240
  
 
Interviews of LIC staff members also point to broad initial skepticism of the PRSP framework and 
reforming the ESAF: 
We didn’t have any problems getting management to agree with it [the PRSP]. And the 
shareholders liked it. The [majority of] staff had concerns from various angles. …a lot of 
people had problems with the practicality of the PRSP process that required a great deal of 
coordination. Some people were concerned about branding, putting poverty reduction up there 
as the sort of headline on our facility. Some people thought it represented mission creep. Some 
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people thought we were taking too much responsibility as the Fund on an issue that we had 
little experience.
241
 
 
 For Fund staff, the notion that all of a sudden we would be involved in poverty reduction 
 came as a strain at first. Wasn’t poverty reduction the job of the World Bank? That was 
 my reaction. This wasn’t the way we do things.
242
 
    
Camdessus also challenged the institutional culture of staff through his framing of the reform:   
  
 The staff view was that macroeconomic stability was necessary for growth and growth was 
necessary for poverty reduction….At the same time, Camdessus, in his last days, was pushing 
very, very hard. He wanted to go one more step. We had said, “First, macroeconomic stability, 
then growth and poverty reduction.”  He wanted to close the circle and say that poverty 
reduction leads to growth. There was a lot of work done trying to show that and he pushed in 
that direction. The institution was not comfortable doing that.
243
  
 
While the majority of the staff was skeptical of the adoption of PRSPs and reforms of the ESAF, 
several key staff members were sympathetic to a shift in policy direction:  
There were certain IMF staff who were supportive and understood the stakes. Jack Boorman, 
who was head of Policy, Development, and Review at the time, Hugh Bredenkamp, and Masood 
Ahmed. But there were often lone voices in the wilderness. It was against a bit the grain and 
there was a need for a certain number of us to push against the culture that pushed aside and 
minimized this work.
244
 
 
For these staff members, the main argument toward a more aggressive stand on poverty reduction 
focused on the fact that despite decreased balance of payment gaps in the 1980s and 1990s, LICs had 
stagnant growth rates. As with the shift in thinking with adoption of the HIPC II, this also challenged 
the primary assumptions of the Polak model: 
With the Polak model, the assumption is the faster you close the balance of payments gap, 
the faster you will grow. The old way of thinking in the 1980s and 1990s was to develop a 
plan that allows a balance of payments gap that lets you go to zero. In that framework, you 
want to tighten and close the balance of payment gap because that gap is created by bad 
policy. That was the business of the 1980s and early 1990s. The thought was, if you close 
all these gaps, all these countries will start growing. But they weren’t. And that’s where the 
institution woke up to the fact that development isn’t just about macroeconomics. That is 
where you saw Camdessus saying it is about poverty reduction and growth, it is not about 
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structural adjustment anymore. Structural adjustment was closing that gap. Poverty 
reduction and growth is about opening that gap.
245
 
 
 
Along with support from a few strategically situated staff members, public pressure also was a 
variable in adoption of the PRSP and PRGF. As described in the Fund’s 2000 Annual Report, “…the 
persistence of poverty – and mounting public pressure – underscored that more had to be done…In 
effect, the IMF transformed the ESAF into the PRGF to make poverty reduction a key element of 
growth oriented, country-owned strategy by combining concessional lending from the IMF in support 
of appropriate macroeconomic policies with antipoverty assistance from the World Bank and other 
development agencies.”
246
  NGOs were also broadly supportive of reforms focused on poverty 
reduction. Oxfam, for example, “welcomed this new approach as an opportunity to develop economic 
policies which are genuinely country-owned, and which have poverty reduction as their central 
aim.”
247
  
 
PRGF Results  
 
H1-H2:  Preference heterogeneity among powerful states was low in this case and supported the 
replacement of the ESAF with the PRGF and subsequent PRSPs. The Managing Director, as a primary 
initiator of this reform, shared preferences with powerful states. Unlike the HIPC case, a coalition of 
powerful states and the MD allowed the reluctant staff little room to resist or shape the adoption of the 
PRGF and PRSPs. 
H3: Unlike the HIPC and HIPC II, NGOs played a more cursory role in the PRGF reform. Raising 
awareness in regard to the problems of the ESAF in the mid-1990s was their primary contribution to 
this shift in IMF LIC policy. 
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H4: As demonstrated by the Executive Board minutes and interviews cited above, Managing Director 
Camdessus was the primary individual who pushed the resistant IMF staff to rethink how it 
conceptualized the relationship between poverty and growth. Several senior staff members within the 
influential Strategy, Policy, and Review Department also supported these efforts. These individuals 
were situated in powerful positions in the institution and thus were able to assert leverage on fellow 
colleagues. 
H5: As with the HIPC II, the ideas pushed by advocates of replacement of the ESAF with the PRGF 
stood well outside the norm of Washington Consensus thinking that was still strongly embedded in the 
institution in the late 1990s. The evidence from this case suggests that under circumstances where 
coalitions were among powerful states and the Managing Director, the relative “cognitive dissonance” 
the reform may produce for resistant staff is unable to block reform. 
        
Extended Credit Facility/ Rapid Credit Facility/ Stand-by Credit Facility (ECF/RCF/SCF) 
 
In mid-2009, the Fund’s Executive Board scrapped the PRGF-ESF Trust and replaced it with the 
Poverty Reduction Growth Trust (PRGT).
248
  In January 2010, the PRGF was replaced with three new 
loan facilities that drew from the PRGT. These included the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Rapid 
Credit Facility (RCF), and Stand-By Credit Facility (SCF). Adoption of the ECF/RCF/SCF differed 
from the previous cases as the drivers of the reform primarily came from a coalition that included the 
Managing Director, staff, and LIC EDs. In regards to powerful states, prior to the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008, only Britain and France were supportive of replacing the PRGF, while the 
U.S., Germany, and Japan stood in opposition. As the crisis developed in late 2008 and early 2009, 
opposition from these states dissolved and the new framework was adopted. Unlike in the late 1990s, 
NGO pressure played no active role in this policy shift.  
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The consensus among staff interviewed is that Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn was the 
key driver in this LIC policy shift: 
 Strauss-Kahn was a trigger…he created a huge amount energy and a mandate for every part 
of the Fund to rethink what they were doing. We in the Strategy, Policy, and Review 
Department were tasked with looking at all our operations and where we needed to refresh 
them. We revamped conditionality…structural performance criteria were abolished across 
all facilities. We were also tasked with looking at what we could do to make the low 
income facilities more tailored and effective for poor countries.
249
 
 
Often times it only takes a spark. You look at Strauss-Kahn. He didn’t have, given the 
world was falling apart, a lot of time devoted to LICs…He would go once or twice to 
Africa… But he pushed enough and oriented enough so that the rest of us who believed in 
this work could keep going.
250
 
   
  
This same sentiment is shared by current and former Executive Board members:  
 
 The role of the Managing Director in setting LIC policy is critical. Ultimately it is the 
Managing Director’s expression of interest in LIC issues that moves it onto the Board’s 
agenda. Strauss-Kahn initiated and continued efforts to reshape IMF facilities to be more 
responsive to African needs.
251
 
 
 The Managing Director is critical. Dominique Strauss Kahn wanted to give more fiscal 
 space to meet the need of LICs and less, more targeted conditionality.
252
 
  
Staff also point to the March 2009 “Successful Partnership for Africa’s Growth Challenge” held in 
Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania as a watershed moment for Strauss-Kahn and the Fund’s relationship to LICs 
as Strauss-Kahn formally announced greater commitment to LICs through reforms of the PRGF: 
  My goal is at least to double the IMF’s concessional lending resources. I also want to 
 increase the flexibility of IMF financing. We are exploring better ways to provide 
 short-term financing to members facing immediate financing needs. Raising our  access 
 limits, which have become increasingly binding, is under discussion. We are also 
 trying to streamline conditionality, and tailor it better to the circumstances of each 
 individual country. Related to this, we are re-examining our policies on debt limits, to 
 make them more flexible.”
253
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The Fund staff member responsible for organizing the new framework outlined by Strauss-Kahn 
highlighted the thinking around the reform focused on flexibility and diversity as follows: 
We figured what divides the types of LIC engagement with the Fund are two issues: capacity 
and financing needs – in particular – the length of financing needs. With capacity, a critical 
component in the new architecture is the explicit recognition that we need an instrument to 
provide policy support and financing in the context of a situation where a country cannot 
implement a full Fund program. And then the other key difference when we come to countries 
that could implement a full Fund program is how long it will take to achieve a sustainable 
macroeconomic position. …So to recognize that LICs are now quite diverse in terms of the 
time needed between the situation they are in now and a more stable and sustainable 
macroeconomic position is what distinguishes the instruments.
254
 
 
There was also concern among staff that a title including “poverty” produced a stigma for potential 
borrowers and that gaps in PRGF LIC policy required a new architecture: 
I think there was a need to rebrand [the PRGF] and here the Asia-Pacific Department was 
influential. It argued, “whatever we do, don’t call is something to do with poverty.” Why? 
Low Income Countries in Asia and the Middle East didn’t like the stigma of poverty. There 
also were these near middle income countries and the islands that were eligible to use the 
PRGF and the poverty name didn’t fit their reality. When you talk about Vanuatu, for 
example, using the PRGF, it doesn’t resonate because poverty is not as pressing in Vanuatu 
as it is in Sudan. Then you have states like Georgia and Armenia who are eligible for the 
PRGF, but the poverty focus doesn’t fit where they are in their development process. There 
were also other clear gaps as well. There were some countries, for example, who had civil 
strife and couldn’t get post-conflict assistance because they weren’t officially in a civil war. 
And the Finance Department was keen to sort out the mess of the financing and wanted to 
change the structure to one trust rather than many pockets.
255
   
 
Relative to powerful states, there was little initial consensus in regard to replacement of the PRGF 
with new concessionary facilities prior to the 2008 crisis. From the U.S., there was growing resistance 
to Fund lending to LICs and a push for a focus on grants facilitated mainly by the World Bank 
following adoption of the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI)
256
 in 2005: 
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 The U.S. position was let’s give debt relief and not give them any more loans. They are too 
poor, their institutions are too underdeveloped. and there is no nerve to collect money for 
these efforts, so let’s go to grants. The IMF should do non-loan arrangements and the Bank 
should do grants.
257
 
 
Germany, although supportive publically of the PRGF, often argued behind the scenes against 
greater institutional shift away from a strict focus on monetary issues and maintenance of strict 
conditionality: “In the end, Germany always goes along with the reforms but along the way 
they challenge us to not weaken conditionality and not to finance excessively.”
258
   
 
Support for PRGF reform prior to 2008 came primarily from the British and French:  “The Brits and 
the French position was, ‘We did bad lending in the past. Let’s clear out the space so there can be new 
borrowing for better projects.’”
259
 The British and the French also pushed for long term engagement 
with LICs and were supportive of PRGF reform:  
 The British and the French have more of a tolerance- even perhaps a desire- to see the Fund 
engaged on a continuous basis in LICs because they think that having us there with 
financing creates positive momentums for reforms and prevents things from going too 
badly. The U.S. would like our engagement to be episodic.
260
 
 
According to staff interviews, low income states were receptive to overhaul of the PRGF and 
continued engagement of the Fund in their policy direction. Specifically, finance ministers of LICs 
welcomed greater engagement and input into a new Fund architecture: 
 The finance ministers of the LICs do like interaction with the Fund because they like in 
some sense the expertise but also the leverage we bring. Having the perspective of sound 
public financial management they see as very important to push reform and have budgets 
that make sense…It is really through our program support that we can help build 
macroeconomic management capacity and this is very much appreciated by finance 
ministers and central banks in LICs.
261
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Fund through the MDRI-II. As of 2010, $3.4 billion in debt relief was granted to 32 LICs who had reached HIPC 
completion points 
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Divisions among powerful states in regard to PRFG reform quickly evaporated as the 2008 crisis 
unfolded and the pressure Strauss-Kahn exerted on the Executive Board after the Tanzania conference:   
One other key element in getting the deal done was the dynamics created by the crisis. I 
 think it  is fair to say that our shareholders (states) are often strongly divided on LIC 
 policy and we needed consensus on this one, mainly because we wanted to create a new 
 trust. I think the crises got us over the finish line as every Executive Board member came 
 on board in 2009.
262
    
 
No evidence of direct lobbying for PRGF replacement was found from the traditional NGO 
community focused on the Fund. Staff interviewed also downplayed the impact of NGOs on adoption 
of the 2010 reforms: 
NGOs are much less influential now than in the late 1990s because they much less to complain 
about. It is uncomfortable for them as we go through this crisis that we have all these 
countercyclical programs and protection of social spending that are pervasive in our LIC 
programs…Some NGOs continue to drum up the same type of issues that they did in the late 
1990s, but these arguments are not gaining much traction.
263
 
 
 
An Executive Board member representing LICs reiterated this position. While NGOs were the key 
actor that pushed the IMF to address issues of debt sustainability a decade prior, they had little input 
into the 2010 reforms and have little impact on current LIC policy choices at the Fund: 
First, let me recognize the role that NGOs played in debt relief and the adoption of the 
HIPC…  There reforms occurred in large part due to the constant pressure from NGOs. 
Now, debt relief is out of the way and there is much less that NGOs can engage with. The 
debt issue was something tangible. The only link you can make now is with inflation policy 
where NGOs generally push for higher inflation targets. There is not much left that is 
tangible and human that an NGO can get engaged with at the Fund. We do consult with 
them but in a limited fashion. Once a year during the annual meetings, along with the 
Executive Director’s from the World Bank, we host a civil society forum. We engage, we 
have cordial meetings, and nobody complains.
264
 
 
ECF/RCF/SCF Results 
H1-H2:  Prior to the 2008 crisis, there was growing division between powerful states in regard to IMF 
involvement in LICs. France and the UK advocated for a continuation of PRGF concessionary lending 
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and a focus on poverty issues and were sympathetic to more flexible conditionality requirements. The 
U.S. instead advocated for phasing out IMF LIC lending programs. Germany was worried with 
loosening conditionality requirements and was increasingly concerned that too much focus on 
development issues was pushing the Fund away from monetary and fiscal issues. This lack of cohesive 
vision among powerful state principals in the mid-2000s allowed Strauss Kahn room to initiate 
overhaul of the PRGF. Once the crisis hit, all-powerful states rallied around the ECF/RCF/SCF 
initiative pushed by Strauss Kahn and LIC staff and the framework was quickly adopted. 
H3: As noted above, NGOs were not involved in efforts to reform the PRGF. 
H4: Managing Director Strauss Kahn was the primary internal advocate for the reform of the PRGF. 
Several senior members of the African department and SPR also argued for a more flexible approach 
to LIC concessionary lending. In addition, Fund chief economist Oliver Blanchard called for a 
rethinking of how the Fund approaches monetary and fiscal policy response. Following the 2008 
crisis, Strauss Kahn and Blanchard advocated for countercyclical policy response as a component of 
the flexibility of the new LIC concessionary lending program. In this context, it can be argued that 
these individuals took up the role of internal norm entrepreneurs in this policy change. 
H5: Advocates for replacement of the PRGF with the ECF/RCF/SCF initially highlighted that the new 
framework would be both more flexible in dealing with LICs and also respond more nimbly to the 
diverse realities of LICs. Prior to the 2008 crisis, the reform was not spun as policy shift that would 
fundamentally challenge IMF thinking.  
Conclusions 
Comparison across these cases uncovers the following patterns (see Table 3.1 below). First, two tiers 
of actors were identified in LIC outcomes. What I call “primary actors” included the Managing 
Director, powerful states, and staff. “Secondary actors” included LICs, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress. 
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In all the cases examined, LIC reform occurred either with a coalition formed between at least one 
primary and one secondary actor as seen in the HIPC or at least two primary actors as seen with the 
HIPC II, PRFG, and ECF/RCF/SCF. While preliminary, evidence from these cases suggests that future 
LIC policy change should occur under the following two scenarios. First, if there is broad support 
among three primary actors for reform, policy shift should occur. Second, at a minimum, some form of 
coalition between two primary actors (MD-staff, MD-powerful states, powerful states-staff) or primary 
actor and secondary appears necessary to produce significant policy change. As such, evidence from 
these cases also suggests that a primary actor “can’t go it alone.” Without the support of other primary 
actors, staff, powerful states, and management must have backing from a secondary actor to initiate 
reform successfully. In the HIPC case, for example, the U.S. and UK formed a successful coalition 
with NGOs against the preferences of the Managing Director, staff, and other powerful states. 
   Table 3.1:  Coalitions of IMF LIC Reform (1996-2010) 
Reform       In opposition    In support 
HIPC -Powerful states 
  (France/Germany/Japan) 
-Managing Director 
-Staff 
 
-Powerful states 
(U.S./UK) 
-NGOs 
HIPC II  -Powerful states 
-Managing Director 
-Staff  
-NGOs 
-LICs 
PRGF 
 
-Staff 
-Majority of LICs 
-Powerful states 
-Managing Director 
-Select senior staff in SPR 
-Select LICs 
ECF/RCF/SCF -Powerful states 
(U.S./Germany/Japan) 
-Powerful states 
(UK/ France) 
-Managing Director 
-Staff 
-LICs 
 
As predicted by PA models, increased division among powerful state principals provided openings for 
management and staff to initiate, resist, or shape LIC policy. This was most salient when staff and the 
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Managing Director shared preferences. In the HIPC case, divergence of state preferences around a 
conservative plan of debt forgiveness supported by staff and Camdessus allowed the proposal to go 
forward for adoption. Splits among powerful states in regard to overhaul of the PRGF framework prior 
to the 2008 crisis also gave Strauss-Kahn and the staff room to initiate a new framework for LICs. If 
preference heterogeneity between powerful states on the Executive Board is high in future scenarios, 
we should expect management and staff to enjoy the same degree of leverage to initiate or block 
reform efforts. Evidence from these cases also points to the importance of the Managing Director and 
senior staff in the Strategy, Policy, and Review department in lobbying for change. In the PRGF case, 
for example, Managing Director Camdessus and the leader of SPR highlighted the connection between 
poverty reduction and long-term growth to a broader audience of Fund staff highly sceptical of this 
position. In the ECF/RCF/SCF case, the leadership of Managing Director Strauss-Kahn was a key 
variable that ultimately produced this reform. 
 
In regard to delegation chains and the impact of pressure applied distally to principals, evidence from 
the HIPC and HIPC II cases is inconclusive. According to staff interviews, NGO direct pressure was 
essential and effective in the reforms of the late 1990s (HIPC, HIPC II, and PRGF). Internal IMF 
documents also note the impact of NGO efforts that leapfrog delegation chains and apply pressure 
directly to Fund staff and management. NGOs, however, also concurrently lobbied states to reform the 
Fund. Disaggregating the impact of direct and indirect lobbying on Fund policy choices requires 
further study before any conclusions can be drawn. More conclusively, evidence from the HIPC case 
demonstrates greater success of direct lobbying when the NGO has at least one primary actor 
supporting their position. SO theory hypothesizes that the manner in which a new policy reform is 
framed should impact its potential success or failure. In the HIPC and ECF/RCF/SCF cases, the 
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argument presented by those who pushed for reform did not challenge the status quo of what was 
considered appropriate Fund policy. In the HIPC II and PRGF, those who championed reform did so 
in a way that more fundamentally countered IMF thinking. While this is a small number of cases, the 
contradictory evidence suggests that the framing of a reform effort matters less in the ultimate success 
or failure of its adoption than other variables highlighted above. 
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Chapter 4 - Crises of Legitimacy: Constructivist Explanations of LIC Change 
As established in chapter 3, the evidence derived from the study of four cases of LIC policy change 
suggests that coalition formation is a key mechanism necessary for the IMF to implement formal 
policy shift. As predicted by PA models, increased division among powerful state principals provided 
openings for management and staff to initiate, resist, or shape LIC policy. This was most salient when 
staff and the Managing Director shared preferences. This evidence supports a broader notion also 
consistent with PA models that policy changes occur due to shifting degrees of control of more 
powerful actors over less powerful actors. This implicitly supports the notion put forth by PA theorists 
that less powerful actors (agents) enjoy some degree of autonomy relative to their principals.  
Given the evidence in chapter 3, one notion that can be dismissed is the idea that any one powerful 
state, even the U.S., can on a consistent basis determine LIC policy choices in the institution. As 
highlighted by constructivist scholar Jeffrey Chwieroth, another important contribution of PA inspired 
studies of the Fund , and also supported by the evidence in this project, is that the impetus for change 
can be driven by agents rather than principals.
265
   
 
 Despite these contributions, Chwieroth and constructivist IO scholars argue that one key weakness of 
rationalist theory is that it is ontologically ill equipped to examine the belief systems of staff and how 
changes in belief systems impact change. As noted by Chwieroth, “if you want to know to understand 
how IOs work and evolve, they we must attend not only to member states’ interests but also to beliefs 
that prevail within IOs and the internal processes and debates shaping these beliefs.”
266
 Chwieroth falls 
in line with a series of other constructivist IO scholars who frame their inquiry not as fundamental 
challenge to rationalist theory, but one that engages with a different component of reality that 
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influences policy outcomes. Relative to our purposes for this project, while PA models can tell us that 
some form of coalition appears necessary for change to occur, they don’t elucidate if, how, or why 
shifts in thinking among those actors might support or undermine the formation of those coalitions or 
other processes that produce reform. 
 
In chapter 4, I model a study of LIC IMF change on methods used by Chwieroth and several other 
“conventional” constructivist scholars, including Susan Park, Antje Vetterlein, Bessma Momani, and 
Manuella Moschella.
267
  Chapter 4 first outlines how contemporary constructivist theory explains IMF 
change. This is followed by an exploration of how the Fund has come to accept particular ideas of 
what constitutes appropriate macroeconomic and development policy in the post-Washington 
Consensus period and how these changing ideas impacted IMF LIC reform. This is first accomplished 
by tracing how five prominent mainstream frameworks of economic theory have influenced the 
economics profession and Fund management and staff. These economic frameworks include 
Keynesianism, the neoclassical synthesis, monetarism, new classical economics, and New 
Keynesianism.  
 
Applied to the study of the post-Washington Consensus period, a constructivist framework finds that 
the Asian crisis in the late 1990s and the 2008 global financial crisis catalyzed shifts in thinking in the 
economics profession and policy elites that impacted change in two key areas of Fund LIC policy. The 
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2008 crisis sparked a Keynesian-inspired shift within the economics profession and Fund that 
challenged nearly three decades of neoclassical consensus concerning appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policy response. Specific to LIC policy, this shift ushered in a new acceptance of countercyclical and 
flexible monetary and fiscal policy that helped bring about the replacement of the PRGF with the 
ECF/RCF/SCF in 2010.  
 
Fallout from the Asian crisis led to a reevaluation of the role of the state in its relation to market 
efficiency, growth, and development. As seen in the Fund’s adoption of the PRGF in 1999 and current 
ECF/RCF/SCF framework, support of targeted state intervention to enhance market efficiency, 
improve institutional capacity, and invest in human capital is now a fundamental component of IMF 
strategies to reduce poverty and support growth in LICs. Despite this shift, several components of 
neoclassical ideology remain firmly entrenched in how the Fund thinks about development. In LIC 
initiatives, this is expressed through a mantra that consistently and explicitly grounds the IMF’s focus 
on poverty reduction since the 1999 reforms as a “pro-growth” strategy staunchly opposed to policy 
deemed distortive to markets. While the state is to be used to enhance market efficiency, improve 
institutional capacity, and invest in human capital, LICs are advised to avoid protectionism, over or 
undervalued exchange rates, subsidies, redistributive tax arrangements, and large scale entitlement 
programs.  
Theorizing IO Change:  A Constructivist Framework 
At its ontological foundation, constructivists frame the world as one being driven by the “logic of 
appropriateness.” Humans, as inherently social beings, form collectively held ideas of the world.
268
  
                                                 
268
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These collectively held understandings form the primary structure within which humans and 
subsequent state behavior and the international system is embedded. Despite the inherent 
intersubjectivity of the world, this variant of constructivism argues a positivist framework can 
systematically identify how changing patterns of identity formation and shifts in norms and ideas 
explain social and political change.  
 
Constructivists frame their study of change as one that recognizes exogenous, systematic factors but 
also is consciously and primarily focused on internal, institutionally specific agency and variables of 
the IO understudy that can catalyze or resist reform.
 269
 The agency of IO actors also is constituted and 
influenced by institution specific organizational culture. As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore, 
…IOs..are established to accomplish certain tasks. To do this, they develop general 
consensus around their understandings of their core mission and the functions of their 
organization; goals to be pursued; basic means to pursue these goals, and some way to 
measure results. Thus organizations create a shared discourse, symbols, and values for their 
staff. These shared elements, in turn, generate a group identity for the organization and 
structure interactions among those within it.
270
 
Maintenance and reproduction of organizational culture and identity is not a passive process. Staff 
members internalize particular frames of reference and also socialize new employees to adopt 
particular norms and routines within the bureaucracy. Organizational culture therefore is deeply 
embedded and serves as the frame of reference through which events and signals from the external and 
internal environment are cognitively processed. 
Established organizational culture and subsequent policy direction is not predicted to change quickly 
or easily in bureaucracies. As noted by Momani, several studies that draw from organizational theory 
                                                 
269
 Ibid., “Exogenous variables recognized that can stimulate change in IOs recognized by organizational theory include: 
structural changes in the international system, crises and disasters causing shocks to ripple in international organizations, 
competition between and among international organizations vying for additional jurisdictional turf; changes in international 
norms and values, and changes in attitudes and policies of key international members.”  
270
 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, p. 19. 
     
110 
 
conclude individuals in bureaucracies have a default position that resists change: “Organizational 
theorists contend that individuals resist change because they fear the unknown, have selective attention 
to and retention of new information, prefer habit and routine, need the security of the known, and feel 
threatened by change.”
271
 Resistance to change manifests itself at the organizational level “because 
there is a lack of trust, differing perceptions and goals, social disruption with change, a limitation of 
resources to devote to change, and most importantly change requires a change in the organizational 
culture.”
272
 Despite inertia against radical or swift reform efforts, constructivists highlight that IOs are 
also never static entities. Vetterlein notes four prominent features of IOs that make them subject to 
change over time. These include shifting relationships with powerful state principals; the fact that the 
institution’s original institutional mission evolves due to changing realities in the international system; 
modifications in formal organizational structure; and less observable alterations of informal 
organizational culture.
273
 
Constructivist Theory and IMF Policy Change 
Park and Vetterlein present a framework for studying Fund reform through the concept of “norm 
cycle.” Norms, defined as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of 
actors,” are not simply static entities that these institutions either adopt or reject. Rather, policy norms 
are reflexive and represent shifting processes of collective understandings of how the world works by 
various actors both within and outside the IO. As such, a policy norm “emerges not from thin air but 
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always out a specific context of an already existing norm which may be contested or inflexible in a 
changing context.”
274
 
     Figure 4.1: Norm Cycle. 
 Norm Contestation   Arguing/Persuasion/Negotiation  Norm Emergence 
            
    Crisis/Externalization/Objectivation     Habitualization/Institutionalization/Legitimization 
     
       
     Norm Stabilization 
Three points in the life of a norm cycle are identified by Park and Vetterlein: norm emergence, norm 
stabilization, and norm contestation (see Figure 4.1 above).
275
 A norm gains traction and stabilizes 
only if it first is granted legitimacy. The degree of legitimacy granted to a new norm and subsequent 
policy direction is predicted by examining three constitutive components. The norm has “formal 
validity” if it has been integrated into “the IO’s constitution or Articles of Agreement, its operational 
strategy, and/or is included in Fund …loan contracts.”
276
 More informally, a norm has “social 
recognition” when it is accepted by actors as the right thing to do. At the policy level, a norm has 
“cultural validity” when expressed in programs at the local level. Once accepted as legitimate, patterns 
of behavior around the norm emerge and are reproduced through policy creation and become 
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institutionalized in the organizational culture.
 277
  I draw from this framework and hypothesize that 
economic ideas also follow a similar pattern of emergence, stabilization, and contestation. 
Specific to the IMF, Moschella identifies three constituencies that legitimize development norms, 
economic ideas, and policy choices in the institution.
278
  The first constituency consists of member 
states. While the Fund exhibits a high degree of autonomy in its daily operations, as an 
intergovernmental organization, it ultimately must have significant support from member states. A 
norm or economic idea that fundamentally challenges the position and interests of powerful states is 
not expected. The second constituency involves academic economists and the broader economics 
profession. Many beliefs shared by IMF staff originate in the economics field that is trained and 
generally concerned with maximizing welfare and efficiency above other objectives. Chwieroth also 
notes that Fund staff have leverage in their support or resistance to new policy norms due to the fact 
that they are socially recognized as authorities and experts in the field of economics. Staff thus exhibit 
productive power as they construct meaning and shape and define what policy choices are legitimate 
and realistically possible to pursue.
279
   
 Studies of epistemic communities demonstrate that there are also networks of knowledge-based 
experts who “share knowledge about the causation…of phenomena in an area for which they have a 
reputation for competence” and produce “a common set of normative beliefs about what action will 
benefit human welfare” in the policy domain in question.
280
  Like-minded experts can influence what 
is considered legitimate in policy direction through a process of administrative recruitment that favors 
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individuals that share their ideological positions. This process is similar to what organizational 
sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell describe as “normative isomorphism.” Processes of 
professionalization produce formal and informal networks that weed out individuals who stand outside 
the boundaries of appropriate thinking. Individuals who find positions within professional 
bureaucracies will generally share the ideas and norms of the mainstream.
281
 
Along with member states and the economic profession, private market actors also play a part in 
granting emerging norms and subsequent policy directives legitimacy at the Fund. Moschella notes 
that “it is widely recognized that market actors endorse IMF activities when they acknowledge that the 
Fund’s financial assistance to a member country is of help in restoring the conditions for fruitful 
investment.”
282
 In this gatekeeper role, the IMF provides an informal guarantee that member-states 
will not pursue policy choices that seriously challenge or undermine the interests of private investors. 
Moschella also points to evidence where private market actors have undermined Fund policy 
directives. The lack of private support for the IMF sponsored Special Data Dissemination Standard 
(SDDS) initiative, for example, limited the success of the process of international data 
standardization.
283
 
Leanord Seabrooke also contends that the post Washington Consensus period has witnessed an 
expansion of what he terms the IMF’s “social constituency of legitimation.”  Fallout from the 
controversy over structural adjustment lending in the 1980s and the Asian crisis has produced a 
significant “legitimacy gap” for the Fund. In response, the IMF is now focused on gaining support 
from the public in member states. The Fund’s decade-old practice of increased transparency and 
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participation in PRSPs, for instance, are interpreted as an expression of growing sensitivity to the 
concerns of civil society.
284
 
 While the process of internalizing norms and ideas into individual and collective identity produces 
some form of stability concerning how the organization thinks, they are never fully static or 
uncontested. The effort of internal norm entrepreneurs and external systematic shifts produce new 
experiences and interpretations that challenge organizational culture, policy practices, and even more 
fundamental challenges to legitimacy. Park and Vetterlien identify three triggers that undermine 
legitimacy. First, ideological space for reform is opened when there is broad based agreement among 
elites that a particular economic or policy program fails. Second, similar to findings from 
organizational theory, an unexpected external shock can challenge taken for granted assumptions. 
Third, “mass condemnation” occurring in conjunction with acknowledgement of past policy failure 
and an external shock can facilitate the acceptance of new ideas and approaches. Once a policy 
position norm or idea comes under question in this scenario, staff, management, NGOs, and/or states 
use mechanisms of persuasion, arguing, shaming, and negotiation to push for reform. Moschella offers 
an additional predictive framework for Fund policy shift based on the aforementioned social 
constituencies of legitimation. Given the importance of social acceptance of particular norms and ideas 
in the production and maintenance of policy directives, we can expect change to occur when gaps open 
between “the institutionalization of specific economic ideas in the Fund’s policies” and “the 
acceptance of these policies by the actors of its social constituencies of legitimation.”
285
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Paradigmatic Ideas of Development 
Contemporary constructivist studies of the Fund focus on two interrelated levels of ideas that shape its 
institutional culture and subsequent policy choices. The first level is that of paradigmatic economic 
ideas. These ideas are embedded in theoretical debates about economics and set “cognitive 
background assumptions” and the interpretive framework for the workings of the economy and shape 
what is considered sound policy advice.
286
 Within the boundaries of paradigmatic thinking sit various 
schools and trends in economic thinking that gain and lose legitimacy over time.  
Specific to paradigmatic ideas, a focus on shifts in thinking in the economics profession and its 
relationship with Fund LIC policy reform requires that we first step back and recognize in broad terms 
what constitutes the ideological parameters of acceptable policy choices and debate in mainstream 
development economics. Wilfred David, in his study of Fund thinking, identifies five prominent 
principles broadly shared among the staff and the larger mainstream economics community.
287
 The 
first is a belief that growth and national income generation are only possible when there is substantial 
and sustained capital investment and a skilled workforce. Development strategies for poor societies 
therefore encourage policies and institutional reform that primarily facilitates rapid resource 
mobilization and investments in human capital. A second principle is that material gain is maximized 
only if there is rational and efficient allocation of scarce resources. Alternative choices made 
irrationally or without complete information will produce long term increases in scarcity and a 
subsequent decrease in growth and living standards. In order to make rational decisions in the 
                                                 
286
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allocation of scarce resources, prices thus should equal real costs in all markets. Market information 
should also be easily accessible and transparent.  
 
A third principle is that the best mechanism to establish efficient allocation of scarce resources is 
through market mechanisms. While not perfect, well-functioning and transparent markets minimize 
conflict and ultimately are the best mechanism for growth and relatively equitable distribution of 
resources. Building on this theme, the fourth principle extends a preference for free markets to the 
international arena. A liberal international environment underwritten by the rules of free trade and 
comparative advantage will produce the most favorable conditions for development. The fifth 
principle frames development as a rational process that is ultimately tackled through technocratic 
adjustment of incentives and/or institutions that improve market performance. As summarized by 
David, “The ruling paradigm of the economics of development rests on the classical-neoclassical view 
of the world in which change is gradual, marginal, non-disruptive, equilibrating, and largely painless. 
Incentives are the bedrock of economic growth. Once initiated, growth becomes automatic and all-
pervasive, spreading among nations and trickling down among classes so that everybody benefits form 
the process.”
288
 
  
These principles express themselves broadly throughout the Fund’s formal mandates. As outlined in 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, orderly global trade and exchange are the most effective tools to 
support international equilibrium and development. In Article 1(iii), Article (v), and Article (vi), the 
Fund is directed “to promote exchange rate stability,” “maintain orderly exchange arrangements,” and 
provide member states “with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments 
                                                 
288
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without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.” The Articles also 
stress that the IMF promote a liberal market international economic order – and in so doing – produce 
successful development outcomes. This is articulated most clearly in Article 1(ii) where the Fund is to 
“facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the 
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income.”   
 
Adherence to an orderly, cooperative, and transparent market system thus sets the broad intellectual 
and ideological “goal-posts” of mainstream development economics. Within these boundaries, 
however, sits a diversity of policy debates related to two distinct policy areas where the Fund is 
actively involved: (1) monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize short term balance of payment 
disequilibria; and (2) structural reform that improves economic efficiency and stimulates growth and 
development. Drawing from a constructivist framework, the following hypotheses are derived for 
explaining post-Washington Consensus LIC policy change through a focus on these two policy areas: 
H1: Policy reform initiatives that draw from ideas and norms that question market based solutions for 
LICs are unexpected. 
 
H2 :  A crisis of legitimacy that challenges taken for granted”macroeconomic and development ideas 
and/or norms is necessary for substantive LIC policy change. 
 
H3: Chances of LIC policy change are greatest when economic ideas or norms institutionalized within 
the Fund are questioned by broader epistemic community of development economists. 
 
Economic Ideas and “Appropriate” Macroeconomic Policies 
Constructivist studies of Fund change maintain that the primary constituency of legitimation is the 
economics profession. As outlined by Chwieroth, “Cycles, trends, and shifts in economic theory shape 
the content of [staff] expertise by helping to determine what constitutes an economic problem and how 
such problems are best solved. When the staff members approach their tasks, they necessarily come to 
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rely on the content of their training to develop specialized knowledge and to form judgments about 
policy.”
289
 Capturing how these trends manifest and shape the IMF’s normative culture, policy 
direction, and periods of change is achieved by methodologically “drilling down” into what Ben Clift 
and Jim Tomlinson describe as the “political sociology of policy instruments” approach.
290
 I first trace 
how five prominent economic schools of thought have shaped internal IMF debates concerning 
monetary and fiscal policy and how this has manifested itself in influencing post Washington 
Consensus LIC policy reform. These include Keynesianism, the neoclassical synthesis, monetarism, 
new classical economics, and New Keynesianism (see Table 4.1 below).  
Evidence from interviews, internal staff documents, and LIC lending arrangements shows that ideas 
drawn from monetarism, new classical economics, and New Keynesianism produced a highly stable 
framework of what constituted appropriate macroeconomic policy from the 1982 Mexican debt crisis 
to the global financial crisis of 2008. Since this time, evidence points to greater influence of more 
traditional Keynesianism in Fund and LIC policy response. Along with calls for more flexible inflation 
targets, a policy of active, countercyclical fiscal response has emerged in LIC policy directives. To 
give context to these ideas, I start first with an overview of traditional Keynesianism. 
Keynesianism as a Response to Classical Orthodoxy 
Keynesian economics developed as a direct critique to classical economic orthodoxy that 
predominated in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Classical orthodoxy is based on five 
assumptions:  (1) markets are perfectly competitive; (2) economic actors are fully informed of market 
dynamics; (3) economic actors are rational utility optimizers who make efficient use of information; 
(4) in open markets, an equilibrium price is established that reflects when the quantity of the product  
                                                 
289
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Table 4.1 Five Economic Schools of Thought   
School of Thought Major Themes? Appropriate Policy 
Response? 
When most influential in 
IMF? 
Keynesianism -Critique of “self-
correcting” logic of 
classical economics 
-Market failures due to 
inadequate levels of 
investment/consumption 
and self-reinforcing, 
subjective conceptions 
about the future  
-Expansionary monetary 
policy in moderate 
recessions 
-Aggressive fiscal policy 
during more severe crises  
-Public investment 
-Redistribution 
-Capital controls 
1945- early 1960s 
 
2008-present 
 
Neoclassical Synthesis -Merges aspects of 
Keynesianism and classical 
theory 
-Markets not self-correcting 
in short term but generally 
correcting in long term 
 
-Targeted and short term 
monetary and fiscal 
intervention to counter 
recessionary periods. 
-Permanent government 
intervention discouraged 
-Capital control 
liberalization 
1960s-late 1970s 
Monetarism -Money supply is primary 
variable that drives 
economic outcomes 
-Money supply neutral in 
long term and non-neutral 
in short term   
-Free of government 
intervention, markets are 
self-correcting in long term 
 
-Limit money supply to 
match underlying 
fundamentals 
-Avoid expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy  
-Avoid market distortion in 
labor markets 
-Capital control 
liberalization 
Late 1960s-late 1980s 
New Classical Economics 
 
-Micro-level processes 
explain macro level 
outcomes 
-Critique of monetarist 
assumptions of short –term 
market inefficiency.  
-Free of government 
intervention, “real time” 
adjustments by utility 
maximizing actors 
guarantees efficient markets 
in short and long term 
-Avoid expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
-Monetary policy as tool to 
combat inflation 
Late 1970s-2008 
New Keynesianism 
 
 
 
-Micro-level processes 
explain macro level 
outcomes including 
involuntary unemployment 
- Critique of New Classical 
Economics’ assumption of 
perfect markets. Imperfect 
markets are rule, not 
exception. 
-Market not efficient in 
short term due to menu 
costs, efficiency wages, etc. 
-Monetary and fiscal policy 
as instruments to correct 
market failure. More 
effective if used in short 
term. 
- Inflation targeting as 
primary policy goal of 
central banks. 
-Targeted policy to reduce 
market imperfections 
Mid 1980s-2008 
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demanded is just equal to the quantity of product supplied at that price;
291
 and (5) given the above 
conditions, an economy will self-adjust to clear markets of excess supply or demand,
292
 allows for 
“Pareto-efficient” welfare improving outcomes,
293
 and  will always trend toward its natural level of 
real GDP
294
 and full employment. 
 
Specific to conceptualizations of full employment and its relationship to free markets, the classical 
school is rooted in ideas initially developed by nineteenth century economists John Stuart Mill and 
Jean Baptiste Say. They begin with the notion that the only reason people produce is to consume. If 
the desire to consume drives the effort of production, it is impossible to have conditions of 
overproduction in free market systems due to lack of demand. Or as stated in Say’s Law, production 
(supply) and selling of one product therefore can be thought of as demand for another product of equal 
value.
295
 If supply creates its own demand, a key mechanism that must be in place to guard against 
misplaced production is free market price and wage flexibility. Under open market conditions, the 
price mechanism will correct short term misdirected production as owners will either drop prices or 
shift production to other profitable enterprises. Free labor markets also allow wages to fall or rise in 
accordance to the value of production. In this scenario, any unemployment in the economy is either 
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voluntary (e.g. – workers unwilling to take wages below market value) or “frictional” due to short 
term imperfections in the labor market.
296
 
 
This approach also highlights the role that savings and investment have in maintenance of natural 
levels of real GDP. A certain percentage of income is saved rather than spent. An increase in savings 
reduces the demand for consumption of goods and services. In response, suppliers reduce production 
of consumption goods and services, employment falls, and the short term equilibrium level of real 
GDP falls below its natural level. While this appears to contradict Say’s Law, the classical argument 
counters that savings can be conceptualized as a source of spending for investment. Under normal 
circumstances, investment spending fills the gap of lowered consumption spending and the natural 
level of GDP is maintained.
297
 Classical theorists also argue that free markets self-correct when the 
demand for investment falls below the supply available via saved income. In this scenario, flexible 
interest rates are the mechanism that adjusts saving and investment. In periods of excessive saving, for 
example, downward pressure is exerted on interest rates.
298
 As interest rates fall, savings decrease and 
subsequent investment levels increase. Investment levels also increase as high rates of saving 
represents decreased demand and prices for consumer goods. As consumer goods industries become 
less profitable, resources shift toward investment industries that are in higher demand. Investment, for 
classical theorists, thus increases precisely when consumption decreases and moves the economy back 
to its equilibrium real GDP.
299
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In his seminal The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes leveled a broad based 
critique of the logic of market self-correction championed by classical theorists.
300
 A key argument 
pushed by neoclassical economists in the interwar period was that increased wage inflexibility due to 
the rise of the labor movement undermined recovery and full employment.
301
  Keynes maintained that 
even if wages, interest rates, and commodity prices are perfectly flexible and adjusted accordingly 
downward during periods of economic contraction, there is no guarantee that an economy will self-
correct. In fact, as seen during the Depression era, an economy can reach equilibrium levels well 
below full economic capacity. This radical break from the self-correcting classical logic focused on 
three primary interrelated themes: money and its relationship to uncertainty; investment levels, 
effective demand, and employment; and the variable of human subjectivity in driving business cycles. 
 
Classical and neoclassical understanding of money maintains that it serves only as a medium of 
exchange.
302
 Keynes instead highlighted that money plays an additional role around the storage and 
maintenance of wealth as follows. Saved income can be lent for interest, invested in a capital asset, or 
held in liquid form. Individuals, particularly when they are uncertain about the future profitability of 
capital investment or return on interest rates, hoard money in liquid form. Given that the holding of 
excess savings in liquid form produces no income, money thus serves the function of wealth 
maintenance.
303
 The fact that individuals choose to invest or not invest surplus income in productive 
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activity thus undermines the classical argument and Say’s Law in two primary areas. First, individuals 
make choices to keep or not keep income in liquid form based on expectations about the future. For 
Keynes, these expectations about the future are primarily based on the subjective and often volatile 
“conventional wisdom” of the day. Mass psychology, rather than “rational actors responding to a 
rational world,” thus is a key variable that determines if and when individuals will invest or hoard.
304
  
Second, when hoarding occurs, this liquid savings is not a component of demand but rather subtracts 
from it. Supply does not de facto create its own demand.
305
   
 
Maintenance of demand in the economy through consumption is also undermined by high inequality. 
The wealthy minority has more income than they need for consumption. The poor majority, in 
contrast, consumes little due to low income levels.
306
 Given this reality, Keynes highlighted the 
fundamental role that investment plays relative to production of income and maintenance of effective 
demand and employment. Investment not only supports demand in the future, it is essential for the 
maintenance of current levels of consumption.
307
 Keynes thus focused on factors that undermine 
investment and subsequent full employment. As introduced above, a certain percentage of excess 
income is hoarded. Keynes argued that the rate of interest is best understood as the price paid to those 
who part with liquid savings.
308
 The greater the desire to hoard (what Keynes termed the “liquidity 
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preference”), the higher the interest rate must be to induce those with liquidity to part with cash.
309
   
Those with liquid assets will only invest these resources if the expected future profits from this 
investment are greater than the reward given by current interest rates.
310
  Several dynamics thus can 
produce a downward spiral of economic retraction that can lead to economic recession or depression. 
If there is little confidence in future profitability, interest rate levels, even at very low levels, will 
exceed future expected earnings and investment decreases. Lower investment translates into reduced 
demand, higher unemployment, and reduced profits. Fear of still worse future conditions increases the 
incentive to hoard income in liquid form. This produces continued downward expectations on future 
profits and the downward cycle begins anew.
311
 
 
Breaking this cycle thus requires several potential interventions from government to stimulate 
investment and aggregate demand. In moderate periods of economic contraction, an increase in money 
supply can lower interest rates sufficiently to catalyze investment. In more severe periods of economic 
contraction, monetary policy that reduces interest rates may not be sufficient. During these “liquidity 
traps,” Keynes maintained that government spending and investment were critical to jumpstart the 
economy back toward full productive capacity and full employment.
312
 Along with short term 
monetary and fiscal policy response to economic contraction, Keynes identified a series of additional 
measures that reduced instability and unemployment over the long term. These include a steep 
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progressive income tax, greater public investment and government coordination of private investment, 
and regulations to reduce speculative activities.
313
 
  
Keynesianism emerged as the dominant economic theory in the 1930s until the mid-1950s and 
provided the intellectual foundation for those sympathetic to policies of countercyclical government 
intervention and highly regulated financial and international capital markets.
314
 As the prominent 
framework that shaped the creation of the IMF, Keynesian theory also was prominently featured in 
early Fund policy.
315
  This was most strongly expressed in initial support of capital controls. Along 
with reducing international volatility in the Bretton Woods framework, capital controls gave states the 
ability to implement countercyclical monetary and fiscal measures to support full employment 
policies. Keynesian-inspired ideas are also expressed in the Fund’s framework of demand management 
in relation to balance-of-payment disequilibria. Components of the Polak model (see chapter 2), for 
example, are rooted in Keynesian assumptions that balance of payment crisis reflects imbalances of 
aggregate demand and supply and that multiple policy levers including monetary and fiscal 
intervention should be used to restore equilibrium.
316
 
 
Contemporary critics of the IMF including Joseph Stiglitz argue that the institution moved away from 
its Keynesian roots mainly following the 1982 Mexican debt crisis until the 2008 global financial 
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crisis. For Stiglitz, the Fund was guilty of adopting “the pre-Keynesian position of fiscal austerity in 
the face of a downturn…which almost always entail contractionary policies leading to recessions or 
worse” during this time.
317
 Several staff members interviewed for this project, in contrast, argued that 
Keynesianism has always remained at the center of the Fund’s normative culture, even during the 
Washington Consensus era:  
Public perceptions have sometimes put the IMF in an ideological corner. I don’t think we 
had a dramatically different view [during the 1980s and 1990s]. You have to remember that 
we have always been a Keynesian institution. We are an institution of fiscal activists.
318
 
 
Other staff members and Executive Directors noted that the post-2008 period witnessed a return to 
greater acceptance of Keynesian thinking in the economics profession and the institution: 
 In terms of institutional thinking, I think we started out as a Keynesian institution in 
 the 1940s and 1950s and then moved quite a lot to the Chicago school, free market side 
 of things and now it’s a little more middle of the road.
319
 
 
I explore this possible return to Keynes in further detail below with a look at post-2008 shifts in LIC 
policy on inflation and fiscal and monetary counter-cyclical intervention. 
 
The Neoclassical Synthesis 
The diversity of opinions among current IMF LIC staff in regard to when and how Keynesian thinking 
has influenced the Fund is partially explained by the emergence of the neoclassical synthesis. As 
outlined by Chwieroth, the main economics debate in the late 1950s and 1960s was not between 
Keynesians and the emerging monetarist school, but rather an internal Keynesian divide. One group, 
consisting primarily of economists based at Cambridge University, sought to preserve and build on a 
strict interpretation of Keynesian themes.
320
  These self-described “post-Keynesians” argued for 
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maintenance and expansion of capital control and a robust policy of countercyclical full employment 
policies.
321
 Several American economists, including Paul Samuelson and James Tobin (also known as 
“neo-Keynesians”), instead argued for a rethinking of Keynes within a neoclassical framework.
322
   
 
Samuelson et al. pushed for a “neoclassical synthesis” that combined aspects of Keynesian and 
classical theory and emerged as the dominant economic school of thought until the late 1970s. 
Proponents of the synthesis rejected neoclassical assumptions that economies self-correct and argued 
like Keynes that counter-cyclical government intervention is necessary to stimulate recessed 
economies to their full productive capacity. Neoclassical synthesists, however, diverged from 
Keynesianism in several key areas. While Keynesianism maintained that markets are inherently 
unstable and driven by irrational and inefficient use of information, neoclassical synthesists 
differentiated between short-term and long-term market dynamics. In the long term, markets are 
considered efficient and equilibrating. Long-term efficiency, however, is undermined by short-term 
market errors (e.g., asymmetric information, price stickiness). At the Fund, this translated into an 
emphasis on targeted, short-term fiscal and monetary response rather than a focus on a more 
permanent regime of government intervention.
323
  The neoclassical synthesis and Fund policy also 
distanced itself from Keynes’ support of capital controls. Drawing back to neoclassical assumptions, 
both long and short term speculative capital flows were not considered destabilizing, but rather natural 
equilibrating factors in an open trading system.  
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In what Jacqueline Best describes as the “hollowing out” of Keynesianism, the dismissal of Keynes’ 
focus on inter-subjective dynamics driving market behavior reframed macroeconomic issues as 
essentially technical, short-term issues that could be modeled and ultimately corrected.
324
 The 
ascendency of this interpretation of macroeconomics helped reinforce a technocratic, economistic 
norm at the Fund that remains firmly embedded in the institution (see chapter 2). Based on interview 
with staff, this form of Keynesianism with a neoclassical and technocratic bent is arguably what many 
Fund staff who consider themselves Keynesians self-identify. Fiscal intervention that “works” in the 
short run is the primary concern rather than a focus on developing policy that accepts long-term 
instability and irrationality of modern capitalist economies. 
Monetarism 
The neoclassical synthesis focus on demand management emerged as the dominant mainstream 
macroeconomic paradigm in the 1960s and early 1970s. Its most direct challenge came from the 
emerging popularity of monetarist theory in the 1970s and 1980s. Developed by economists associated 
with the University of Chicago including Milton Friedman, monetarists root their analysis in four 
primary assumptions.
325
 First, as with neoclassical orthodoxy, markets free of distortion are efficient 
and equilibrating. Second, the amount of money in an economy is the primary variable driving total 
spending and overall level of economic activity and output. Expansion of money supply is reflected in 
increased economic activity, inflation, and inflationary expectations. Third, a stable and non-
inflationary economy free of government intervention will tend toward full employment. Fourth, while 
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long-term increases in money supply consistent with productive capacity of a society are stabilizing, 
short-term changes in money supply are destabilizing. Monetary stimulus unrelated to underlying 
fundamentals, for example, produces inflation with no guarantee of increased employment. Attempts 
to reduce inflation through a short-term decrease in money supply also are problematic due to what 
monetarist describe as “adaptive expectations.” Economic output and employment are reduced but 
high wages and prices remain due to lag time “between changes in fundamentals and the market’s 
perception of these changes.”
326
 
 
Based on these assumptions, monetarist theory strongly contrasted with the neoclassical synthesists in 
several areas. First, countercyclical fiscal policy is at best inconsequential to growth and often 
detrimental as it crowds out private investment. Second, attempts to restore full employment through 
fiscal or monetary policy or to manage unemployment through wage intervention are 
counterproductive. Monetarists argue there is a natural rate of unemployment consistent with a 
society’s productive capacity and that government intervention to stimulate growth results in inflation 
with possibly little effect on increasing employment. Intervention in labor markets also produces wage 
distortions that unnecessarily maintain or increase unemployment above their natural levels. Third, 
given that short-term monetary intervention is problematic, discretionary monetary policy is to be 
avoided. Authorities should instead use fixed, rigid rules that support a gradual expansion of money 
supply in line with underlying productive capacity.
327
   
 
Fund historian James Boughton asserts that monetarism “had less impact on the IMF than on the 
economics profession at large, and its influence was felt primarily in efforts made to examine and 
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ultimately reject it.”
328
 Rather, it was the emergence of new classical economics (see below) that “had 
the biggest post-Keynesian impact on the IMF.”
329
 This is arguably overstated as several prominent 
policy positions consistent with monetarism have shaped policy directives of the Fund. Most evident is 
the logic and general conclusion associated with components of the Polak model. While Polak 
explicitly differentiates his monetary approach to the balance of payments model as a “Keynesian 
inspired IMF version” from that of a competing “Chicago School revolutionary approach,” the main 
policy recommendations are the same: Creation of domestic credit leads to loss of foreign reserves of 
an equal amount.
330
 As such, states with balance-of-payment deficits are advised to reduce domestic 
consumption.
331
 
 
Another prominent impact of monetarism in IMF thinking was its stance on capital controls in the 
1980s and 1990s. Monetarists frame aversion to capital controls as misguided, arguing that capital 
flow volatility is a symptom of speculators and investors responding rationally to underlying policy 
and institutional weakness. Capital movement thus is a corrective mechanism rather than a variable in 
and of itself that causes economic turmoil. This argument was expressed most forcefully by IMF 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus and First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer in the late 
1990s as they unsuccessfully lobbied for the Fund Executive Board to amend its Articles of 
Agreement to include jurisdiction over capital controls.
332
  While the fallout from the Asian crisis 
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cooled IMF efforts to pursue an integration of capital account liberalization into its formal mandate, 
two interconnected monetarist-inspired themes remain influential in Fund debates. First is the notion 
that the primary role of monetary policy is sustaining price stability rather than focusing on issues of 
full employment. Second, given the political pressure for short term inflationary stimulus, the most 
effective institutional arrangement to promote price stability is an arrangement where central banks are 
independent and follow fixed rules rather than ad hoc discretion when instituting monetary policy.333   
New Classical Economics 
As with monetarism, new classical economics gained popularity in the 1970s as Keynesian-inspired 
models failed to provide a logical explanation of patterns of stagflation afflicting many major 
economies during this time. New classical economics, like monetarism, dismisses Keynesian 
assumptions of inefficient markets and roots its thinking in classical conceptions of prices, markets, 
and natural rates of unemployment.
334
  Free of intervention, prices and wage levels clear markets 
(balance supply and demand) efficiently. New classical economics, however, diverges from 
monetarism in its conception of individual adaptability to changing market conditions. Monetarists 
maintain that markets clear in the long run but short-term inefficiencies in markets exist due to 
adaptive expectations and the relative inflexibility of prices and wages to adjust quickly to shifts in 
money supply. These short-term dynamics impact aggregate demand, employment levels, and 
economic output.
335
 New classical theory rejects the notion that markets and prices only clear over 
medium and long time horizons. Rather, rational, utility maximizing individuals and firms constantly 
adjust to changing market conditions to maximize profit and/or utility. The aggregate effect of 
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individuals and firms acting rationally and in “real time” guarantees that prices accurately reflect 
underlying fundamentals and quickly balance supply and demand. 
 
Individuals and firms also develop what John Muth initially described as “rational expectations” of 
future market direction.
336
  Rational economic actors learn to predict changes in government policies 
and also how to react to these changes to maximize profits and utility. Through this process, new 
classical theorists argue that individuals and firms will also offset government policy aims, preventing 
them from having a real effect on aggregated demand and economic output.
337
 This translates into an 
aversion of “activist” fiscal or monetary intervention: 
 Activist policies must be curbed, first, because a growing body of evidence…suggests that 
existing models cannot succeed in offsetting the normal fluctuations in output, 
employment, or other aggregates. Second, activist policies must be curbed because most of 
their effects are uncertain…Third, activist policies must be curbed because even if we 
know what their results would be, we wouldn’t know whether they were desirable or not.
338
 
 
Neoclassicalists instead advocate that governments focus on issues of market stability and intervene 
primarily in areas that improve overall efficiency.  
 
Specific to the Fund and LICs, a focus on efficiency and stability rather than activist intervention was 
a key component of structural adjustment lending under the SAF and ESAF frameworks in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Merging aspects of new classical and monetarist thinking, reduction in government 
spending was seen as the most effective macroeconomic tool to stimulate growth by reversing low 
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rates of private investment and high inflation found in the majority of poor states during this period.
339
  
Fiscal austerity via cuts in government employment and caps on salaries and transfers was also pushed 
to reduce overall consumption and produce so-called “demand compression” to help reverse balance 
of payment deficits.
340
 While conditionality frameworks under the PRGF and ECF/SCF/RCF moved 
away from the notion that fiscal austerity and private investment guarantees growth, components of 
new classical and monetarist themes remain. In a 2008 staff paper outlining the role of Fund in LICs, 
for example, “prudent fiscal policy” entails a “fiscal stance” that helps “ensure macroeconomic 
stability and debt sustainability, and avoids crowding out.”
341
 
New Keynesianism  
New Keynesianism first emerged in the early 1980s as a reaction to monetarist and new classical 
critiques of Keynesian inspired theory. As outlined by Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz, New 
Keynesians share with traditional Keynesians three general propositions: “1. During some periods – 
often extended – an excess supply of labor exists at prevailing level of real wages. 2. The aggregate 
level of economic activity fluctuates markedly…These fluctuations are greater in magnitude and 
different in pattern from any that might be accounted for by short-run changes in technology, tastes, or 
demography. 3. Money matters, at least most of the time, although monetary policy may be ineffective 
in some periods (like the Great Depression).”
342
 While in disagreement with new classical and 
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monetarist assumptions concerning market self-correction, New Keynesians concede that the new 
classical focus on microeconomic principles to explain macroeconomic outcomes is an important 
advancement. New Keynesians thus adopt the micro-foundational focus of new classical economics 
but differ in their assumptions about the nature of markets. While new classical models see market 
distortion as the exception rather than the rule, New Keynesians highlight that imperfect information 
and other distorting externalities are a “given” in market transactions.
343
 The cumulative effect of 
individuals rationally responding to imperfect market conditions produces aggregate market failure, 
particularly in the short run.
344
 
 
New Keynesians highlight several dynamics that produce price and wage rigidities during periods of 
economic downturn that undermine market clearing. Specific to prices, the concepts of “menu costs” 
and “price staggering” explain why reduced demand during economic downturn does not necessarily 
result in lower prices. Menu costs refer to the cost of changing prices. Prices do not adjust quickly or 
continuously as it costs firms resources to implement a new price.
345
 Price staggering also occurs as 
firms are conscious of their prices relative to other firms and don’t want to be the first to decrease their 
prices.
346
 In regard to explanations of involuntary unemployment, the concept of “efficiency wages” 
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highlights why wages may remain high despite high unemployment. Firms pay above market average 
wages as high wages make workers more productive, produce less turnover, and attract more qualified 
and dedicated employees. In the aggregate, the choice of individual firms to pay above equilibrium 
wages to their high value workers reinforces involuntary unemployment.
347
 
 
In regard to macroeconomic policy response, New Keynesians are generally conservative in their 
application of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy.
348
 Influential New Keynesians including N. 
Gregory Mankiw, for example, are strong supporters of inflation targeting and present their policy 
positions primarily as a response to demand shocks (e.g., government spending).
349
 In the short run, 
central bank manipulation of interest rates is to be used to counter inflationary pressure caused by 
demand shocks. Given that prices and wages are sticky, however, there will be periods of involuntary 
unemployment following a necessary reduction in money supply. The best solution therefore is to 
proactively avoid imbalances caused by introducing excessive aggregate demand into the economy.
350
 
This framing of monetary policy became the norm in the 1990s through broad acceptance within 
central banks and the Fund of the so called “Taylor Rule.”  Introduced by New Keynesian economist 
John Taylor in 1992, it stipulated that central banks “lean against the wind” by systematically 
responding to increased inflation “with a more-than-proportional increase” in nominal interest rates.
351
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The 2008 (legitimacy) Crisis and a Return to Keynes? 
A combination of monetarist, new classical, and New Keynesian theory (also referred to as “the New 
Consensus”) was reflected in Fund macroeconomic positions from the 1982 Mexican debt crisis to the 
2008 global financial crisis. Inflation management was the primary goal of monetary policy along with 
a dismissal of countercyclical fiscal policy. Trust in the stability and long term efficiency of markets 
also factored into aversion to government intervention into labor and financial markets. Relative low 
volatility, low unemployment, and low inflation in most industrialized states from the 1980s to 2008 
were attributed to these policy directives. Described as “The Great Moderation,” proponents of the 
New Consensus including then Federal Reserve governor Ben Bernanke argued that financial 
liberalization and “improved macroeconomic performance, particularly monetary policy” were 
primarily responsible for nearly three decades of steady growth and low inflation in industrialized 
states.
352
 Olivier Blanchard, for his part, declared in August 2008 that an intellectual consensus had 
formed around appropriate monetary, fiscal, and regulatory response, concluding that the “state of 
macro was good.”
353
   
 
As introduced above, constructivists focused on the IMF argue that a “crisis of legitimacy” can 
facilitate ideational change and policy reform. The 2008 global financial crisis proved to be such an 
event as components of three decades of macroeconomic policy consensus were called into question.  
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, in a 2011 speech delivered at an IMF sponsored forum on “Macro and 
Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis,” captured this sentiment in his opening remarks:  
The last few years have not only been a crisis for the global economy, but also a crisis for 
economics. The Great Moderation led too many of us to underestimate macroeconomic 
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risks…the recent experience has raised profound questions about the pre-crisis consensus 
on macroeconomic policies.
354
 
 
Blanchard, in an apparent mea culpa, shared a similar notion that the relative stability in advanced 
economies prior to the 2008 crisis had “lulled economists and policymakers into a false sense of 
security” and that the “Great Recession” required “a reassessment of what we know about how to 
conduct macroeconomic policy.” 355 As outlined below in analysis of shifts in monetary and fiscal 
policy, the post-2008 period is characterized in part by the growing influence of more orthodox 
aspects of Keynesian theory.  
Monetary Policy 
In regard to monetary policy, Blanchard outlined the pre-2008 consensus thinking in these terms: 
Stable and low inflation was presented as the primary, if not exclusive, mandate of  
central banks. This was the result of coincidence between the reputational needs 
of central bankers to focus on inflation…and the intellectual support for inflation  
targeting by the New Keynesian model….There was an increasing consensus that 
inflation should not only be stable, but very low (most central banks chose a 
target around 2 percent).
356
 
 
Blanchard also noted that despite some debate among economists that exceedingly low target inflation 
rates could replicate dynamics of deflationary spirals seen during the Great Depression, these concerns 
were largely dismissed prior to the 2008 crisis: “The liquidity traps in the Great Depression, combining 
significant deflation, and low nominal rates, were seen as belonging to history, a reflection of policy 
errors that could now be avoided.”
357
  Blanchard argued that there is now recognition that inflation 
targets were too low in the pre-2008 era and led to “costly” consequences: 
When the crisis started in earnest in 2008, and aggregated demand collapsed, most 
 central banks quickly decreased their policy rate to close to zero. Had they been able 
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 to, they would have decreased the rate further: estimates…suggest another 3 to 5  percent 
 for the United States. But the zero nominal interest rate bound prevented them from 
 doing so…it is clear that the zero nominal interest rate bound has proven costly.  Higher 
 average inflation, and thus higher nominal interest rates to start with, would have made it 
 possible to cut interest rates more, thereby probably reducing the drop in output and the 
 deterioration of fiscal position.
 358
 
  
Specific to LICs policy, the debate on appropriate inflation levels prior to the 2008 crisis appeared 
more sensitive to the effects of exceedingly low inflation targets on growth rates and monetary 
flexibility. In a 2005 staff paper, discussion around appropriate inflation rates recognized that “the 
desirability of single digit inflation had been questioned” and that no consensus around the appropriate 
inflation rates for LICs had been clearly established. In their ultimate conclusion that LIC policy rates 
should be targeted between 5 and 10 percent, Fund staff argued that LICs needed room for short term 
expansionary intervention due to the high risks of exogenous shocks to their economies, but also 
warned against inflation levels above 10 percent: 
On balance, the above considerations support the use of single-digit inflation targets…. 
However, pushing inflation too low, say below 5 percent, may entail a loss of output and 
seigniorage revenue, suggesting a need for caution in setting very low inflation targets in 
low-income countries. As these countries tend to be subject to larger output volatility and 
more pronounced price shocks, program design should take these economic attributes 
properly into account. In particular, inflation targets should be set so as to help avoid risks 
of an unintended contractionary policy stance. 
359
 
If discussion prior to the crisis called for higher inflation rates, the 2008 crisis resulted in LIC staff 
more forcefully pushing flexible monetary response. As seen in Figure 4.2 below, target rate inflation 
levels of LICs negotiated with the Fund have increased under the new ECF/RCF/SCF framework. 20 
of 34 LIC lending arrangements negotiated in 2010-2011 have inflation targets above 5 percent as 
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compared to 10 of 32 under PRGF lending from 2003-2007. 5 LICs also have inflation targets between 
10 and 20 percent under the new lending arrangements.
360
 
    
Figure 4.2 Target LIC Inflation Rates (1995-2011) 
      (Number of LICs) 
   
    3% below 3.1%-5% 5.1-10% 10.1-20% 
 
1995-1999   15  13  14  5 
(ESAF) 
 
2003-2007   12  10  9  1 
(“late” PRGF) 
  
2010-2011    7  7  15  5 
(ECF/RCF/SCF) 
 
    Source: Goldsbrough et al (2007); Martin and Watts (2012)  
 
 
Staff debates on how LICs should deal with the aftermath of the 2008 crisis maintain that most LICs 
were conservative in their monetary response and argue that in future downturns a “more active 
monetary easing” is advisable: 
 In the 2009 downturn, LICs did not fully exploit the scope of monetary easing…while 
 LICs did lower nominal policy rates, they did so by less than the  decline in inflation 
 would have allowed, resulting in sharply higher real policy rates at the peak of the 
 crisis. In the event of another global downturn and softening of commodity prices, 
 more active monetary easing may be appropriate in LICs with moderate inflation.
361
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Staff from the Africa Department also argue for Keynesian-inspired monetary policy that reflects 
inflation levels and adjusts accordingly: “As inflation falls, monetary policy should be eased…On the 
other hand, countries still experiencing excessive inflation many need to tighten monetary policy.”
362
 
Fiscal Policy 
New Consensus thinking, drawing from monetarist, new classical, and New Keynesian theory, 
dismissed countercyclical fiscal policy as an appropriate macroeconomic policy tool. As noted by 
Blanchard, “In the 1960s and 1970s, fiscal and monetary policy had roughly equal billing…In the past 
two decades, however, fiscal policy took a backseat to monetary policy.”
363
 For New Keynesians, 
aversion to countercyclical fiscal response was coined in terms of rational expectations of individual 
economic agents. Individuals aware of plans of increased government spending financed through taxes 
or bonds understand that such activity negatively impacts future income. As such, they rationally 
chose to decrease consumption to save for future higher taxation. The subsequent drop in consumption 
therefore offsets attempts by government authorities to stimulate aggregate demand.
364
 Monetarists 
and new classicalists also portrayed countercyclical fiscal response as irresponsible, as deficit 
spending undermined macroeconomic stability through increased inflationary pressure.  
 
Since the 2008 crisis, countercyclical fiscal policy has been reestablished as an appropriate component 
of macroeconomic response in the Fund. Strauss-Kahn fired the first shot at the New Consensus in 
early November 2008. The crisis, he argued, was “…what economists call a Keynesian recession” and 
required coordinated international fiscal expansion to stimulate demand and “avoid a global 
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depression.”
365
 At a November 2008 emergency G-20 summit meeting, Strauss-Kahn welcomed the 
fact that G-20 leaders emphasized “fiscal stimulus, which I believe is now essential to restore global 
growth.”
366
  Fund staff papers during the first year of the crisis reiterated similar themes. A joint staff 
paper from the Research and Finance Departments in December 2008 urgently argued for a “timely, 
large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective, and sustainable” fiscal policy stimulus to increase 
aggregate global demand.
367
 In perhaps the most dramatic shift in policy recommendations since the 
early 1980s, the paper warned against pro-cyclical balanced budget requirements and called for a 
strong public sector involvement to help stimulate demand: 
 First, …governments should make sure that existing programs are not cut for lack of 
 resources. In particular, central governments or sub-national governments that are  
 facing balanced budget rules may be forced to suspend various spending programs. 
 Measures should be taken to counteract the procyclicality build in these rules….Second, 
 spending programs, from repair and maintenance, to investment  projects delayed, 
 interrupted or rejected for lack of funding or macroeconomic considerations, can be 
 (re)started quickly. A few high profile programs, with good long-run justification 
 and strong externalities, (for example, for environmental purposes) can also help, directly 
 and through expectations. Given the higher degree of risk facing firms at the current 
 juncture, the state could also take a larger share in private-public  partnerships for 
 valuable projects that would otherwise be suspended for lack of private capital.
368
 
 
Acceptance of Keynesian themes of countercyclical intervention has also been seen in the Fund’s 
support of “automatic fiscal stabilizers” in the post-2008 era. As outlined by Blanchard et al., the 
impact of future recessions could be ameliorated if automatic targeted tax rebates and income transfers 
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to “low-income or liquidity-constrained households” were implemented once employment levels fell 
below a threshold level.
369
 
 
As with monetary policy, staff involved with LIC policy diverged somewhat from the broader 
institutional and professional consensus on fiscal policy prior to the 2008 crisis. Starting with the 
PRGF, fiscal policy advice centered on issues of debt sustainability, strategic financing, and 
appropriate public expenditure to support the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
370
 Staff 
argued that fiscal policy ultimately should work to lower budget deficits and public debt levels to 
manageable levels, as doing so would increase levels of private investment and subsequent growth. 
Specific to LICs, however, a history of unsustainable debt levels produced dynamics that undercut the 
ability of these states to pursue prudent fiscal policy choices. Staff argued for a two tiered strategy. 
LICs should work toward a tighter fiscal stance while multilateral institutions and bilateral donors 
should concurrently maintain or increase concessionary lending and debt forgiveness to produce 
policy space for pursuing MDG initiatives.  
 
Following the broader institutional trend following the 2008 crisis, countercyclical fiscal policy 
reentered the policy tool-kit for LICs. A series of staff papers focused on the crisis and LIC response, 
for example, highlighted the importance of countercyclical fiscal intervention during the crisis and 
rebuilding “policy buffers” going forward in preparation for future economic recession: 
Growth was supported by a countercyclical policy response-a first for LICs in contrast to 
past crises when the fiscal stance was tightened. Most LICs let their fiscal automatic 
stabilizers operate, and the median income in real primary spending was higher than in the 
previous five years…Empirical analysis suggests that the response allows vital spending to 
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be preserved, in particular on social sectors and infrastructure, and helped mitigate the 
negative impact of the global crisis on economic growth and the poor.
371
 
  
Fund staff involved with LICs also maintained that targeted income transfer plans “to the poorest often 
result in a larger stimulus to aggregate demand, given their higher propensity to consume” and argued 
for targeted public works programs and income transfer as a component of fiscal stimulus. 372  
 
When asked what drove the IMF to support more Keynesian fiscal and monetary policy choices in the 
new ECF/RCF/SCF framework, answers from LIC staff generally came to the conclusion that the 
macroeconomic position of LICs leading into the 2008 crisis was the most influential variable shaping 
why LIC staff supported a countercyclical position: 
Many countries had built up quite significant policy space because debt had been reduced, 
inflation had come down, because deficits across the board were relatively small. All of 
these things put together allowed countries some room and they used it. I don’t think there 
has been some sort of deep ideological change.
373
 
 
In 2008, many LICs were in much more favorable position then they would have been ten 
years prior. Due to their good macroeconomic performance, they had built up policy 
buffers that they were able to then use. It was that change that made it very clear to 
observers outside the Fund that countercyclical policies have a role.
374
  
 
This was a new policy direction but the new direction was driven by the conditions in low 
income countries. It was at some level pragmatic advice that worked because countries 
actually had the reserves and policy space to actually do the stimulus. I would not pin the 
Fund’s position too much on any internal change in culture and thinking but perhaps more 
of an evolution also of the countries that we work in.
375
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Staff explanations as to why the Fund shifted in a more Keynesian direction thus did not reflect 
this as representative of a broader crisis of legitimacy. 
 
Structural Reform and Market Efficiency 
Unlike fiscal and monetary shifts seen after 2008, evidence points to little significant challenge to 
norms that champion improved market efficiency as the primary goal of structural reform. Since the 
1982 debt crisis and through the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the 2008 global financial crisis, IMF 
policy has consistently supported market-determined exchange rates, trade liberalization, and aversion 
to government-induced price intervention as the most prudent course of action for growth and 
development. Specific to LICs, policy focused on poverty reduction that first emerged under the PRGF 
and continued with the ECF/RCF/SCF framework explicitly argues for removal of market distortive 
policies as a prime tool to meet poverty reduction targets in LICs.  
 
Normative frames wary of market distortion have their roots in debates in the 1950s and 1960s. During 
this time period, IMF policy advocating limited state intervention and trade integration contrasted 
sharply with those sympathetic to the then popular strategy of ISI. As outlined in chapter 2, proponents 
of ISI argued poor states could only develop if they abandoned liberal economic models dependent on 
export of primary commodities. ISI instead advocated for internal industrialization through a series of 
state interventions that ostensibly reduced dependence on exports and kick-started the economy into 
producing manufactured goods for domestic consumption. While those critical of ISI stood outside the 
mainstream in the 1950s and 1960s, faltering growth rates in the 1970s across much of Latin America, 
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Africa, and the Middle East and the fallout from the 1982 Mexican debt crisis reshaped the 
development debate on terms more in line with the Fund’s position.
376
   
Most notable in this respect was a series of influential publications in the 1970s supported by the 
Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD),
377
 the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER),
378
 and the Brookings Institution
379
 that focused on various deleterious 
effects of market distortions caused by ISI policies. Following the 1982 crisis, two edited volumes 
from the Institute of International Economics focused on Latin America reinforced similar themes.
 380
  
Bela Balassa et al.’s Toward Economic Growth in Latin America (1986) underscored how inefficiency 
and corruption due to state intervention in Latin America had produced economic stagnation and 
dependency on global capital markets to finance deficits.
381
 John Williamson’s Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (1990) outlined a growing “Washington Consensus” within 
the IMF, World Bank, D.C. -based think tanks and the U.S. government concerning appropriate policy 
to reform indebted ISI states.
382
 These critiques of ISI served as the ideological foundation for 
aversion to state intervention in development outcomes that remain strongly embedded in Fund 
thinking and policy choices. I explore in more detail below how this has manifested itself in three 
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policy areas applied to LICs: market determined exchange rates, support of trade liberalization, and 
aversion to government-induced price distortion. 
Exchange Rates 
A primary purpose of the IMF, outlined in Article I (iii) of the Articles of Agreement, is “to promote 
exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid 
competitive exchange depreciation.” Fund thinking concerning the relationship between exchange 
rates, growth, and development in poor states is summarized as follows. Drawing from monetarist 
inspired theory, an assumption is first made that aggregate money supply is relatively stable, that 
individuals have access to goods and money balances, and that the demand for goods and money is 
positively correlated with income. A temporary disequilibrium between current money holding and 
long run demand for money produces a movement in international reserves. High demand for money 
due to economic expansion and/or deficit spending, for example, generates a trade surplus, as that 
economy imports money through increased exports to increase its money supply. Conversely, excess 
supply of money gives rise to a trade deficit as the country reduces supply of money through a rise in 
imports. Under open market conditions, exchange rate fluctuations reflecting case specific 
macroeconomic fundamentals are to be expected and states generally should not act to artificially 
create overvalued or undervalued currency values.
383
 
 
Due in part to the history of ISI, the primary concern of Fund staff over the past three decades is that 
developing states may return to a pattern of state intervention that overvalues exchange rates. LICs, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, also demonstrated more willingness than many other developing 
states in the post-ISI era to intervene in currency markets to maintain inflated exchange rates during 
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the 1980s and 1990s.
384
 The argument against artificial overvaluation of currency focuses on the 
following themes:  (1) Overvaluation represents a tax on exports and subsidization of imports. 
Discrimination against exporters lowers their ability to compete in foreign markets, lowers foreign 
exchange receipts, and subsequently undermines a state’s ability to obtain imports; (2) Limited foreign 
reserves may also become rationed and inefficiently allocated by the state; (3) Overvaluation puts 
pressure on import-competing industries. As seen under ISI, these interests will lobby for protectionist 
measures that further distort markets; (4) Overvaluation stokes possibilities of capital flight, 
particularly when currency comes under speculative attack; and (5) Defending an overvalued currency 
through tight monetary policy can produce economic recession.
385
   
 
Exchange rate stability in LICs is also particularly vulnerable to the effects of large and sporadic 
inflows and outflows of foreign currency into their economies. Sharp upsurges in income come from 
four areas:  discovery and export of a natural resource, a price spike in international markets of a 
primary export commodity, foreign direct aid, and short term foreign direct investment. Often 
described by development economists as symptoms of “Dutch disease,” large inflows of foreign 
currency place upward pressure on exchange rates and render traditional export sectors less 
competitive in international markets.
386
  Inflow of money also increases domestic demand for goods 
and services and can produce a production shift away from export sectors to the domestic non-trading 
goods sectors. For Fund staff, the general consensus is that a shift in production away from traditional 
export sectors that “generate learning by doing” undermines a country’s human capital potential and 
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subsequently undermines long term growth and development. Some form of government intervention 
to devalue currency in the short term may be advisable to limit the effects of Dutch disease.
387
 
 
While there is broad agreement among development economists on the negative impact of overvalued 
exchange rates, there is growing concern among Fund staff with strategies that move in the opposite 
direction and deliberately undervalue exchange rates. Most pertinent in current internal Fund debates 
around this issue are the contributions of Harvard economist Dani Rodrik. Rodrik, in a 2008 study 
focused on growth rates in developing countries from 1950-2004, presents evidence that growth rates 
were higher in developing states that deliberately undervalued their currency. Rodrik asserts that this is 
due to institutional factors and market failures unique to developing states that disproportionately 
impact traded goods sectors. Rather than the more difficult task of reforming markets and institutions 
that would invite investing in tradable sectors, devaluation serves as a “second best” policy for poor 
states. While the most prudent solution would be “deep” institutional and market reform, Rodrik 
concludes that a more practical course for poor states is to abandon the devaluation scheme and 
directly subsidize export sectors and allow exchange rates and wages to adjust to equilibrate the 
current account balance.
388
   
 
Current Fund staff working with LICs are wary of strategies of devaluation or direct subsidies to 
export sectors. When asked about Rodrik’s conclusions, for example, a senior staff member in SPR 
responded as follows:  
 Fund advice to countries is, broadly speaking, to try and keep the real effective exchange 
rates aligned with fundamentals. There are two reasons why we would not advocate an 
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active strategy of underevaluation: (1) the beggar-thy-neighbor problem (it is, after all one 
of the Fund’s reason d’etre to discourage such policies); and (2) attempts to sustain such a 
strategy for an extended period (which policy makers would be tempted to do) would give 
rise to other distortions-notably high /rising inflation-that would be harmful to growth.
389
 
  
Exchange rate policy recommendations for LICs thus remain broadly in line with the Washington 
Consensus view developed three decades ago. While overvaluation is the major concern with 
developing states, under-valuation can also be detrimental to growth potential. Exchange rates should 
reflect underlying fundamentals and be competitive enough to promote export growth, but should not 
be deliberately undervalued due to subsequent inflationary pressure and underinvestment in domestic 
sectors.
390
 
Trade controls  
As with exchange rate policy, contemporary thinking that shapes how Fund staff approach trade 
restrictions in LICs has roots in critiques of the ISI model that emerged in 1970s and 1980s. Among 
economists, the debate around the appropriateness of trade protectionism was challenged most forcibly 
by contributions of Anne Krueger, Jhagdish Bhagwadi, and T.N. Srinivasan. Krueger’s seminal “The 
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society” in American Economics Review modeled the adverse 
economic effects on growth that occur when actors compete for import licenses. Krueger argued that 
import licenses and other non-tariff trade restrictions create substantial economic rents due to the fact 
that they legally grant monopolistic control of market share to favored, politically connected actors. 
She highlighted that we should expect hard fought competition for these rents (“competitive rent 
seeking”) that misallocate resources in the formal economy and incur a subsequent welfare cost 
additional to that caused by tariff restrictions alone. The high cost of winning market share via rents 
also incentivizes actors to turn to informal and/or illegal activities (e.g., bribery, smuggling, black 
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markets) that can further undermine growth and development goals.
391
 Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
generalized Kreuger’s argument to explore further how various market distortive policies create what 
the authors described as “Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking” activities.
392
    
 
The battle against rent-seeking was also tied to the concept of “efficiency prices.”  Efficiency prices 
are considered those that result in profit maximization per unit of input use and are deemed to exist 
under conditions where domestic markets are able to freely interact with international markets. State 
intervention into markets undermines appropriate prices and subsequent efficient allocation of 
resources.
393
 Trade liberalization for poor states was thus considered the primary tool to counter 
distortive effects and spur growth and development
394
 and was heavily integrated into the rationale for 
IMF (and World Bank) structural adjustment lending in the 1980s and 1990s.
395
 Krueger, who went on 
to serve as the World Bank’s Chief Economist (1982-1986), First Managing Deputy Director of the 
IMF (2001-2003; 2005-2006), and interim Managing Director of the IMF in 2004, reflected on this  
“radical” shift toward a free trade model in her 1997 presidential address to the American Economic 
Association: 
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Ideas with regard to trade policy and economic development are among those that have 
changed radically. Then and now, it was recognized that trade policy was central to overall 
policies of economic development. But in the early days, there was a broad consensus that 
trade policy for development should be based on “import substitution”...The contrast with 
views today is striking. It is now widely accepted that growth prospects for developing 
countries are greatly enhanced through an outer-oriented trade regime and fairly uniform 
incentives for production across  exporting and import-competing goods…It is generally 
believed that import substitution as a minimum outlived its usefulness and that 
liberalization of trade and payments is crucial for both industrialization and economic 
development…And, while there are still some disagreements over particular aspects of 
trade policy both among academic researchers and policy makers, the current consensus 
represents a distinct advance over the old one, in terms both of knowledge and of the 
prospects it offers for rapid economic growth.
396
 
 
 
IMF publications, policy documents, and interviews with staff suggest the “consensus” described by 
Krueger remains firmly ingrained in the institution’s thinking. A 2009 IEO report focused on IMF 
involvement in trade issues from 1995-2007, for example, observed that “… the IMF’s position on 
trade policy reflected a rather broad consensus in the academic and public policy literature on the 
merits of liberal trade regimes.”
397
 The same report notes that Fund staff draw from arguments in the 
literature that protectionist measures as representative of “second best approaches” to market failures 
are often unrelated to trade. Rather than support the second best solution, Fund policies should instead 
target correction (“first best solutions”) of the market failure itself.
398
 This same ideological support of 
free trade is found in Fund policy debates following the 2008 crisis. A 2010 article in Finance and 
Development authored by two economists from SPR outlines current trends in protectionism since the 
crisis and highlights three areas that the Fund should address to support free trade in the near future:  
(1) enhanced monitoring of trade policy that supports discriminatory policies; (2) guard against 
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“murky” protectionist policies (e.g., public procurement, product standards, and custom procedures) 
and (3) support effort to conclude the current stalled WTO Doha Round.
399
  
  
Specific to staff working with LICs, Fund position papers on how best poor states can maintain growth 
and development in post-2008 crisis environment draw heavily from an argument focused on the 
merits of free trade: 
Trade is an engine of development and can contribute strongly to reducing 
poverty….Perhaps the most important step that the international community can take to 
support LDCs- and, indeed, of all LICs-is to conclude the WTO Doha Round…To benefit 
strongly from better trade opportunities, the LDCs would need to tackle aggressively their 
own high tariff and nontariff barriers to trade…On tariffs, a reasonable goal within a few 
years is for a maximum 25 percent rate and a simple average below 15 percent. Nontariff 
barriers, such as non-critical road blocks and checkpoints, and overly burdensome custom 
practices, significantly slow trade and should be removed.
400
 
 
 
The aforementioned 2009 IEO report does note that despite an ideological position strongly supportive 
of trade liberalization, the past two decades have witnessed a swing in the conditionality requirements 
in LIC lending arrangements that focus on trade liberalization. From the mid-1980s until 2000, the 
general trend was active and growing involvement in trade policy issues in SAF and ESAF programs. 
From 2000 forward, trade issues have been less central in Fund LIC lending arrangements. Reasons 
behind this shift are explored further in chapter 5.  
 
Price Distortions 
Government intervention in market prices consists of two broad forms (see Figure 4.3 below). “Fixed” 
pricing includes setting producer prices, ceilings on consumer prices, freezing of wholesale and retail 
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price margins, and commodity price support. “Input” pricing involves subsidies and use of taxes to 
discourage consumption of particular products. 
 
 
 
 
     
     Figure 4.3 Price Intervention Typology 
   
 Fixed Pricing     Common Features 
  Producer Prices    State purchases export at maximum prices 
       and sells on international market at higher price.  
        
  Consumer Prices   Retail price ceiling 
 
  Price Margins    Wholesale/retail margins set by law. 
 
  Commodity Prices   State purchases select commodities at    
       guaranteed minimum 
 
 
 
 Input Pricing 
  Price Subsidies    Subsidies used to support domestic production  
       of commodities, support  urban populations  
       and/or encourage use of specific inputs 
 
  Taxes/Disincentive Pricing  Artificially inflated prices on inputs and/or  
       outputs  to discourage consumption   
     
      (Source:  David, The IMF Policy Paradigm, 1985, p.70.) 
Most salient to LIC government intervention in market distortion are issues related to the agricultural 
sector. ISI inspired policies in the 1960s and 1970s heavily penalized agricultural sectors through 
various price interventions. Most common was the practice of fixing low producer prices to 
agricultural products. In this scenario, marketing boards of parastatal agencies with monopoly control 
purchased from agricultural producers at artificially low rates and then sold at open (world market) 
prices. Along with this “tax” on agricultural producers, price controls on basic foodstuffs were also a 
common practice during this period. For critics of this model, the narrative is that these policies 
ultimately produced a subsidization of urban elites at the expense of the rural and urban poor: 
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The general conclusion is that the rural and agricultural sectors have been taxed in favor of 
a relatively high-cost, high-wage, import substituting, and domestically oriented 
manufacturing  sector. The overall result has been a squeezing of the poor and powerless, 
and a general nurturing of a domestic industrial and bureaucratic class earning excessive 
monopoly rents.
 401  
 
Within this context, Fund and World Bank co-sponsored studies of price distortion in the agricultural 
sector are grounded in the following set of arguments. First, as seen under ISI inspired policy, 
government intervention into agricultural markets via export taxes, tariffs, or price subsidies worsens 
outcomes for the most vulnerable. Food protectionism increases domestic food prices, which impact 
poor consumers disproportionately as they spend more of their income on food than the well off. 
Government intervention into agricultural markets also does not help the rural poor who don’t own 
farmland and have to pay higher food prices and those who do own land but don’t produce for 
commercial markets.
402
 Second, protectionism undermines innovation, supports inefficient processes, 
and diverts resources away from rural education, infrastructure development, and technical 
assistance.
403
 Third, while protected agricultural markets might see short term price stability, the 
overall cost of market distortion is increased instability in prices in world markets. Both in the medium 
and long term, a better strategy is to liberalize agricultural markets.
404
   
 
Along with concerns surrounding agricultural price distortions, the Fund’s position has consistently 
argued against a broad range of subsidies used in LICs. Along with food subsidies described above, 
subsidies on energy use and transportation remain a prominent concern. A 2010 staff paper focused on 
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the increase in energy subsidies in Africa since the 2008 crisis argues that while well intended, price 
subsidies are generally costly and inefficient in allocation and disproportionately benefit the 
wealthy.
405
 The Fund’s response to the global prices spikes in agricultural and oil prices in 2007-8 
provides further evidence into how strongly embedded norms wary of market distortive effects remain 
in the institution. Masood Ahmed, current Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department 
and heavily involved in LIC policy is a lead spokesperson for the Fund’s position on subsidies.
406
 In a 
2008 article in Finance and Development, Ahmed argued for targeted, short-term subsidies to help the 
poor rather than long-term state intervention as the most appropriate response to global price spikes. 
There is also a focus on “achieving market-led solutions in the longer run” rather than long term, 
untargeted subsidies that will undermine producers and contribute to inflationary pressure.
407
   
 
The Fund’s April 2011 regional outlook on Sub-Saharan Africa argued along similar lines. Food price 
controls should be avoided as they “exacerbate scarcity” and “amount to ad hoc taxation of those that 
produce, distribute retail items.” The same goes for fuel subsidies. “Country studies show that fuel 
subsidies are almost invariably badly targeted” and as such tend to be “highly regressive” and “very 
costly fiscally” as they “encourage excessive consumption, and are difficult to phase out because of 
vested interests.”
408
 Several recent Fund loan agreements with LICs demonstrate that the Fund’s 
normative position on subsidies is being heeded by member states. Mozambique, for example, 
reported that it will gradually phase out fuel subsidies in 2012 and replace food and transport subsidies 
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with more “targeted schemes,” including a voucher scheme covering low income workers, students, 
and the elderly.
409
 Senegal followed a similar model in 2008 as it eliminated subsidies on food staples, 
vegetable oil, and butane gas.
410
  
 
Evidence thus points to a highly stable norm of free market thinking in the Fund that emphasizes the 
distortive effects of rent seeking. This notion has expressed itself consistently as seen in LIC policy 
directives on exchange rates, trade, and subsidies since the demise of ISI in the early 1980s. This is 
best captured by a senior staff member in the Research Department who argued that the Fund “has 
remained fairly Washington Consensus oriented all the way through” his three decade tenure.
411
 
Conclusions 
H1: Policy reform initiatives that draw from ideas and norms that question market-based solutions for 
LICs is unexpected. 
 
H2 :  A crisis of legitimacy that challenges taken for granted  macroeconomic and development ideas 
and/or norms is necessary for substantive LIC policy change. 
 
H3: Chances of LIC policy change are greatest when economic ideas or norms institutionalized within 
the Fund are questioned by broader epistemic community of development economists. 
 
 
Returning to the hypotheses above, I draw the following conclusions. First, despite policy shifts 
catalyzed in part by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the 2008 financial crisis, LIC reform 
measures have remained within the boundaries of paradigmatic conceptions of market based 
development established and reinforced for over five decades in mainstream economics. Second, while 
LIC policy since the late 1990s promotes limited state intervention and “pro-poor” policies, these 
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directives are conceptualized and enacted through a script that diverges little from a framework wary 
of market distortive protectionist and redistributive policy directives. This sentiment is best captured 
by a staff member from the African Department, who describes the PRSPs as follows: 
Policies have become more generous, but the basic principles have not changed…  When 
you boil it down, the core targets were there in 1986 and they are still there today. The core 
quantitative conditionality requirements have not changed. Think of it as a new cereal 
package. Clearly it looks different on the outside, and there is a bit of difference in what is 
inside, but it is still cereal.
412
 
 
In this sense, it is easy for Fund critics to argue that little has changed in the institution and among its 
social constituencies of legitimation in the post-Washington Consensus era.  
 
Analysis derived from constructivist process tracing of ideas, however, points to a more complicated 
story. While monetarist, new classical, and New Keynesian arguments wary of market distortive 
policy choices remain firmly entrenched in LIC lending arrangements, a shift in thinking has occurred 
in monetary and fiscal policy debates. As seen with the response by Strauss-Kahn and Blanchard to the 
2008 crisis, policy elites can reach a tipping point where they fundamentally question components of 
past policy direction and show willingness for self-critique and reform. Evidence thus points to the 
economics profession and Fund management and staff as entities that seek legitimacy in their policy 
choices. Specific to LIC policy, rejection of the New Consensus framework of monetary and fiscal 
policy popular from 1982 to 2008 has been replaced by more Keynesian ideas supportive of activist, 
countercyclical response. Returning to the model of norm cycle presented by Park and Vetterlein, the 
notion of activist and countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy has achieved stability within the 
Fund. We can expect future LIC policy initiatives in the short and medium term to include traditional 
Keynesian macroeconomic themes. 
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This chapter also highlights that more precise insight into current Fund reform is best achieved by 
conceptually treating themes of monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize short term balance of payment 
disequilibria as separate at some level from policies choices focused on structural reform and market 
efficiency. Evidence from this chapter demonstrates that we can expect more flexibility and change 
with the former as most policy choices along the spectrum of Keynesianism to monetarism still falls 
within broad paradigmatic themes of mainstream development economics. Alternative development 
proposals for LICs that challenge consensus around what is deemed market distortive should not be 
expected unless broader and deeper challenges or crisis in capitalism occur that subsequently 
challenge deep held beliefs in market efficiency. I address some of these concerns in chapter 5 through 
introduction of critical, historical structural engagement with IMF LIC policy reform.  
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Chapter 5   Inclusive Neoliberalism: Historical Structural Explanations of LIC Reform 
Mainstream theoretical approaches applied to the study of LIC policy in the post Washington 
Consensus period provide several new insights into what drives reform in this institution. From 
chapter 3, evidence derived through the use of PA models suggests that while the actors may change, a 
coalition consisting of at least one primary actor is necessary for policy reform. From chapter 4, 
constructivist analysis focused on the role of economic ideas and norm shifts and their relationship to 
contemporary IMF LIC policy reform highlights that Fund thinking and subsequent policy reform is 
influenced by external crises and policy failures. However, some ideas that frame policy choices are 
more sacrosanct than others. While conceptions of what is considered appropriate monetary and fiscal 
response have shifted in the post Washington Consensus period and have facilitated LIC policy 
reform, ideational frameworks skeptical of market distortion remain firmly entrenched in IMF 
thinking. 
 
In chapter 5, I shift gears from current mainstream theory and examine Fund LIC policy reform in the 
post Washington Consensus through the lens of a historical-structural framework developed initially 
by Robert W. Cox and adopted by several generations of neo-Gramscian IPE scholars. I first 
summarize how Cox differentiates what he describes as a “critical” approach from “problem-solving” 
studies of politics. I then outline the concept of historical structure and Gramscian concepts of 
hegemony, state-society complex, and historic bloc, and explore how a historical structural framework 
engages with the study of contemporary international politics. Specific to the IMF, I then apply Cox’s 
methodology to trace the historical structural foundations of the institution and how its role has 
changed in relationship to LICs and the broader world order in three distinct periods:  the hegemonic 
era of Bretton Woods, the non-hegemonic Washington Consensus era of globalist supremacy, and the 
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current era characterized by attempts of the globalist bloc to reassert a consensual framework of 
inclusive neoliberalism. This provides the context to assess two primary hypotheses put forth by 
several neo-Gramscian scholars focused on post Washington Consensus reform. First, the social 
upheaval and crises born out of the Washington Consensus period threatened to undermine the 
legitimacy of market driven development. In order to facilitate long term support for IMF and World 
Bank policy, the Fund has become more sensitive to concerns of weak economic growth, poverty, and 
increased inequality in LICs. Second, given that the IMF is one component of a broader globalist bloc, 
neo-Gramscians maintain that post Washington Consensus IMF reforms are a by-product of 
progressive elements within the globalist bloc to (re)establish a hegemonic world order through a more 
inclusive form of globalizing capitalism.  
 
Cox, Critical Theory, and Historical Structures  
Rationalist and constructivist frameworks employed in chapters 3 and 4 fall into what Cox categorizes 
as “problem-solving” theory. Problem-solving theory is designed to study and improve outcomes in a 
particular social and political order. Cox argues that problem-solving approaches “take the world as 
they find it” and analytically separates the entity understudy from deeper power relations and social 
forces that perpetuate the order within which the phenomena understudy are embedded.
413
  
Ontologically, this lends itself to an atomistic understanding of the world. Human agents and their 
behavior are “reduced to their outward phenomenal aspects” and historic entities such as the IMF are 
conceptualized and studied as independent objects that exist ‘out there’ in a broadly stable (a 
“continuing present”) social and political order underwritten by general patterns or laws that can be 
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elucidated through positivist methodology.
414
 Cox highlights two analytical strengths of political 
analysis rooted in problem-solving theory. It sets clear limits on the potential variables that impact the 
phenomena understudy that allow for precise, targeted examination. Through invoking the ceteris 
paribus assumption, it is also able to identify patterns of causal effect between variables and tease out 
patterns that can be applied in a predictive capacity to a given social and political order.
415
    
 
Critical theory differs in its understandings and approach in several key respects. It is an openly 
normative framework whose purpose is to systematically evaluate (“historicize”) power structures and 
institutional arrangements of an existing world order and analyze the possibilities of alternative futures 
and how they might come into effect. Given its focus on historical social process, it rejects an 
essentialist understanding of human nature and the notion that subsequent political and social 
arrangements (e.g., social relations of production, the state, institutions, and interstate system) have 
inherent or timeless qualities. Rather, society is conceptualized as consisting of reflexive human agents 
embedded in historically specific social structures and institutions that simultaneously shape – and are 
shaped – by their actions. Integral in this reflexivity of human agents is their individualized processes 
of interpreting the world. While individual human beings are interrelated to historically specific and 
coherent structural arrangement of ideas and institutions, this does not determine in a mechanical 
fashion their ways of thinking and acting. This tension between individual agency and 
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broader structural intersubjective understandings thus serves as a primary source of historical 
change.
416
  
 
While a dialectic, relational understanding of social structures and human action is inconsistent with 
positivist ontological and epistemological assumptions, a critical approach is not devoid of predictive 
capacity. Through systematic analysis of the social structures and power dynamics of a world order, a 
range of possible alternatives that might emerge are presented.
417
 Cox describes this as “utopianism 
…constrained by its comprehension of historical processes.”
 418
 Methodologically, this is 
accomplished through application of an ideal type that Cox terms a “historical structure.” A historical 
structure is a simplified representation of time-specific patterns of forces that frame in broad terms the 
“context of habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which action takes place” within a 
given world order.
419
 While these forces don’t determine agency and outcomes directly, they impose 
pressures and constraints:  “Individuals and groups may move with the pressure or resist and oppose 
them, but they cannot ignore them.”
420
  Three interrelated forces are identified that make up a 
historical structure. These include material capabilities, ideas, and institutions (see Figure 5.1 below). 
 
              Figure 5.1:   Historical Structure 
 
 Ideas 
 
              Material   Institutions 
            Capabilities 
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Material capabilities describe power resources of a social order tied to level of technology, financial 
and military power, and organization capacity. Ideas are divided into two broad categories. 
Intersubjective meanings are broad-based and historically derive shared understandings of the world. 
Cox stresses the crucial dynamic by which intersubjective understandings take on an objective form 
that serves as the foundation of historical structures: 
Historical structures express the unity of subjective and the objective. A nation, a class, a 
religion are not real physical objects, yet they give real form to the human situation. They 
are ideas shared in the subjectivity of innumerable individuals…In being so shared, these 
ideas constitute the social world of these same individuals. They attain objectivity in the 
structure that circumscribes human action. These structures are as much a part of the 
material existence of people as the food they eat and the clothes they wear.
421
 
.  
If intersubjective meanings form the objective foundation of historical structures, more contested and 
varied are “collective images of social order.” Perhaps best described as more openly ideological 
frameworks of thinking, these ideas engage with “both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing 
power relations, the meaning of justice and public goods and so forth.”
422
 Cox highlights that tensions 
found between rival ideologies or between ideologies that challenge broad-based intersubjective 
understandings can serve as flashpoints of change that may produce alternative material and 
institutional arrangements and subsequent shifts in the historical structure.
423
 
 
Dynamics surrounding the interplay between ideas and power relations are introduced into the 
framework of historical structure through discussion of institutions and hegemony. Institutions are 
operationalized as expressions of ideational and material forces that subsequently reinforce prevailing 
power relations. Here, Cox adopts Antonio Gramsci’s conception of hegemony to capture the critical 
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role that institutions play in perpetuating a historical structure.
424
 Hegemony, as developed further 
below, is conceptualized as a form of domination where power relations primarily take on a 
consensual form and subsequently lower coercive aspects of rule.
425
 Institutions such as the IMF can 
serve as critical vectors for the formation and reproduction of hegemony in several respects. First, as 
institutions are ostensibly designed to serve general interests rather than the interests of ruling groups, 
they increase the legitimacy of the status quo.
426
 Institutions also reinforce the rule of powerful groups 
through framing how particular issues are understood and managed. This is particularly salient when 
potentially counter-hegemonic ideas challenge power structures, as institutions can absorb and reframe 
these ideas in a form that is consistent with hegemonic doctrine.
427
 As is the case with material and 
ideational forces, institutions are not determined in any strict sense by ruling groups. They can “take 
on their own life” and facilitate opposing tendencies that challenge and transform historical structures 
and subsequent world orders.
428
 
 
In sum, a critical approach applied to the study of international politics is interested in understanding 
how the contemporary world order has come to be, and what forces and dynamics potentially may 
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transform it. The structural context of a world order is first established through identification of the 
time-specific interrelated material capabilities, ideas, and institutions that underwrite it. The next step 
is an application of a historical structural approach that involves clarification in regard to the stability 
of that order, and what possible amalgamation of contradictions and pressure points therein could lead 
to its transformation. Specific to the focus on the IMF, application of the historical structural approach 
will examine how Fund LIC reform in the post Washington Consensus period may be reflective of 
nascent attempts to rebuild global hegemony in the early 21
st
 century around “inclusive 
neoliberalism.” Employment of Cox’s method first necessitates further clarification as to why a 
historical structural framework employs a social relational ontology of the state and power how this 
understanding is then applied to the study of the international system and multilateral institutions.  
Social Relational Ontology of the State, Power, and Hegemony 
Mainstream problem-solving theories of international relations, including neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, conceptualize a world system inhabited by states that are:  (1) the origin and primary 
unit of political action; (2) sovereign, rational actors whose unchanging modus operandi is to 
maximize their security in an anarchical world system and; (3) unrelated in form and function to social 
forces, including those tied to productive processes.
429
 Historical structural approaches instead argue 
for what they describe as a relational understanding of the state. States are not sovereign entities with 
preset and timeless qualities or the sole site of political activity. They are instead conceptualized as 
time-specific institutionalized expressions and points of linkage between global and local social 
forces.
430
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A social relational framing of the state is also inconsistent with mainstream realist and structural 
Marxist conceptions of state power, multilateral institutions, and hegemony in the international 
system. In both neorealism and world system theory, for example, state power is reduced to single 
dimension of dominance based on relative economic position and/or hard power capabilities.
431
 For 
historical structural IR scholars, this approach fetishizes state power as it fails to elucidate social 
forces and dynamics that ultimately produce the conditions necessary for the state to act. Power 
instead should be “seen as emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of 
accumulated material capabilities that is as the result of these processes.”
432
 If power is derived from 
social processes, a relational framework also rejects the notion that power can be reduced or 
conceptually tied only to territorial entities such as the nation-state. Historical structural analysis 
therefore recognizes the global system as a totality within which power tied to social processes and 
forces operates at multiple sites of human activity within, above, and below the state.
433
  
 
Cox, drawing from the tradition of historical materialism,
434
 argues that a universal component that 
shapes historical structures includes social forces in the human experience tied to productive 
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relations.
435
 While an integral component of social structures, Cox and neo-Gramscians stress that 
productive relations should not be conceived in economistic terms: “Production…is to be understood 
in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed. It 
covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals, and 
institutions that are the prerequisites of the production of physical goods.”
436
 Nor do social forces 
engendered by productive processes determine in a unilinear direction political outcomes. Rather, Cox 
maintains that historical comparisons of different modes of social relations of production elucidate 
how new productive processes generate social forces and power relations and how these forces shape – 
and are shaped by – particular forms of state and world orders.
437
    
 
Specific to forms of state and its relationship to social forces of production, I return to the relational 
ontology introduced above and develop further several components of Gramscian theory. Cox 
describes the state in terms of state-society complexes underwritten by historical blocs. A historic bloc 
describes the configuration of social forces that serves as the foundation of a particular state form. This 
is conceptualized in dialectical terms, where interacting and mutually constituted subjective (ideology, 
political organization, etc.) and objective elements (physical means of production) form a complex of 
social relations that is expressed in the form and function of the state.
438
 By state-society complex, 
Cox draws from Gramsci’s analysis of the Western capitalist state as constituted by both a coercive 
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apparatus of government and a highly developed private sphere of civil society  (“extended state”)
 
 
critical to the formation and reproduction of historic blocs and hegemony.
439
   
 
In this context, civil society has within it multiple sites (education, the media, religious institutions, 
etc.) where ideological frames of common culture are formed that produce a base level of cohesion 
and stability among the multiple and often contradictory elements of a historic bloc. Intellectuals tied 
to the dominant class (“organic intellectuals”) also play a prominent role in the production of 
hegemony in civil society as they “perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental 
images, technologies, and organizations that bind together the members of a class and of a historic 
bloc into a common identity.”
440
 Under conditions of hegemony, we can expect that ideology, power 
relations, and prominent institutions are not perceived as representing the interests of a particular class 
and as such promote “buy in” from subordinate groups. This dynamic will serve to reproduce cohesive 
rule and reduce challenges that undermine structures of power and interests of the leading class.
441
  
 
If hegemony is established at the national level, Cox contends that this can also expand and operate 
upward and outward to the global level. Based on analysis of the past two centuries, this involves 
several components: (1) an emergence of a preeminent state power and its historic bloc that facilitates 
the expansion of a new social relations of production and the interests of its leading class on a world 
scale; (2) construction of a world order that is universal in conception and; (3) opportunities for 
hegemony to operate in globally formed expressions of civil society that support the dominant mode of 
                                                 
439
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production and historic bloc.
442
 As summarized by Cox, world hegemony is best conceptualized as “a 
social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure….expressed in universal norms, 
institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces 
in civil society that act across national boundaries-rules that support the dominant mode of 
production.”
443
  
 
While hegemonic periods lower coercive rule and increase stability, they are never uncontested or 
permanent in character. Shifts in productive relations and subsequent state-society complexes, a 
breakdown of class coalition formation in a historic bloc, or counter-hegemonic social and political 
movements can undermine hegemony in historical structures. Non-hegemonic world orders are 
characterized by a lack of ideological cohesiveness, increased conflict, and more overt use of coercive 
force by powerful entities. In the capitalist era, Cox identifies the “era of rival imperialisms” (1873-
1945) and the current period of globalization (1965-present) as non-hegemonic in character. This 
stands in contrast to the hegemonic world orders of mid-19
th
 century pax Britannica and the post-WW 
II US led Bretton Woods era (1945-1965).
444
 
 
Tracing the Historical Structural Foundations of the IMF 
Application of the historical structure method to the study of post Washington Consensus IMF reform 
involves historical comparisons of power relations and social structures that led to the formation of the 
institution in 1945 and how the nature of these forces and the Fund have changed over time. In this 
section, I first summarize prominent dynamics of the 19
th
 century pax Britannica and the subsequent 
era of “rival imperialisms” to establish context for the formation of the IMF and roles it played in the 
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reproduction of post-World War II historical structures. Specific attention is focused on the rise of a 
Fordist historic bloc in the United States during the first half of the 20
th
 century and how this 
development provided the foundation for the post-World War II hegemonic era of pax Americana 
supported by multilateral institutions, including the IMF. This provides the necessary context and a 
comparative anchor to evaluate current hypotheses that IMF LIC reforms in the post-Washington 
Consensus signal a broader attempt by a dominant transnational historic bloc to rebuild global 
hegemony around an inclusive neoliberal model.  
 
Cox’s point of departure in his study of modern world orders focuses on the first industrial revolution 
and the emergence of capitalist social relations in Great Britain in the late 18
th
 century and early 19
th
 
century. With the rise of capitalist social relations in Britain, the ascendant bourgeoisie successfully 
used state power to replace feudal and mercantilist practices (e.g., protectionist measures, guild 
mandated regulation of production, state granted monopolies and corporations) with laws that 
promoted conditions for free markets. By the mid-19
th
 century, the formation of a hegemonic historic 
bloc and liberal state form in Britain served as the foundation for an outward expansion and expression 
of liberal hegemony at the global level.
445
 The liberal hegemonic world order of pax Britannica was 
supplanted by a non-hegemonic and conflictual period described by Cox as the “era of rival 
imperialisms” (1875-1945). Challenges to British power from the rise of Germany and the United 
States in later half of the 19
th
 century and sustained periods of economic crises across Europe and 
North America from the 1870s to the outbreak of World War I catalyzed competitive imperial 
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expansion across Africa and Asia. The political and economic fallout of World War I undermined any 
remaining vestiges of the liberal global economy of the mid-19
th
 century. Following multiple attempts 
to revise the international gold standard in the 1920s, the project was abandoned in 1931. Competitive 
“beggar they neighbor” currency devaluations to correct balance of payment deficits and stimulate 
demand combined with a sharp rise of protectionism spurred by the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 
soon followed. Protectionism and the effects of the Great Depression produced severe drops in global 
trade and economic outputs that further reinforced the international turmoil and competition leading up 
to WW II. 
 
A shift away from liberal hegemony and the liberal state form also coincided with radical shifts in 
productive relations in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. The replacement of small-scale capitalism 
with assembly line factory models of production transformed the nature of work, social relations, and 
historical structures. Most notable in this respect was the emergence of scientific management 
(“Taylorism”) of mass-based industrial production initially developed in the United States in late 19
th
 
century. In this model, the pacing and control of production was removed from skilled workers and 
replaced with an assembly line model of fragmented, highly specialized tasks performed by low 
skilled labor.
446
 The introduction and eventual consolidation of mass-based production and 
consumption was underwritten by new social structures, ideology, and practices initially described by 
Gramsci as “Fordism.”
447
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Gramsci maintained that this production regime was successfully implemented and reproduced in the 
United States through a combination of coercive and persuasive tactics.
448
 Leading industrialists of the 
early 20
th
 century including Henry Ford, for example, employed direct coercive means to undermine 
unionization yet paid high wages, offered company-based pensions and insurance, and supported an 
expansion of the state’s role in protecting worker well-being.
449
 Rupert, in his study of early 20
th
 
century U.S. state-society relations, also highlights the critical ideological and cultural dimensions that 
helped create and sustain Fordism. These included a reframing of “the American way” as consistent 
with the values of employer-employee partnership, industrial and labor efficiency,
450
 and mass 
consumption.
451
 Moreover, a focus on maximizing productivity was framed in universalistic terms. 
Moving beyond just the American reality, all of humankind was to benefit from the productivity and 
prosperity of the U.S. capitalist model.
452
   
  
Despite such lofty aspirations, the implementation and reproduction of Fordism was not without 
significant struggle. Through multiple waves of confrontation between a growing trade union 
movement and powerful American industrialists in the 1920s and 1930s, Fordism evolved to include a 
critical dynamic of class compromise expressed in the policies and ideology of FDR’s New Deal.
453
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Here, a welfare state committed to full employment policies was complemented by moderate unionism 
supportive in principal to capitalism and loyal to the U.S. government and its policy objectives.
454
 As 
discussed further below, the formation of this hegemonic historic bloc and the productive forces 
unleashed by Fordism was an integral component of the post-World War II world order of pax 
Americana managed in part by the IMF. 
 
The social relations and state forms born from the assembly line factory model manifested itself 
differently in Europe than the United States with important ramifications for the trajectory of post-
World War II historical structures and multilateralism. The highly productive model that emerged in 
the United States was not hampered by what Gramsci described as the historical hangover of 
“parasitic” classes and social forces in Europe.
455
 While European industrialists attempted to emulate 
U.S. factory methods, pushback from powerful non-productive classes undermined full 
implementation of Taylorism. This shaped state/society relations in two major areas. First, states in 
Europe became more active intermediaries in the industrialization process as they attempted to balance 
the interests of large scale industrial capital supportive of “scientific” production methods and reinter 
classes who stood in opposition. Lower productivity and powerful non-productive classes in Europe 
also undermined attempts to reproduce the high wage, mass consumption strategy of Fordism that 
helped moderate the American union movement. Managing the class antagonisms and demands of 
industrialists, non-productive classes, and a radicalized workers movement in Europe, was manifested 
in what Cox describes as a corporatist “welfare-nationalist” state form. Invoking nationalist and 
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militaristic sentiment, these state forms championed protectionism, selectively integrated demands of 
capital through government managed industrialization, and undermined more radical elements of labor 
through expansion of welfare provisions. This state form was reinforced by World War I and World 
War II as governments played an integral role in planning and implementing national strategies of 
industrial production for war efforts. This translated into strong support of tripartite corporatist models 
involving government-business-labor coalitions.
456
 
The IMF as a Mechanism of Hegemony in the Bretton Woods era 
The outward expression of U.S. based Fordist hegemony to an international scale represented the 
major force that reshaped the post-World War II global order. In this section, I outline the major 
dynamics of this process with emphasis on the relationship between an ascendant internationalist-
Fordist historic bloc, the transformation of the nationalist welfare state to a liberal-Keynesian state 
form,
457
 and how the formation and early IMF played a central role in these efforts. Building on this 
foundation, I then discuss how neo-Gramscians focused on the Fund theorize its modern role in a 
contemporary non-hegemonic world order characterized by a transnational restructuring of capitalism, 
the formation of a globalist historic bloc, and the emergence of the transnational state form. 
 
Neo-Gramscian interpretations of pax Americana maintain that this hegemonic world order had its 
roots in the restructuring of U.S. state-society relations during the Depression years around the Fordist 
                                                 
456
 Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, pp.181-189. 
457
 Cox highlights that the state form that predominated during pax Americana represented in broad terms compromise and 
tension between elites focused on liberalizing capitalism and working class support of Keynesian welfare state policies. He 
describes this state form as “neoliberal.” To avoid confusion with the commonly understood use of the term, I instead use 
“liberal-Keynesian.” 
 
 
 
  
     
175 
 
“politics of productivity.”
458
  Here, the New Deal consensus that emerged in the interwar years and 
World War II was reinforced by a broad-based belief that American industrial capitalism, stripped of 
its most abusive characteristic by a moderate labor movement, had proven superior in productive 
capacity both to totalitarian models (e.g., fascism, communism) and capitalist European states. High 
growth rates through capital-labor consensus, in turn, had produced the social stability and conditions 
in the U.S. for liberal democracy and individual freedom to flourish.
459
 This understanding thus 
equated problems in politics with inefficiencies in production that could be overcome by conditions 
that maximized economic growth.
460
  The formation of interclass coalitions focused on growth, rather 
than a focus on redistribution or restructuring of social productive relations through class-based 
political action, thus became a central tenet for those championing the American capitalist model. As 
with the formation of Fordist hegemony in the U.S. in the interwar period, the internationalization of 
Fordism also was articulated as serving a higher universal purpose. As noted by Stephen Gill, its 
“ideological banners included the concepts of liberty, modernity, affluence, welfare and the ‘end of 
ideology,’ fused into a concept of ‘the West’ and an anti-communist alliance.”
461
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For the U.S., reconstruction of the post-World War II order along peaceful, prosperous, and non-
communist lines thus required at baseline a commitment from its allies to maximize economic 
productivity and growth through adoption of the Fordist model. An additional critical dynamic that 
emerged in the U.S. in the interwar period and World War II was the ascendance of an international 
Fordist historic bloc. This coalition of liberal minded government officials, internationally oriented 
industrialists and financiers, and the leadership of major industrial unions found common ground in 
the notion that productivity and subsequent American interests were undermined by the wide-spread 
protectionism of the interwar years.
462
 For this historical bloc, a post-World War II order could only 
serve American and universal interests if Fordism was combined with an open global economy.  
 
The state form created in the reconstruction of capitalist Europe through the Marshall Plan reflected 
the vision of the international-Fordist historic bloc. This included the adoption of American business 
and labor management practices, support and integration of a moderate union movement and centrist 
political parties, and a commitment to free trade through participation in the nascent Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation.
463
 As highlighted by Cox, the state form that emerged in the late 
1940s in capitalist societies also had to manage three established components of the welfare-nationalist 
state from the previous era at odds with liberal economic ideology. First, states were now active 
managers of the economy through corporatist arrangements and Keynesian demand management. 
Second, states selectively intervened to protect vulnerable social groups from market forces. And 
third, as a component of a half century of state economic management, capital investment was 
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concentrated in a powerful oligopolistic sector more open to world markets that coexisted with 
domestically oriented and smaller competitive sectors of small businesses and the state sector.
464
   
With the support of the oligopolistic sector, capitalist states passed laws and supported the creation of 
institutions including the IMF to facilitate integration into an open world economy. However, these 
states also had to balance the demands of domestic groups who often were the short term losers in the 
transition away from more generous welfare state policies and protectionism. This tension manifested 
itself in the dynamic of “embedded liberalism” discussed in Chapter 2. Transitional and selective 
exceptions to liberalization were granted to cushion particular domestic sectors while the national 
economies as a whole were restructured to integrate into an open world market.
465
    
 
It is within this context of the internationalization of Fordism, the rise of an international Fordist 
historic bloc, and the emergence of a post WW II liberal-Keynesian welfare state form that historical 
structuralists analyze the early IMF. As outlined in chapter 2, the Fund had clear policy objectives 
when formed in 1945. It promoted global trade stability and liberalization through the implementation 
and management of a flexible gold standard and provision of conditional short term lending for states 
with balance of payments deficits.
466
 Historical structural understandings of the IMF add several more 
layers to this analysis. The IMF at its inception reflected in large part the interests and belief system of 
the U.S. led international historic bloc. This bloc stood increasingly at odds with more left leaning 
proponents of Keynesian state capitalist models that prioritized full employment policies and 
protectionism over open market policies.
467
 Member states with balance of payment deficits that 
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borrowed from the IMF, for instance, were disincentivized from pursuing full employment policies 
due to loan conditionality that prioritized currency stability and a return to payments equilibrium. 
 
Fund policy concurrently reflected the tensions found in emerging liberal-Keynesian welfare state 
forms between forces that lobbied for a maximization of liberalization and the historical hangover of 
class compromise forged in the interwar years. While the IMF prioritized a commitment to balance of 
payment equilibrium over full employment, its conditional lending program allowed for a softer 
landing of internal adjustment than was seen during the 19
th
 century classic gold standard.
468
   In 
addition, the IMF’s support of capital controls during the Bretton Woods era allowed individual states 
to pursue independent monetary and fiscal policy decisions. This gave national politicians room to 
appease domestic constituents who had grown accustomed to the full-employment policies of the 
interwar years. During  pax Americana, the Fund also did not push industrialized states to abandon 
corporatist arrangements or mixed market economies. These policies facilitated the popular buy in to 
the new hegemonic project of international Fordism in advanced capitalist states. 
 
The policy choices advocated by IMF in regard to LICs during the Bretton Woods era also can be 
traced to the social forces and contradictory elements of international-Fordist hegemony. As 
introduced in chapter 2, much of the developing world during this time embraced ISI policies. While 
Fund policy makers were opposed to the heavy state intervention and protectionism of ISI, IMF 
conditionality requirements for poor states did not require internal structural reforms to liberalize their 
                                                                                                                                                                      
incentivized to return to equilibrium. Under this plan, conditionality would not be tied to borrowing and states with balance 
of payments deficits could pursue full employment policies.  
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economies during this time period. Fund policy therefore reflected a position of compromise between 
the policy objectives and ideology of a U.S. led international historic bloc and elites in ISI states. For 
the former, tepid support of state capitalist – but anti-communist regimes – was a necessary 
compromise given the realities of Cold War politics. The integral role of generally anti-communist 
unions in the corporatist model of ISI also was congruent with the model of Fordist class coalitions 
seen in wealthy capitalist states. Rather than force structural reforms to dismantle ISI through the 
leverage of conditionality requirement as was done in the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF instead pushed its 
anti-statist agenda through technical assistance programs such as the IMF Institute. Cox argues that 
this less coercive dynamic of winning hearts and minds of elites in peripheral states to reflect the 
interests and belief systems of dominant social and economic forces is a critical component of how 
international organizations, including the Fund, reproduce hegemony.
469
  
The IMF, Globalization, and the Politics of Supremacy  
If the IMF played a central role in – and was reflective of – the formation and reproduction of a 
hegemonic world order during the Bretton Woods era, neo-Gramscians maintain that the Fund also 
played a critical role in the shift away from U.S. led international Fordism starting in the late 1960s. 
Here, historical structural analysis of the contemporary world order and its relationship to the IMF and 
its LIC policy choices focuses on four interrelated themes: the introduction and acceleration of 
globalized production following the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s; the rise of an American led 
globalist historic bloc dominated by an emerging transnational capitalist class unable to secure global 
hegemony; a restructuring of the liberal-Keynesian welfare state form to a transnational, neoliberal 
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state form; and counter-tendencies that have emerged that challenge what Stephen Gill describes as the 
“politics of supremacy” employed by the globalist historic bloc.
470
 I develop these themes below. 
 
For two decades following WW II, the Fordist model produced historically unprecedented rates of 
growth, labor productivity, low unemployment, increased living standards, and redistribution in 
developed capitalist economies.
471
 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Fordism and the hegemonic 
Bretton Woods order began to falter. Drops in productivity and consumption in wealthy capitalist 
states, combined with the spikes in oil prices due to Middle East conflict, produced both high 
unemployment and inflation. Profit rates also fell sharply through the 1970s, as did exchange rate 
stability when the Bretton Woods modified gold standard was abandoned in 1973.
472
 Marxist and 
neoGramscian scholars point to this “crisis of capitalism” as the catalyst that sparked a new epoch 
characterized by a movement away from nationally organized capitalism and Keynesian state forms 
toward a world characterized by the emergence of globalized capitalist production and transnational, 
neoliberal state-forms.
473
  
 
A key variable in the restructuring of capitalism and state forms is the emergence of what Robinson, 
Kees van der Pijl, and Leslie Sklair describe as the “transnational capitalist class” (the TCC).
474
 The 
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TCC, made up of the owners and managers of transnational corporations and transnational financial 
institutions, has become the “owners of the major productive resources of the world” and as such 
“imposes the general direction of production worldwide and conditions the social, political, and 
cultural characteristics of capitalist society worldwide.”
475
 The TCC also serves as the dominant class 
in an emerging globalist historical bloc described by Robinson as follows: 
At the center of the globalist bloc is the TCC…and also includes the elites and bureaucratic 
staffs of the supranational organizations agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and the WTO. The historic bloc also brings together major forces in the 
dominant political parties, media conglomerates, and technocratic elites and state managers 
in both North and South, along with select organic intellectual and charismatic figures who 
provide ideological legitimacy and technical solutions…Below this transnational elite is a 
small, shrinking layer of middle classes who exercise very little real power but who, 
pacified by mass consumption, form a fragile buffer between the transnational elite and the 
world’s poor majority.
476
 
 
Since the 1970s, this bloc has supported a two dimensional strategy to restructure social and economic 
systems to support global capitalist production. The first dimension involves worldwide market 
liberalization and the formation of legal and regulatory structures to support globalized production and 
trade (e.g., the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995). The second involves the internal 
restructuring and integration of national economies into the liberalized global economy.
477
 As 
documented by multiple studies of the IMF and World Bank, the Bretton Woods institutions were 
central players in this process in LICs, particularly after the 1982 Mexican debt crisis.
478
 Robinson, for 
example, highlights that the IMF and World Bank implemented over 566 structural adjustment 
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programs in over seventy countries from 1979-1992 focused primarily on dismantling state heavy and 
protectionist strategies of ISI.
479
     
 
The restructuring of the national economies through the efforts of the IMF, World Bank, and other 
members of the globalist bloc also is interrelated to the “transnationalization” and “neoliberalization” 
of state forms. In comparison to the state form of pax Americana, the most critical difference in 
contemporary state-society relations is the marginalization of organized labor. As noted above, class 
compromise forged in capitalist states in the mid-20
th
 century served to constrain both emerging 
factions of globalizing capital and nationally based capital in the Bretton Woods era. In the post-
Bretton Woods period, the mobility of capital and concentrated efforts of the globalist bloc to 
undermine unions and Keynesian welfare state policies has drastically reduced the bargaining position 
of labor.
480
 As articulated by Robinson, “In the new capital-labor relation, labor is increasingly only a 
naked commodity, no longer embedded in relations of reciprocity rooted in social and political 
communities that have historically institutionalized in nation-states.”
481
 In both industrial societies and 
LICs, this has translated in part to sharp reductions of unionization levels, and subsequent increases in 
flexible labor markets, subcontracting, outsourcing, part-time and temp work, and informal economic 
activities.
482
   
 
Gill and Robinson contend that this more adversarial relationship between labor and capital is one 
example of a broader theme of the “politics of supremacy” that has marked the post-Bretton Woods 
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historical structure and actions of the globalist historic bloc. Supremacy in this context refers to “rule 
by a non-hegemonic bloc of forces” that exercise dominance over other groups.
483
 Multiple factors in 
the contemporary era facilitate supremacy over hegemony. These include the socially destabilizing 
effects of inherent contradictions found in capitalism (e.g., overproduction and under consumption, 
polarization of wealth) that are exacerbated by the increased scale of globalized production and the 
elimination of Keynesian welfare and ISI state forms.
484
  In addition, the globalization of production 
produces tension between the ascendant transnational and weakening nationally based capital. 
Workers tied to transnational capital will not share the same interests and policy positions (e.g., 
rejection of protectionism) as those tied to nationally based companies.
485
   
 
The globalist bloc has also failed to produce and sustain a universal and unified social vision to 
ideologically legitimate its dominant position and policy reforms. This is not due to lack of effort. 
Most salient in this regard is the influence of discourses surrounding globalization employed by the 
globalist bloc. Starting in the 1980s and becoming most pronounced after the collapse of communism 
and the economic boom of the 1990s, liberal market globalization was articulated as the inevitable and 
best option to maximize economic well-being, individual freedom, and democratic rule. Manfred 
Steger, in his study of the ideology of the globalist bloc, describes this framing of globalization in 
liberal market terms as “globalism”:   
…globalism…endows the concept of globalization with market-oriented norms, values, and 
meaning. The only viable public policy, so this dominant story of globalization goes, is one 
supportive of economic deregulation, privatization, free trade, unfettered capital movement, 
low taxation, and fiscal austerity, especially with regard to social programs.
486 
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 Specific to the IMF, its implementation of SAF and ESAF lending served as a primary vector to 
reinforce this ideological framework of globalism in the 1980s and 1990s in LICs. As with the framing 
of Fordism, the implementation of new policy direction was presented in universal terms. Liberal 
market restructuring and the elimination of ISI, despite the fact it prioritized the interests of local elites 
tied to transnational capital, was to benefit the population at large in the new global era.
487
   
 
By the early 1990s, several factors undermined the globalist vision in LICs and broader prospects of a 
hegemonic world order. The success of the Asian miracle, built around state centered export-led 
industrialization, appeared to contradict the liberal market positions pushed by the Fund and Bank. 
Low and negative growth rates in LICs that had implemented SAPs also increased internal and 
external criticism of Washington Consensus programs and policy directives. As documented in chapter 
3, protest movements and NGOs also began to more forcefully challenge the liberal market 
restructuring of state-society relations and did so through presenting alternative conceptions of 
globalization. Specific to the IMF and LICs, the reaction to these challenges was primarily a defensive 
posture in the late 1980s through the mid-1990s. Rather than address the concerns of policy insiders 
and NGO critics, the Fund and World Bank rolled out a new program focused on “good governance.”   
 
Proponents of good governance within the Fund argued that the primary variables responsible for poor 
growth outcomes in LICs that had entered into SAPs were corruption and/or poor government 
institutions. Structural adjustment was not to be abandoned, but rather deepened through accelerated 
privatization efforts in conjunction with conditionality requirements that focused on restructuring 
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government institutions in ways that would reduce potentials for rent-seeking and corruption.
488
  This 
position was captured in the Fund’s 1997 overview of its role in governance issues, where the staff 
was advised to highlight how corruption and rent-seeking could sabotage the benefits derived from 
privatization: 
The potential risk that poor governance could adversely affect private market confidence 
and, in turn, reduce private capital inflows and investment…should also be brought to the 
attention of the authorities. IMF policy advice should …be based on the broadly agreed 
best international practices of economic management and on the principles of transparency, 
simplicity, accountability, and fairness.
489
 
 
NeoGramcians argue this linkage of governance issues to structural adjustment served to strengthen 
the hand of elites in LICs who pushed highly unpopular privatization policies in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.
490
     
 
Fallout of these policy decisions included a dramatic increase in social upheaval in much of the global 
South during the Washington Consensus period. Along with pockets of violent resistance (e.g. the 
Zapatista movement) to policies of trade liberalization, over 146 austerity protests against IMF and 
World Bank restructuring were documented in LICs between 1976 and 1992.
491
 Incidents of protest 
and social movement mobilization continued through the 1990s. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
for example, 281 protest campaigns and 961 protest events targeting various aspects of liberalization 
and privatization policies occurred between 1995-2001.
492
 Various campaigns focused around the fifty 
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year anniversary of the IMF and Bank in 1994 also highlighted the lack of broad based ideological buy 
in and consensus around the benefits of the globalist model.
493
 
 
NeoGramscians also highlight the central role of the U.S. in reinforcing a global governance 
framework that facilitated the interests of the globalist bloc, but reinforced this process primarily 
through non-consensual means. Gill, for example, argues that U.S. pressure was central in Fund and 
other multilateral institutional efforts to restructure global governance and country specific reforms in 
a manner that attempted “to make transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal democratic 
capitalism, the sole model for future development.”
494
 Gill describes the governance strategy pushed 
by U.S. led globalist bloc as “new constitutionalism.”  Under new constitutionalism, governments 
were pressured to limit the input or influence of politicians and citizens on fiscal, monetary, trade, and 
investment policy. This was manifested in a move toward central bank independence in many LICs 
and laws to forcefully protect private property rights and free trade. Managing Director Camdessus, in 
a 1995 speech on the theme of globalization and the IMF, reiterated these themes as follows: 
First and foremost, countries must maintain sound domestic macroeconomic policies that 
will attract and retain the market’s confidence. In particular, policymakers must recognize 
that the scope for countries to depart from traditional macroeconomic discipline is now 
sharply reduced…Trade liberalization, privatization, and the establishment of transparent 
regulatory systems…help create an environment in which capital inflows can be more 
readily used for long-term productive investment…At the same time, it is critically 
important to establish solid domestic institutions – especially independent central banks and 
strong domestic banking systems – that can accommodate tighter fiscal and monetary 
conditions as the need arises.
495
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Along with support of good governance and “traditional market discipline,” the new era of 
globalization also required that the Fund increase its surveillance role in member states.
496
 As outlined 
by Camdessus, in order to avert the cascading effects of economic and financial crisis, the IMF has 
developed a relationship with LICs that was “…more continuous, intensive, and probing.”
497
   
    
In sum, a historical structural understanding of the IMF in the Washington Consensus period 
highlights how a reconfiguration of social forces and state-society relations by a globalist bloc tied to 
transnational capital shifted the role of Fund in relation to LICs. Rather than reinforce a hegemonic 
world order underwritten by Fordist class compromise and U.S. consensual leadership as seen in the 
Bretton Woods era, IMF LIC policy in the last three decades of the 20
th
 century reflected the interests 
and actions of an emerging globalist bloc unable to secure hegemony. As such, the social and 
economic restructuring of LICs to support globalizing capital were implemented generally through 
disciplinary measures. Specific to the IMF, this included conditionality requirements focused on 
dismantling remnants of ISI in SAF and ESAF concessional lending agreements. Not surprisingly, this 
approach failed to garner broad based support from a variety of sectors in LICs, including elites tied to 
national capital and urban working and middle classes who had previously benefited from the ISI 
model.
498
 If the globalist bloc was unable to secure hegemony by the mid-1990s, the growing number 
and militancy of protest movements focused on the policies of the IMF, World Bank, and the newly 
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formed World Trade Organization in the late 1990s further undermined attempts to form a consensual 
global political order.  
 
Internal dissent among policy elites in regard to the wisdom of the Washington Consensus also 
increased following the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. By the turn of the century, prominent economists, 
including Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Krugman, and Jagdish Bhagwati, called for alternatives 
to the development and trade strategies pushed by the U.S. and the IMF.
499
 Powerful institutional 
leaders, including World Bank president James Wolfensohn, United Nation’s General Secretary Kofi 
Annan, and World Economic Forum (WEF) Executive Director Klaus Schwab, lobbied for a 
rethinking of development and trade strategies, often invoking the theme of “globalization with a 
human face.”
500
 Critiques of the IMF following the Asian crisis also came from conservative voices, 
particularly within the United States. In return for support of Clinton administration funding requests 
for the IMF in 1998, the Republican controlled Congress created the Financial Institution Advisory 
Commission (known more commonly as the “Meltzer Commission”) to review the IMF and other 
multilateral institutions. The Meltzer Commission highlighted multiple IMF policy failures in LICs 
and called for a drastically reduced role for the institution in structural adjustment lending.
501
 
 
                                                 
499
 The most developed critique of the Washington Consensus was that of Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz was fired from his 
position of chief economist of the World Bank in 1999 for his pointed critique of the IMF and the U.S. Treasury regarding 
their development policy positions and response to the Asian Crisis.  
500
 Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, p.164. 
501
 Formed through the efforts of Republican Senator Phil Gramm and House majority leader Dirk Armey, the Meltzer 
Commission released its findings in March 2000. The majority of the eleven commissioners argued that future IMF lending 
to LICs should be: short term only (no longer than 120 days) and preconditioned on the credit viability of the state in 
question (no lending to countries with questionable credit). Two unanimous recommendations from the Commission 
included a call for the write off of debt for heavily indebted poor countries and that the Fund limit any future lending to 
short term loans. See Kathryn Lavelle, Legislating International Organization: The US Congress, the IMF, and the World 
Bank (Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 143-152.  
     
189 
 
For Gramscian scholars focused on this time period, the growing criticism of globalist orthodoxy  
from below and internal division among elites signaled a prominent shift in the nature of the 
contemporary historical structure and world order. Robinson, for example, argued that the “clamor for 
reform from the top down” signified “a crisis of confidence in the global capitalist system within the 
ranks of the transnational elite and a willingness among the more politically astute to promote a ‘post 
Washington Consensus’ project reform to save the system itself.”
502
 Rupert highlights a similar loss of 
confidence and consensus among globalist bloc elites that emerged in the late 1990s.
503
 Even U.S. 
president Bill Clinton, perhaps the most ardent cheerleader for neoliberal reform throughout the 1990s, 
now argued that these same policies bore some responsibility for undermining working class support 
of free trade and globalizing capitalism.
504
     
Toward a new hegemony? IMF LIC reform in the post Washington Consensus.  
The turmoil and crisis seen within the globalist bloc in the late 1990s and early 2000s serves as the 
contextual foundation for neoGramscian explanations of post Washington Consensus policy change. 
As introduced in chapter 1, Robinson and Rückert maintain that post Washington Consensus reforms 
are a form of “inclusive neoliberalism” ultimately designed to undermine growing resistance and 
challenges to the globalist bloc and the broader project of globalizing capitalism. Specific to the IMF, 
reforms including debt relief through the HIPC and HIPC II initiatives, “pro-poor” lending through 
introduction of the PRGF, “participatory” development strategies with the introduction of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and Keynesian-inspired policies of the ECF/RCF/SCF are 
explained as attempts by the globalist bloc to “attenuate some of the sharpest social contradictions of 
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global capitalism” in the interests of assuring “long term stability and reproduction” of the current 
historical structure.
505
  In this section, I assess and build on this interpretation of IMF LIC reforms in 
the post Washington Consensus as follows. I first briefly outline the concept of “inclusive 
neoliberalism” as initially developed by David Craig and Doug Porter and applied by contemporary 
neoGramsians to their understanding of contemporary multilateral policy reforms. I then examine if 
and how post Washington Consensus IMF LIC policy changes were reflective of discord within the 
globalist bloc. I focus specifically on if there is evidence to support the notion that the impetus for 
these reforms is rooted in broader attempts by the globalist historic bloc to build a new hegemonic 
order reinforced by a more inclusive form of capitalism and development. 
 
Gramscian explanations of post-Washington Consensus Fund policy reforms maintain that these 
policy shifts are rooted in a new inclusive form of capitalism that has emerged within the globalist 
bloc. As outlined by Craig and Porter, the inclusive liberal market model is rooted in the belief that the 
pursuit of free markets and social goals are not only mutually compatible, but also produce a positive 
feedback loop of improved development outcomes.
506
 Within the IMF ( and World Bank), this has 
translated into the “participatory” and “pro-poor” reforms that emerged in the late 1990s that focused 
on the interdependence of the economic growth, reduced poverty, and increased social empowerment 
and inclusion.
507
 As outlined in the Fund’s current guidelines for LIC policy, for example, poverty 
reduction strategies “should be…country-driven, promoting national ownership of strategies through 
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broad-based participation of civil society; …partnership-oriented, involving coordinated participation 
of development partners (government, domestic stakeholders, and external donors); and based on a 
long-term perspective for poverty reduction.”
508
 
 
Craig and Porter maintain that explanations for a move away from the strict model of market 
liberalization to a more inclusive variant is clarified through comparison of early 21
st
 century 
dynamics to those seen in episodes of 19
th
 and 20
th
 century capitalist development. They argue that 
prior to the current era of globalizing capitalism, trends followed roughly Karl Polanyi’s concept of 
“double movement” in market-society relations.
509
 The first movement of market liberalization and 
state-society restructuring to support capitalist development was supported by an ideological 
framework that separated economics from politics and replaced traditional and local social regulation 
with the ‘laws’ of market-based relations. The second movement, social regulation and government 
policies that moderate the effects of market forces, followed soon thereafter as was seen in the 
emergence of Keynesian welfare states, ISI state models, or more nefariously expressed in state 
capitalist models of fascist regimes.
510
 
 
For Craig and Porter, the post Washington Consensus period differs from previous eras in that policies 
of inclusive neoliberalism appear to pre-emptively undermine the possibility of the second movement 
in LICs: 
Comparison with Polanyi’s account leads to the conclusion that Poverty Reduction and 
Social Inclusion are in fact an attempt to secure and embed liberal reforms in the social 
order…but one that is being actively managed from the top down, drawing potential 
adversaries into managed dialogues and partnerships… [and acts as]…a kind of pre-
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emptive, strategic inoculation against a more broadly and socially contested double 
movement, the kind of double movement arguably most feared by the agents of a wider 
liberal project.
511
 
 
Rückert argues that a key dynamic in this “strategic inoculation” against more statist or redistributive 
centred reactions to the Washington Consensus period is the role that the Bretton Woods institutions 
currently play in absorbing radical challenges to a market driven development paradigm. Two primary 
mechanisms are identified. First, incorporation of LIC elites into decision-making processes around 
poverty reduction strategies and policy choices tied to lending arrangements undermines potential 
challenges to the globalist model. Increased dialogue with civil society over the last decade also 
absorbs “counterhegemonic ideas and concepts to make it seem as though the concerns of critics are 
being heard and taken seriously.”
512
   
 
Internal IMF documents over the past decade and interviews with various IMF LIC staff demonstrate 
that the institution was aware of growing resentment and push back by the late 1990s. Fund staff, for 
example, specifically recognized and articulated the need to secure ‘buy in’ from various constituents 
in LICs as seen in a 2001 staff paper titled “IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs”: 
Ownership matters because it directly affects program implementation…When the program 
is owned by the country, decisions on such action are likely to be made quickly and in 
support of the program, which makes is more likely that the program will succeed. 
Furthermore, ownership will make it easier to generate domestic political support for the 
program, since it is likely to be seen, as an indigenous product, rather than a foreign 
imposition.
513
 
 
In 2003, the IMF prepared an internal “Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society Organizations” 
that reiterated similar themes. The rationale for engaging with civil society concluded that “Active 
civil society involvement with global institutions like the IMF is not only an inescapable fact of life in 
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21
st
 century politics, but there are also significant reasons for the Fund to welcome and nurture these 
relationships.” These reasons included dispelling “public misconceptions regarding the Fund and its 
activities,” increasing “support for Fund backed measures,” and deepening “ownership of the policies 
that the Fund advances.”
514
 
 
LIC staff interviewed also highlighted a shift toward a more consensual approach with LIC authorities 
following the turmoil of the late 1990s and early 2000s: 
One area where there has been a sea-change in the last ten to fifteen years is that we are 
turning more and more to the countries and saying, “What’s your plan?, What do you 
think? How can we help you do this?” rather than “This is the answer, the Washington 
Consensus, here is the recipe.”
515
 
 
 We noticed with the debt campaigns in the late 1990s how important it was that certain 
topics be discussed in the public domain and that we take into account what people are 
thinking about these things and listen carefully to what they say.
516
 
 
Structural adjustment had gotten a very bad name over the ten years from 1986, particularly 
within the recipient countries. I think it is still debatable whether that was a cover for their 
own failings, but structural adjustment certainly coincided with a time that really was very 
hard for low income countries. It is natural that people would say that it was the IMF’s 
fault. You still hear that a lot in Ghana and Nigeria as they went through very difficult 
periods. So our changes reflected at some level the pressure from the African countries on 
our policy who said we couldn’t go on like this, that we had to rethink how you do 
business.
517
 
 
A move toward a more consensual approach is noted by several LIC country authorities, including  
the former Permanent Secretary of Tanzania’s Minister of Finance, who noted a shift in the Fund’s  
“willingness to listen” following the Asian crisis.
518
The notion that the Fund was sensitive to public  
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perception and the need to build legitimacy at the turn of the century is further supported by evidence 
from a series of Executive Board evaluations of its external communications strategy. These studies, 
undertaken in 1998, 2000, and 2003, included in-depth analysis of the number and slant of media 
reports on the IMF and also undertook surveys to gauge public opinion.
519
 The 2003 report concluded 
that in regard to its public perception, “the challenge the Fund faces is long-standing and deep rooted” 
and “that its public image continues to be slightly less favourable than the World Bank, and both trail 
the United Nations in polls of elites and the general public.”
520
 The report also noted that despite 
current low favourability ratings, the IMF was now seen as a less secretive institution and “should 
seize on this opportunity to build on this opportunity through a continuous, well-coordinated 
communications effort aimed at improving understanding of and support for the Fund and its 
activities.”
521
     
 
Field studies that evaluate the engagement of the Fund with civil society actors in African LICs 
undertaken by Jan Aart Scholte also support the notion that the IMF actively worked to increase 
consensus building in the 2005-2010 time period.
522
  Since 2006, the IMF and Bank have sponsored 
up to forty civil society actors from LICs to participate in each round of the Annual and Spring 
Meetings. In 2007, the Fund also created a “civil society liaison” position within its external relations 
department focused specifically on relations with LICs. And in 2010, a new Regional Advisory Group 
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for Sub-Saharan Africa was formed that includes three civil society representatives among its twelve 
members.
523
 
 
Fund Documents and staff responses also point to the fallout of the 2008 crisis as deepening the 
participatory, consensual approach to IMF LIC policy implementation. LIC staff highlight the March 
2009 Tanzania conference organized by Strauss Kahn as a key moment in this process. As articulated 
by a senior LIC staff member of the African Department, while the direction of LIC policy didn’t 
radically change due to the Tanzania conference, the interactions with LICs policy makers shifted 
considerably: 
Another watershed moment was the Tanzania Conference where Strauss Kahn said, “Look, 
I want to speak for you at the G-20, but you need to tell me what you want me to say for 
you.” It can sound a bit patronizing, but it wasn’t seen that way. The point of this was that 
now it was our turn to listen to the LICs. The very fact of the way he said it and the way he 
held that conference, it didn’t change fundamentally the advice we were giving or the 
economic framework we had on our mind, but it changed the way policy makers would 
approach and talk to us, and assert themselves. The Tanzania Conference, on one hand, can 
be seen as a bunch of fluff because the intellectual ideas bantered about were not new, but 
it was the idea that this is your institution that has to be responsible to your [LIC] needs. So 
tell us, talk to us about what you want.
524
  
 
Along with a concerted effort to build a more consensual framework of market-driven development in 
the past fifteen years, the Fund also revamped the form in which LIC conditionality requirements are 
implemented and monitored following the 2008 crisis. Since the introduction of the SAF in 1986, the 
Fund employed highly specific “structural performance criteria” to assess if countries borrowing from 
the institution were on track to comply with loan conditions focused on structural reform. If a member 
state failed to meet these structural performance criteria, a formal waiver approved by the EB was 
needed to gain access to future release of loan resources. In May 2009, structural performance criteria 
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were eliminated from IMF conditional lending and replaced by a more general review process 
coordinated by the EB. The Fund describes the rationale behind this shift as follows: 
In the past, the IMF has been criticized by some governments and civil society 
organizations for demanding too many reforms in exchange for financial assistance…. 
structural performance criteria came to be seen as a key source of stigma attached to 
borrowing from the IMF. The IMF is hoping that its new lending framework will overcome 
the lingering mistrust that has marred its relations with some countries, particularly after 
the Asian crisis in the 1990s, and that countries in need of help to overcome what has been 
billed as the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression will no longer hesitate to 
approach the IMF.
525
  
 
According to a senior staff member in the SPR Department, the elimination of the structural 
performance criteria was a calculated cost-benefit analysis focused on increasing buy in from LIC 
authorities and civil society to the necessity of structural reform: “There was a feeling that 
conditionality had gotten a bit out of control and it was time to trim it back. The benefit is that you will 
have a program that had greater ownership by the authorities and we were willing to go down that 
road.”
526
 IMF LIC policy reform in the post-Washington Consensus period thus is characterized by an 
active consideration for consensus building and a less disciplinary framework of market driven 
development.  
 
More controversial is the claim articulated by Robinson and Rückert that post-Washington Consensus 
IMF policy shifts and broader themes of inclusive liberalism are the by-products of a conscious effort 
by elements of the TCC and the globalist bloc to move away from the “politics of supremacy” toward 
a more consensual, hegemonic global order. As introduced above, Robinson argues that since the late 
1990s, “the transnational elite had moved from the offensive to the defensive as the system began to 
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enter a crisis of legitimacy.”
527
 Reforms including the HIPC, HIPCII, PRGF, and ECF/RCF/SCF thus 
represent a reaction to “a crisis of confidence in the global capitalist system within the ranks of the 
transnational elite and a willingness among the more politically astute to promote a “post-Washington 
consensus” project of reform in order to save the system itself.”
528
  
 
In the final section of chapter 6, I examine if there is evidence to support this notion through analysis 
of annual meetings and policy documents of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in the post-
Washington Consensus period. The WEF, as highlighted by Robinson, is the “comprehensive 
transnational planning body of the TCC.” 
529
 Kees van der Pijl makes similar claims: “The most 
comprehensive transnational planning body operative today, the WEF…is ….a true International of 
capital, the first identifiable forum in which concepts of control are debated and if need be, adjusted, 
on a world scale.”
530
 If Robinson’s assertions have validity, we should at a minimum witness three 
tendencies within the WEF in the post-Washington Consensus period. First, recognition of various 
crises that characterized this time period. Second, recognition that these crises represent a broader 
threat to globalizing capitalism. And third, in response to these crises, debate and policy suggestions 
designed to increase buy in from the global citizenry to the globalist political project. 
 
I focus my analysis on WEF Annual Meetings. Held each January in Davos, Switzerland, the meetings 
focus on one central theme (see figure 5.2 below) and involve approximately 2500 participants.  
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                     Figure 5.2 Central Themes of World Economic Forum Annual Meetings (1999-2012) 
Year            Theme        
1999    Responsible Globality: Managing the Impact of Globalization 
2000    New Beginnings: Making a Difference      
2001     Sustaining Growth and Bridging the Divides: A Framework for Our Global Future 
2002   Leadership in Fragile Times: A Vision for a Shared Future 
2003  Building Trust 
2004  Partnering for Security and Prosperity 
2005 Taking Responsibility for Tough Choices 
2006  The Creative Imperative 
2007  Shaping the Global Agenda: The Shifting Power Equation 
2008  The Power of Collaborative Innovation 
2009 Shaping the Post-Crisis World 
2010  Improve the State of the World: Rethink, Redesign, Rebuild 
2011 Shared Norms for the New Reality 
2012 The Great Transformation: Shaping New Models 
 
I start with the 1999 Annual Meeting focused on “Responsible Globality.” WEF documents highlight 
that participants demonstrated concern in regard to fall out of the economic crises in Asia, Brazil, and 
Russia, the limitations of free markets, and discussed how to reform globalization in a more inclusive 
manner: 
Crucial discussions were held to look at where globalization is taking us and how we can 
make it a more responsible process. In the midst of the Asia crisis, after the financial 
collapse in Russia, and the Brazilian crisis,… it was clear that globalization and free 
markets left to themselves do not always produce the desired or necessary results for 
society at large. There was wide spread agreement that although a free market system is the 
best and most efficient, there are inequalities that government, in new partnerships with 
other sectors of society, needs to address.
531
 
 
Direct reference was also made to the IMF’s role in the Asian crisis and a need for Fund and other  
multilateral institutions to “adjust their modus operandi and programmes to the new requirements 
created by the global economic environment” in order to respond to the “growing backlash of large 
segments of the world’s population.”
532
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These themes of crisis, backlash, and a more inclusive form of globalization dominated the discussion 
a year later at the 2000 Annual Meeting. As described by a WEF summary of the event, the fallout of 
the failed 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization’s meeting was a wakeup call for those in Davos who 
championed globalization: 
Two themes dominated the Annual Meeting in Davos this year- the Internet and Seattle. 
And while opinion was fairly unanimous on the former – it’s going to change the world – 
few exactly knew what to do with the latter. One and a half decades into the technological 
revolution there is an increasing number of people crying “stop the world, we want to get 
off.” In Seattle, the protesters may not have spoken with a clear voice that was heard above 
all others. Although the 20,000 plus protesters that hijacked the agenda probably had as 
many individual goals, they shared a common view that globalization has somehow turned 
the planet into a commodity. It was certainly easier in Davos to forge an ideological 
consensus in favor of globalization, but in the aftermath of Seattle, there also seemed little 
doubt that the system needed reworking.
533
 
 
Within this context of “reworking the system,” a panel led by British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
focused on the difference between market economy and market society. “The market economy has 
clearly won the battle. While people are happy – even eager – to live in a market economy, most do 
not want to live in a market society. The challenge addressed in Davos is to ensure that society is more 
than just the market.”
534
 
    
A panel including U.S. President Bill Clinton and World Bank President James Wolfensohn focused 
on issues of inequality and globalization. Clinton referenced the Seattle protests in his discussion, 
noting “that too many people felt that had no voice in a world that is changing very rapidly.”
535
 He 
also scolded fellow Davos participants to stop ignoring the realities of increased inequality: “Number 
one, we should stop denying that there is in so many places an increase in inequality, and we should 
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instead start explaining why it has happened and what we can do about it.”
536
 Rolf-Ernst Breuer, Co-
Chairman of the Annual Meeting 2000 and Spokesman of the Group Board, Deutsche Bank introduced 
the term “globalization trap” to describe two levels of individuals divided by income that have 
emerged in the era of globalization. Wolfensohn, while recognizing global stratification, also argued 
that “you have to look at other factors including the quality of economic policies being pursued by 
nations, policies that foster the rule of law, a sound financial system, a strong social framework and 
measures to combat corruption.”
537
 
 
While a focus on acute crisis receded from 2002-2008 at Davos, the theme of reducing inequality 
remained. This was complemented by heightened discussion around the eradication of extreme 
poverty, particularly in Africa. At the 2005 Annual Meeting, for example, the kickoff event prioritized 
poverty and equitable forms of globalization as the two primary areas in need of attention.
538
  The 
headline panel (including rock star Bono) focused on African poverty also was representative of 
another trend seen throughout this time period. Namely, voices previously highly critical of the WEF 
were now invited to participate. This also extended to relations with the NGO community. As outlined 
in the WEF 2004/2005 Annual Report, “The World Economic Forum has always recognized the 
importance of engaging civil society, encouraging its representatives to articulate their views to all our 
events. During 2004/2005, we continued to foster strong relationships with an expanding cross section 
of unions and NGOs.”
539
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While the 2002-2008 period was relatively stable, fallout from the 2008 crisis was of deep concern to 
WEF participants. At the 2009 Davos meeting, aptly titled “Shaping the Post Crisis World,” the 
discourse of global crisis management and social backlash reemerged. WEF Executive Chairman 
Klaus Schwab summarized his concerns as follows: 
 There is a growing consensus, among the young and the old as well as across developing 
and industrializing countries that we are experiencing a transformational economic crisis-one 
that is on course to fundamentally change globalization well beyond the domain of  
international finance. We face a destructive social backlash that could foment political 
instability, revive economic nationalism, and reverse development gains should our leaders fail 
first to develop effective solutions to the current economic crisis and then fail to manage the 
growing roster of global risks such as climate change, non-proliferation, and food security.”
540
 
 
The theme of social unrest and protectionism was reiterated by then French Minister of Finance 
Christine Lagarde: “Social unrest and protectionism are the two major risks of the world economic 
crisis.”
541
 In the short term, the message from the 2009 Davos meeting was that a three pronged 
strategy was necessary to climb out of the crisis. This included a coordinated global fiscal stimulus, a 
restoration of capital flows to the developing world, and increased global financial regulation.
542
  In 
regard to the former, “although some participants held out hope for “quantitative easing,” most agreed 
coordinated fiscal stimulus in the G-20 countries is the best hope for supporting global demand.”
543
 
 
Along with calls for Keynesian inspired policy response, the 2009 report also documented a more 
fundamental discussion that emerged in regard to 21st century capitalism. Schwab, for instance, 
argued that the crisis required that Davos participants “overhaul our institutions, our systems, and 
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above all, our way of thinking.”
544
  Specifically, Schwab called for a rethinking of short versus long 
term economic gain: 
Businesses need to look deeply at their systems of remuneration and governance. Industry 
leaders, policy makers and regulators…all have to consider the damage wrought by 
excessive greed. In today’s highly interdependent world, the pursuit of short term gain is 
not a sufficient driver of  optimal decision making. The systemic and intergenerational 
impact of our actions now are more important than they have been before – our ethics, as 
well as our governance institutions and regulatory systems, must somehow reflect this new 
reality. 
545
 
   
  
A focus on short term greed among Davos participants was also noted within the context of public buy 
in or rejection of globalizing capitalism: “In Davos, the potential for social backlash was clearly high 
on the agenda as participants were discussing how to keep rising joblessness and public outrage over 
perceived corporate greed from sparking a rollback of globalization. Capitalism need not be jettisoned, 
they concluded, but it needs to be brought back in line with its role as tool for humanity’s 
advancement.”
546
 
 
Themes of reforming capitalism continued into the 2011 and 2012 Davos meeting. A synopsis of a 
2011 session on “Rethinking Market Capitalism,” for example, concluded that the “Anglo-Saxon” 
model of capitalism favored by multilateral institutions had fallen out of favor and inferred that a more 
regulated form was preferable: “Capitalism has created lucrative returns for a few over the past few 
decades, but has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Some 34 million jobs have been lost 
in the last two years alone. Such trends have caused a crisis of confidence in capitalism and corporate 
executives in particular… Financial institutions that relied on the Anglo-Saxon model of profit 
maximization fell out of favor in many regions, while Asian banks remained largely healthy and even 
                                                 
544
 Ibid.,p.13. 
545
 Ibid.,p.3. 
546
 Ibid.,p.7. 
     
203 
 
expanded their market share….Some new global regulatory structure is needed and the G-20 may be 
best positioned to formulate it.”
547
 
 
In sum, evidence from the Davos meetings in the past decade and a half supports Robinson’s claim 
that the globalist bloc recognizes that crises of the past decade and a half threaten their interests. In 
response to both the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2008, members of 
the TCC demonstrated concern and increased sensitivity to the fact that the status quo of liberal market 
capitalism was not in the long term best interest of the globalist bloc. Specifically, themes of short 
term vs. long term profit, inclusivity, poverty reduction, and reduction of inequality were framed as a 
necessary response to maintain global buy in to the project of transnationalizing capitalism.  
Conclusions 
Historical structural analysis of post Washington Consensus IMF LIC reform explains these policy 
shifts through the development of the following themes. First, the Fund is conceptualized not as a 
thing, but as an expression of time-specific social forces and power relations. A focus on explaining 
change at the IMF thus directs analysis toward clarifying the major tendencies and contradictions of 
social forces and power relations in a particular historical structure and how the Fund is interconnected 
to those tendencies. Second, world orders are broadly characterized as either hegemonic or non-
hegemonic in nature. During the Bretton Woods era, the IMF played a key role and was an expression 
of a hegemonic world order led by a U.S. international-Fordist bloc. From the late 1960s to the 1990s, 
the IMF’s role changed with shifts in historical structure. Along with other multilateral institutions, the 
Fund now helped reinforce a non-hegemonic world order characterized by the emergence and 
consolidation of transnationalizing capitalism and a U.S. supported globalist historic bloc prone to 
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exert more overt forms of coercive power. A key component of this shift in historical structure 
included the dismantling of Keynesian state forms in the global North and ISI state forms in much of 
global South. Specific to IMF LIC policy, this was expressed in an increased focus on structural  
reform issues designed to move poor states away from the ISI model by the late 1970s. Following the 
1982 crisis, the Fund more assertively pushed for liberal market economic restructuring in LICs  
through use of  SAF and ESAF conditional lending followed by a focus on issues of good governance 
in the early 1990s.  
 
Growing resistance to the agenda of the globalist bloc and the Washington Consensus model of 
development grew throughout the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the combination of growing global protest 
movements and the Asian crisis ushered in the current post Washington Consensus period. For neo-
Gramscians including Robinson and Rückert, the  post Washington Consensus is seen in broad terms 
as an attempt by the globalist bloc to soften globalizing capitalism in order to secure its long term 
survival. Specific to the IMF and LICs, this is expressed primarily in how policies supportive of liberal 
market development are implemented. Rather than the top down, disciplinary mode of the Washington 
Consensus period, there is now a focus on inclusion of LIC elites and civil society organizations into 
lending arrangements through the introduction of the PRSP process. This participatory process thus is 
one strategy to secure long term buy in to the globalist political project. Another “strategic 
inoculation” against more radical challenges to capitalist development includes the connection of 
participation with a focus on poverty reduction. As seen with the replacement of the SAF and ESAF 
with the PRGF in 1999, lending to LICs now requires both participation and specific policy plans to 
reduce poverty. Following the 2008 crisis, the removal of structural performance criteria also supports 
the notion that the Fund has adopted a less disciplinary development model. 
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Robinson and Rückert maintain that IMF post Washington Consensus reforms are tied to a broader 
and conscious effort by an increasingly concerned TCC wary of potential backlash to the globalist 
political project. Evidence from Davos meetings held between 1999-2012 demonstrates that members 
of the WEF expressed deep concern of potential blow back from the Asian crisis and the 2008 crisis 
and also saw these crises as potential threats to the contemporary world order. Recommendations to 
manage globalizing capitalism that emerged from the WEF through the post Washington Consensus 
period mirror those found in IMF LIC reform. For example, the general consensus coming out of 
Davos following the 2008 crisis was the need for broad based and coordinated countercyclical fiscal 
stimulus and a rethinking of New Consensus monetary policy. At the IMF, this need for a Keynesian-
inspired response was shared by Managing Director Strauss Kahn, chief economist Oliver Blanchard, 
and staff, and was implemented in the ECF/RCF/SCF policy reform. IMF staff, however, were broadly 
dismissive that their policy choices following the crises of the late 1990s and 2008 were driven by 
broader concerns of global capitalist crisis management. Rather, the shift in the institution toward 
more pro-poor and Keynesian practices was a practical response to events on the ground in LICs. 
Further analysis is needed to tease out how LIC staff self-perceptions around the implementation of 
LIC reform speaks to the broader role the IMF plays in hegemony construction. I examine this 
dynamic in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6- Drivers of Change:  Explaining IMF LIC Reform in the post Washington Consensus 
This project focuses on five major areas. First, through a comparative case study of IMF LIC reform 
from 1995 to 2010, it identifies potential variables and mechanisms that drove these instances of 
policy change. Second, it evaluates if there are any recognizable patterns across these cases of policy 
reform. And third, it assesses if and how policy reform is interconnected to changing social relations 
and social forces in the contemporary historical structure. These three areas, covered in chapters 3-5, 
constitute the empirical component of this project and are first briefly summarized below.  
The next two goals of this project revolve around theoretical concerns and constitute the primary focus 
of this concluding chapter. I first assess the strengths and weaknesses of rationalist, constructivist, and 
historical structural theory in regard to the study of contemporary IMF LIC reform. I then evaluate the 
potential and limitations of a research framework focused on IMF change open to use of both 
positivist and social relational ontologies. Such an approach will not produce one correct answer and 
suffers at some level from divergent baseline understandings of the social world. I focus specifically 
on what I see as intractable differences between theoretical frameworks of IO change that conceptually 
see the social world as made of externally related ‘things’ versus approaches that embrace Marxist-
inspired conceptions of dialectic, internal relations. Despite these tensions, I maintain that the 
complexity of that world and processes of change within it merit space for mainstream and critical 
ontologies and epistemologies. Future studies of the IMF should explore more fully how diverse paths 
of inquiry can be effectively used to explain policy reform.  
Drivers of IMF LIC Change 
From chapter 3, evidence uncovered through the use of principal-agent modeling and sociological 
organizational theory suggests that a necessary condition for IMF LIC change involves processes of 
     
207 
 
coalition building between two tiers of actors. Primary actors include the Managing Director, powerful 
states, and IMF staff. Secondary actors include weak states, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress. In all four 
cases of LIC policy reform studied, some form of coalition that advocated for reform was formed 
between two primary actors or a primary actor and a secondary actor. Second, principal-agent theory 
maintains that increases in preference heterogeneity between powerful states produces conditions that 
give staff or management greater room to initiate or resist change. Evidence from these cases supports 
this hypothesis. In the case of the HIPC, for instance, divisions among powerful states gave Managing 
Director Camdessus and staff leverage to initially block attempts to institutionalize large scale debt 
relief. While the HIPC was ultimately adopted, Camdessus and the staff were able to water down the 
scope and depth of debt relief. Third, principal-agent theory also hypothesizes that pressure applied by 
NGOs on the IMF for policy reform will not be effective if that pressure is directly applied. Rather, if 
NGOs instead focus on winning over powerful states, the IMF will respond to these proximate 
principals. While the general consensus among staff and management interviewed was that NGOs 
played an integral role in IMF’s adoption of the HIPC and HIPC II, this project is unable to discern if 
pressure applied distally or proximately had any more or less causal effect on processes of reform. 
 
In chapter 4, three major hypotheses that draw from conventional constructivist theories of IMF 
change were identified. First, changes in economic ideas and norms about development impact LIC 
policy reform. Second, the mechanisms by which ideas and norms change within the IMF revolve 
around crises of legitimacy. Actors within the Fund are hypothesized to change their framework of 
thinking around certain policy choices when these frameworks are deemed illegitimate by a critical 
mass of elites including the economics profession, powers states, and private market actors. And third, 
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a rejection of ideas or development norms that fundamentally challenge liberal market solutions to 
LIC issues is unexpected.  
 
The evidence derived from a constructivist study of IMF LIC reform is as follows. First, systematic 
crises appear to play a central role in changing ideas around what is deemed legitimate in policy 
choices. A stable framework of economic ideas (the New Consensus) constituted what was considered 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policy from the early 1980s until the 2008 global financial crisis. The 
2008 crisis delegitimized ideas and policy recommendations of the New Consensus among 
development economists and IMF staff. This opened up ideational space for more traditional 
Keynesian themes to emerge in IMF LIC policy and helped catalyze the replacement of the PRGF 
with the ECF/RCF/SCF framework. The Asian crisis of the late 1990s led to a reevaluation of role in 
the state in its relation to market efficiency, growth, and development. Here, in reaction to the policy 
positions of the Washington Consensus, emphasis on poverty reduction and investment in human 
capital were reflected in the replacement of the SAF/ESAF with the PRGF and the introduction of 
PRSPs. The Asian crisis and the 2008 crisis, however, did not challenge more intractable ideas deeply 
embedded in institutional common sense. Despite the turmoil of the late 1990s and 2008, confidence 
in free markets and aversion to large scale and coordinated redistribution remains firmly entrenched in 
IMF thinking. As of 2014, LICs are advised to avoid protectionism, over or undervalued exchange 
rates, subsidies, redistributive tax arrangements, and large scale entitlement programs.  
 
In chapter 5, use of a critical framework focused on the post Washington Consensus period invoked 
the concept of “inclusive neoliberalism” to study contemporary IMF LIC reform. Global elites, 
increasingly conscious of the fallout of economic crises and resistance to globalization, have embraced 
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strategies designed to build long term support for the economic and political project of 
transnationalizing capitalism. IMF post Washington Consensus reforms thus are one expression of 
these efforts. Inclusivity in this context has two dimensions: shifts in thinking embedded in new policy 
positions and processes of how the policy positions are implemented. In regard to the latter, Fund 
policy documents and interviews of IMF staff and management demonstrate that the Fund consciously 
shifted the manner in which its policy initiatives were implemented to increase buy in from LICs. 
Along with a focus on participation through the PRSPs, this move away from top down approaches 
has also included the removal of structural performance criteria and increased LIC NGO participation 
in formal Fund events.  
 
In regard to the nature of the policy shifts themselves, the shift toward poverty reduction and “pro-
poor”  policies in the post Washington Consensus period has been framed as something best achieved 
through maintenance of market efficient processes. In this sense, this study verifies claims put forth by 
Gramscian scholars that a central component of IMF LIC policy choices remains firmly entrenched in 
neo-classical aversion to market distortive policies. The major ideational shift that has happened in the 
post Washington Consensus period is support of countercyclical, expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy. This move toward more Keynesian practices through the adoption of the ECF/RCF/SCF is seen 
by the majority of LIC staff interviewed as a practical response to economic downturn rather than a 
reaction to a broader crisis in capitalism. This interpretation by Fund staff as to why the IMF shifted 
policy direction, however, stood in contrast to the discourse seen in elitist forums including the Davos 
Annual Meetings of the World Economic Forum. Here, individuals clearly identified that the 
governance of globalization required substantive reforms to make capitalism work for the world’s poor 
majority.  
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In sum, while this study is unable to report that there is one thing that explains LIC policy reform, the 
process of testing hypotheses from three distinct ontologies uncovers potential causal variables and 
mechanisms associated with contemporary IMF LIC reform. I also maintain that each framework 
offers a reasonable way of looking at social reality and also offers a plausible causal story concerning 
why the Fund shifts policy position. In this sense, the spirit of this project and conclusions reached 
about potential future research open to multiple ontologies falls in line with recent calls for “analytic 
eclecticism” in middle range IR analysis. As outlined by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein: 
Analytical eclecticism…trains its sights on connections and interactions among a 
wide range of causal forces normally analyzed in isolation from one another. This 
does not guarantee consensus on forecasts or prescriptions that can assist 
policymakers and lay actors. It does, however, encourage a wider, more open-
ended conversation about how the different causal forces identified by proponents 
of different paradigms might coexist as part of a more complex, yet useable 
analytic framework that helps in making sense of concrete social phenomena.
548
 
 
In this spirit, I turn to an assessment of strengths and tradeoffs of rationalist, constructivist, and 
historical structural approaches used in chapters 3-5. I then explore the potential and limitations of 
moving forward with a research program open to use of both mainstream and critical theory.  
Assessing Strengths and Weaknesses of IO Theories of IMF Change  
This project is driven ultimately by normative and practical concerns. While the power of the IMF to 
shape policy outcomes across the globe is well established, explanation as to why the institution shifts 
policy direction is not. Given that IMF decisions impact millions of individuals, scholarship that 
accurately pinpoints dynamics that produce change in the institution is critical to real life outcomes. It 
is this context that I first assess the strengths and weaknesses of rational, constructivist, and historical 
structural frameworks. 
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In chapter 3, the question of IMF LIC policy change is approached through application of principal-
agent modeling supplemented by components of sociological organizational theory. The primary 
strength of this approach, as is the case in rational frameworks generally, is that its assumptions take 
what is a complex reality and simplifies it. It identifies who the major actors are (powerful states, 
Managing Director, staff) and what drives their behavior around instances of policy reform (shirking, 
increased preference division among powerful state principals, and aversion to market distortive 
practices). It therefore has the advantages typical of parsimonious approaches: high predictive capacity 
and generalizable application. Returning to Cox, the rational approach thus falls clearly into the 
problem-solving category. As such, application of this approach has the highest potential of producing 
useable knowledge on how to induce successful reform efforts in the institution. In this project, for 
example, use of a rationalist framework to compare cases of LIC change highlights that coalition 
building appears to be a necessary condition to produce policy reform. If future studies more 
conclusively demonstrate that coalition building is for LIC change, this knowledge can be used toward 
practical ends by NGOs or internal Fund actors interested in policy reform.  
 
Conventional constructivist studies of IMF policy focus start with the following ontological 
assumptions. The primary entities that drive IMF behavior are individuals within the institution driven 
by the “logic of appropriateness.”  These individuals seek legitimacy from peers and external actors in 
regard to economic ideas and policy choices. If a policy choice, economic idea, or development norm 
is deemed illegitimate by a critical mass of fellow economists, powerful states, or private market 
actors, change can occur. While this framework recognizes the interrelationship between multilateral 
institutional actors and broader structural forces and power relations, it argues that every institution 
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has unique dynamics and that ultimately change comes from within. This approach thus ontologically 
recognizes a complex social reality, but presents a relatively simple causal story: delegitimization of 
economic ideas increases the chance for periods of reform. The methodological legwork required to 
support hypotheses derived from this logic involves process tracing and discourse analysis to establish 
how individuals think about economic ideas or development norms at time X, if they change at time Y, 
and if that change in thinking impacts policy reform.  
 
The notion that every institution has its own particular dynamics and culture that must be studied to 
clarify processes that lead to reform is not a radical one. Yet, this emphasis on institution-specific 
“change from within” pushed by constructivist IO scholars has fundamentally reshaped how this 
literature studies multilateral institutions. Process tracing into dynamics of how ideas shape outcome 
in the IMF, for example, provides stronger empirical support to verify or refute claims concerning its 
institutional behavior. This method also can uncover new information pertinent to explanations of 
reform. In chapter 4, for example, drilling down into how the IMF thinks uncovered two levels of 
ideas that shape IMF LIC policy choices. Market distortive practices, including protectionism, 
subsidies, and large scale redistribution, remain off limits in the institution. Any policy reform that 
suggests adoption of these policies as solutions to LIC issues, even after the 2008 crisis, is unexpected. 
Ideas around appropriate monetary and fiscal policy and policy choices to reduce poverty and 
inequality through non-distortive mechanisms instead fall within the debatable category.  
While the methodological focus on internal micro processes is an important contribution, I argue that 
constructivist insights into IMF LIC change are limited in two key areas. At the ontological level, 
constructivists draw from a dialectic approach in presentation of their causal story focused on the role 
of ideas and social legitimacy in institutional change. Rather than externally related variables, norms, 
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individual agents, and institutional culture are presented as internally related, ontologically intertwined 
entities. As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore: “Bureaucratic culture guides action but does not 
determine it. The rules and routines of a bureaucracy shape bureaucrats’ views of the world, define 
their social tasks, shape their interests, and orient them in similar way toward the world.”
549
  
Organizational and bureaucratic culture, likewise, is conceptualized as constituted and implicitly 
shaped by these same norms and individuals: “…the relationship between bureaucrats and rules is 
mutually constitutive and dynamic. Bureaucrats create rules that shape future action, but action, in 
turn, shapes the evolution and content of rules.”
550
 Alexander Wendt, along similar lines, describes the 
internal relation of structure and agency as follows: “Just as social structures are ontologically 
dependent upon and therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents, the causal 
powers and interests of those agents, in their own turn, are constituted and therefore explained by 
structures.”
551
 
While constructivists present a framework that highlights the constitutive nature of structure and 
agency, the current emphasis on multilateral institutional change from within contradicts at some level 
how and where this understanding is applied. Specifically, the trend among constructivist IO scholars 
involves the analytical separation of the multilateral institution in question from social forces and 
power relations ‘out there’ as a means to more precisely capture internal dynamics that impact reform. 
Chwieroth is perhaps the most adamant in this respect as he emphasizes “the role of personnel and 
internal institutional configurations” rather than a focus on dynamics above or below the IO in 
question.
552
  Momani makes similar arguments: “...social constructivists are not suggesting that 
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international organizations are closed-systems where an organization is argued to be self-contained 
and independent of power considerations in the international system… Nevertheless, international 
organizations are also bureaucratic entities with their own internalized sets of norms, ideologies, and 
cultures that need to be considered when studying their behavior and responses to change.”
553
 
The analytical and methodological practice of bracketing off processes that occur within the Fund 
highlights further the tradeoffs of parsimonious and complex analysis. Along with the rationalist 
approach in chapter 3, the relative simplicity of the constructivist approach in chapter 4 allows us to 
cut through the multiple and often contradictory layers of social realty, identify key potential causal 
variables, and test if patterns uncovered can be applied in a predictive capacity. However, this 
framework conceptually is unable to engage with how and why particular processes of ideational 
change, crises, and processes of legitimization are interrelated with broader shifts in social structures 
and power relations unique to the post Washington Consensus period. If applied on its own terms, for 
example, the constructivist approach would simply ignore how factors tied to the rise of 
transnationalizing capitalism and the crises therein have impacted how economic ideas and policy 
choices gain or lose legitimacy. 
A historical structural framework focused on IMF LIC change approaches the phenomenon from a 
fundamentally different ontological and epistemological position rather than rationalist and 
conventional constructivist frameworks. As such, the nature of the questions being asked and answers 
to these questions provide insights that mainstream IO approaches leave unexamined. I highlight three 
unique contributions of historical structural approaches to the study of IMF change that are explicitly 
tied to its social relational understanding of the world. First, it introduces a causal story that sees 
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processes of contemporary Fund policy change as dialectically related to the multiple and often 
contradictory dynamics embedded in the transnationalization of capitalist social relations. The Fund, 
and capitalism for that matter, are not “things” that stand separate from each other. Rather, they are 
understood to be internally related components of a broader social totality.
554
  In this sense, explaining 
IMF change thus also involves explaining at some level how that change both acts on – and is 
impacted by – a particular configuration of social forces and power dynamics tied to productive 
relations. 
 
Second, it recognizes the role that the Fund plays in the production and reproduction of hegemonic or 
more overtly coercive world orders. This broadens and gives deeper meaning to the notion of 
legitimacy crisis presented by constructivist IO scholars. Post Washington Consensus IMF reform, for 
example, is explained in part by the fact that the institution plays a crucial role in managing 
globalizing capitalist social structures. When that order is under threat, as was seen in the late 1990s 
and 2008, Fund policy reform should be expected. The policy choices that the reform address, and 
how it addresses them, is also expected to reflect dynamics and tensions point unique to the historical 
structure under study. 
 
Third, the social relational roots of historical structural theory provide a unique foundation to evaluate 
where and why certain ideas have been folded into post Washington Consensus reforms, while others 
have not, and what that signifies about the contemporary role that the IMF plays in the early 21
st
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century world order. As uncovered in chapter 4, one prominent shift in the post Washington 
Consensus period is acceptance of Keynesian inspired countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy 
response since 2008. Combined with a focus on pro-poor participatory policies introduced after the 
Asian crisis of the late 1990s, this represents both a substantive and procedural shift in IMF thinking. 
As I developed above in Chapter 5, Craig and Porter invoke Polyani’s conception of double movement 
in their explanation of this phenomenon. Through implementation of inclusive liberal policy reforms 
for some of the world’s poorest societies, the Fund and other multilateral institutions undermine a 
potential backlash ( second movement) that would more fundamentally challenge market based 
development (first movement) on a broader scale.  
 
Not surprisingly, IMF staff and Executive Directors interviewed for this project did not share this 
understanding as to why the institution implemented post Washington Consensus reforms. They see 
themselves as practical, non-ideological technocrats who simply responded to the changing facts on 
the ground and shifted their policy positions accordingly. This framing of post Washington Consensus 
policy decisions as merely technocratic tinkering while Rome burned is curious indeed. As developed 
in chapter 6, the Marxist and Gramscian roots of a historical structural framework is uniquely suited to 
explore why a technocratic self- understanding remains at the core of IMF thinking around policy 
reform. It also may provide clues as to why that identity is essential to how the Fund participates in 
(re)building hegemony in the contemporary historical structure.  
 
 Briefly introduced here, Marx recognized that the historical development of capitalism and capitalist 
social relations and modes of surplus value extraction requires that the realm of production be 
conceptualized as a distinctly economic space free of – and externally related to – that of the 
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political.
555
  This framing has embedded in collective common sense a myth that there exists a separate 
and natural world of economics with its own laws and logic. Marx argued that this creation of a 
seeming apolitical economic sphere in capitalist social relations is implicitly a political act as it 
disguises at some level the power relations that produce the conditions necessary for market based 
exploitation and subsequent human alienation.
556
 This separation of the economic from the political 
also is integral to the separation of public/state from private/civil society.
557
  Civil society is the 
apolitical economic space where individual’s right to private property and pursuit of selfish interest is 
expressed. The state, in contrast, is the public space where one can “do” politics.
558
 
 
Applied to our concerns here, we can see that the self-identification of Fund LIC staff as rational 
technocrats rather than ideologically and politically motivated individuals reinforces in broad terms 
the separation of the economic and the political. In so doing, the IMF plays a central role in the 
reproduction of contemporary capitalist social relations that are increasingly transnational in scope.  
This understanding also can be applied to explaining the seeming contradictions that several IMF staff 
interviewed for this project articulated. While recognizing that IMF policy and market based 
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 In pre capitalist societies, the concept of economy as separate from other components of society did not exist. Feudal 
ruling classes, for example, used directly coercive means to extract surplus from producers who had direct possession of 
the means of production. As summarized by Rupert, with the emergence of capitalism, labor is simultaneously freed from 
direct coercion and separated from the means of production. In order to survive, labor “must now enter into an “economic” 
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public interest.” See Rupert, Producing Hegemony, The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power, pp.21-
22. 
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survival, are estranged from potentially fulfilling potentials of productive activity, both from themselves and with others, 
and even from nature itself. Ibid.,p.20. 
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 The capitalist state, however, can’t ultimately serve as a vector to overcome alienation. Its existence and survival is tied 
to maintaining the myth of dualistic separation of the economic and the political. 
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development more broadly need to work for the poor, the boundaries of what is open for debate does 
not include policies that challenge deep held beliefs in market efficiency. Following the logic of Marx, 
this makes sense, as debating the efficacy of market distortive policies would bring “politics” into the 
arena that liberal market economists argue don’t belong and potentially could open up more radical 
challenges to the current historical structure. We should therefore expect that hegemony construction 
in the post Washington Consensus will be most successful if themes of poverty reduction, lowering 
inequality, and pro-poor policies in general remain framed as technocratic problems.  
In sum, use of three distinct theoretical traditions provides insights into different components of social 
reality that inform and drive IMF LIC reform. Taken as an aggregate study of IMF reform, we perhaps 
begin to overcome the common tradeoffs of parsimony versus complexity. More parsimonious 
frameworks uncover specific mechanics of policy reform that are unique to IMF and can be used by 
current policy makers and activists to shape future policy reform. These mechanisms of change, 
however, are ultimately interrelated to broader social forces and power relations elucidated by 
historical structural analysis. While the use of multiple ontologies produces greater knowledge in this 
project, there are some tensions inherent in an approach open to the use of positivist and critical 
relational theory that must be further explored before we can simply embrace it as viable option for 
future research. 
Squaring a Circle? Problem-Solving and Critical Theories of IMF LIC change. 
Robert Cox’s framing of problem-solving versus critical theory sets the foundation to assess if an 
approach open to use of both of these frameworks is ultimately a workable or productive enterprise. 
As is often quoted, for Cox, “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”  As is also the 
case when debating major ontological differences and purposes of political science, Cox’s 
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differentiation between problem-solving theory and critical theory highlights in broad terms some of 
the major tensions that a research program open to rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural 
frameworks must address. Problem-solving theory, as used in chapters 3 and 4, “…takes the world as 
it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they 
organized as the given framework for action.” Critical theory, in contrast, begins from a more overtly 
normative and radical position. It is critical because it “does not take institutions and social power 
relations for granted.” Through systematic analysis of historical processes, it serves as roadmap for 
possible transformative change: “In this way critical theory can be a guide for strategic action for 
bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions 
which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order.”
559
 
Given this understanding, a major “elephant in the room” that emerges with an approach sympathetic 
to components of problem-solving and Marxist-inspired historical structural analysis is that the latter 
ultimately finds the ontological and epistemological position of problem-solving approaches as a 
mythology of sorts, and one that potentially blocks transformative social change. For critical theorists, 
the treatment of social reality as one where you have atomistic social objects, externally related and  
“out there” acting on each other is a clear expression of subject-object duality that has evolved with 
capitalist social relations. If we are examining the IMF through a lens that reinforces these concepts, 
do we at some level reinforce reification of social reality? And if so, doesn’t that undermine our ability 
to systematically examine often unobservable power relationships that reinforce particular outcomes 
that undermine transformative possibilities?  
There are therefore several ways one can deal with what appears to be an unresolvable tension 
between critical and problem-solving approach. First, we can reject attempts to bridge the gap and 
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return to more paradigmatically separate positions. Second, we can ignore the normative “elephant in 
the room” and focus only on the particular strengths and insights that both problem-solving and 
historical structural approaches bring to the table. I reject both of these. In regard to the former, this 
project demonstrates that problem-solving and critical approaches focused on the phenomenon of IMF 
LIC policy change produce more knowledge, and I offer more high quality knowledge about that 
phenomenon than if we looked at it only through a mainstream or critical lens. In this sense, I thus find 
common ground with the growing popularity of the analytical eclectic approach mentioned above 
which prioritizes knowledge construction over sometimes needless paradigmatic divisions.  
In regard to the latter, it certainly would be easier at some level to neuter the normative concerns of 
historical structural theory and focus only on how it empirically supplements the findings of positivist 
frameworks. This, however, feels intellectually dishonest and may ultimately undermine the strengths 
of research open to the use of both mainstream and critical approaches. I advocate for a third 
possibility as follows. First, a question or concern is raised to be studied. Second, a case is made as to 
why use of mainstream and historical structural theory is well suited for the question under study. 
Third, when introduced, each framework more explicitly lays out its normative position and 
understanding of the world, identifies potential limitations born from this understanding, and then 
moves forward in full embrace of that position in looking at the phenomenon under study. Historical 
structural theory, for its part, should be presented and understood as a radical critique. However, it also 
should be noted that it doesn’t have a monopoly on the politics of transformation, nor does use of 
social relational ontology in any way exhaust all the possible ways that political scientists can produce 
a future world better than this one. Problem-solving theory, for its part, should also clearly frame the 
parameters of its strengths and weaknesses. As outlined by Cox, it should make explicit that it is best 
suited for teasing out patterns within a given historical structure and that it is less well suited in 
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explaining how the phenomenon under study is tied to broader and deeper social forces or periods of 
historical structural change. It should also be recognized that despite notions of objectivity, the 
ontology and epistemology upon which positivist approaches are built also have normative qualities. 
Once respective strengths and weaknesses are out of the closet, each theoretical framework on its own 
terms should look at the question under consideration. It is through this process that we stay 
intellectually honest to different understandings of politics, and then use those different understandings 
to produce a better world. 
Next Steps 
In conclusion, I highlight limitations of this project and several next steps. While evidence from the 
cases provides new insights into dynamics of past cases of LIC policy reform, several limitations of 
this study necessitate further development. Specific to chapter 3, inclusion and comparison of 
instances where Fund LIC policy reform did not occur in future positivist-oriented research would 
strengthen the potential predictive capacity around the mechanics of IMF reform. This could include 
examination of the roughly ten years span between the PRGF and ECF/RCF/SCF where no formal 
LIC policy reform was implemented. In chapter 4, one area that needs more examination is how hiring 
practices at the Fund could change normative positions. In chapter 5, a focus on the World Economic 
Forum as the prominent voice of global elites is a reasonable assertion. However, analysis of other 
elite forums in regard to how they have reacted to the past decade and a half of capitalist crisis and 
popular backlash would more forcefully support or refute notions that the TCC is a self-conscious 
group that collectively has agency in shaping outcomes in multilateral institutions, including the IMF. 
Finally, further analysis in regard to the benefits and limitations of approaches to IMF LIC change that 
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employs multiple ontological frameworks is in order.  One possible way to evaluate the effectiveness 
of such an approach would be to apply it to other cases of multilateral institutional reform. 
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APPENDIX 1:  Interview Questions 
 
 
 
  
 
MAXWELL SCHOOL OF CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
I. General Background 
What is your position in the Fund? 
What specific experience do you have in regards to Low Income Countries (LICs)? 
 What do you see as the Fund’s appropriate role in LICs? 
 
II. Policy Paradigms and LICs 
 
Historically, the Fund has been resistant to call itself a development institution. Where do you fall on this? Is 
the Fund in the development business? If so, is this a good thing?  
 
Given that the Fund is staffed primarily by economists, scholars focused on the internal culture of the Fund 
argue that its thinking is often a reflection of values and worldviews seen in the broader economics field. Does 
Fund thinking and changes therein reflect broader trends seen ‘out there’ in the economics discipline? Or is the 
Fund more prone to produce its own internal thinking regarding policy choices?  
 
From your perspective, has the Fund witnessed any significant shifts in its institutional ‘thinking’ during your 
tenure (i.e. Hayekian vs Keynesian thinking). Is so, when did these occur and how did they manifest themselves 
in policy outcomes regarding LICs? 
 
Since the 1982 Debt Crises, the Fund has introduced three concessionary lending programs for LICs:  The 
SAF/ESAF in the mid 1980s, the PRGF in 1999 and the recent replacement of the PRGF with the 
ECF/RCF/SCF in 2010. Where any of these policy shifts representative of ‘deeper’ institutional change at the 
Fund? Why or why not? 
 
III. LIC Policy Determinants  
 
The literature points to various variables that shape Fund policy choices. Please comment on how significant 
each of the following are in shaping LIC policy choices: 
 
a) Powerful states, particularly the United States 
 
b) Recipient states 
 
c) IMF management 
 
d) Managing Director 
 
e) IMF staff 
 
f) the World Bank 
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g) NGOs 
 
h) economic crises 
 
i) public opinion 
 
other ? 
 
Looking at the variables above in a comparative perspective, which have become more and less important in 
shaping LIC policy outcomes at the Fund during your tenure? 
 
Several IMF scholars argue that Fund programs focused on debt relief and development issues for LICs have 
been initiated from management and /or pressure from member states rather than from staff. Would you agree 
with this assessment? 
 
How much input do LIC member states have in shaping policy choices? 
 
IV. Case 1-Introduction of ECF/RCF/ SCF 
 
What do you see as the primary factors that led to elimination of the PRGF and establishment of the ECF/RCF/ 
and SCF in 2010? 
 
Who were the primary actors within the Fund who pushed for the ECF framework? 
 
How has the shift from the PRGF framework to the ECF been received by staff working with LICs? 
 
Can one identify any significant institutional change in thinking about LICs with the introduction of the ECF? 
Why or why not? 
 
Any other comments or thoughts in regard to introduction and implementation of ECF framework? 
 
V. Case 2-Introduction of PRGF/PSRPs/ HIPC II/MDRI 
What do you see as the primary factors that led to elimination of the ESAF and establishment of the PRGF in 
1999? 
 
Who were the primary actors within the Fund who pushed for the PRGF? 
 
How was the shift from the ESAF/SAF framework to the PRGF received by staff working with LICs? 
 
What explains the emergence of a “pro-poor”, participatory framework seen under PRGF? 
 
Who pushed for the establishment of the Policy Support Instrument? 
There is a consensus in much of the political science literature looking at this period that the Fund adopted pro-
poor positions and policy jargon to accommodate growing external criticism and protest movements in late 
1990s. Is this accurate? Why or why not?  
 
Any other comments or thoughts in regard to introduction and implementation of PRGF framework? 
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APPENDIX 2: List of Interviews and Archival Material 
 
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
 
Date   Position       
06.13.11  Director, External Relations Department 
06.13.11  Assistant Director, Research Department 
06.13.11  Deputy Director, Africa Department 
06.14.11  Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy and Review Department 
06.14.11  Division Chief, Strategy, Policy, and Review Department 
06.15.11  Senior Advisor, Middle East and Central Asia Department  
09.19.11  Senior Advisor, Africa Department 
09.20.11  Advisor, Western Hemisphere Department 
09.20.11  Special IMF Representative to the United Nations 
09.21.11  Deputy Division Chief, Africa Department 
09.26.11  Assistant Director, Asia and Pacific Department 
01.24.12  United States Executive Director  
01.24.12  Nordic and Baltic Alternative Executive Director  
01.25.12  Adviser to the UK Executive Director 
01.26.12  Sub-Saharan Africa Executive Director  
 
 
 
 
Phone and E-mail Interviews 
Date   Position       
01.28.12  French Executive Director  
02.24.12  Former Sub-Saharan Africa Executive Director 
06.29.12  Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy and Review Department 
 
 
 
Archives: International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C. 
IMF, Issues and Developments in Multilateral Debt and Financing in the Heavily Indebted Countries-
Preliminary Considerations, SM 96/57, 7 February 1995 (IMF Archives). 
IMF, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, EBM 95/ 12, 24 February 1995( IMF Archives). 
IMF, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, EBM 96/ 34,  8 April 1996 (IMF Archives). 
IMF, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997). 
IMF, Analytical Aspects of the Debt Problems of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, SM/96/23, 31 
January 1996 (IMF Archives). 
IMF, Concluding Remarks by the Chairman: Issues and Development in Multilateral Debt and 
Financing for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries-Preliminary Considerations, Executive 
Board Meeting 95/19,  BUFF 95/18 (IMF Archives). 
IMF, Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM 99/43, 16 April 1999. (IMF Archives). 
IMF, Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM 99/95, 30 August 1999 (IMF Archives). 
IMF, Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM 99/102, 13 September 1999 (IMF Archives). 
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